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Abstract 
 
Contemporary political liberalism defends the view that any legitimate law ought to be 
justified to those reasonable citizens subject to it. A standard way in which to accomplish 
this task is to construct a set of public reasons, comprised of constitutional essentials and 
public democratic values, which are then used to justify all political mandates. The 
dissertation begins with a criticism of this process of justification for outcomes of legitimate 
procedures of public decision-making. It argues that given how reasons contribute to 
judgment formation, it is highly optimistic to assume that reasonable consent on procedures 
of collective decision-making  correspond to the justifiability of procedural outcomes. 
Instead, I argue for an ideal of legitimate decision-making which enables each citizen to 
assume a threshold level of personal responsibility for all political decisions made by the 
political collective.  
 
Integrating responsibility into a theory of liberal legitimacy requires a reformulation of the 
rules of public justification. I argue that citizens concerned with making responsible political 
decisions must be allowed to justify their political positions through both reasonable 
judgments as well as sympathetic judgments such as compassion for those who live with 
disability and mercy towards the criminally motivated. The notion of sympathy, as 
formulated by David Hume and expanded by Adam Smith, provides an account of how 
individuals’ ethical evaluations are affected by their ability to be in fellow-feeling with other 
people. A substantial portion of my doctoral thesis considers the situations in which a 
private judgment couched in sympathetic terms can meet political liberalism’s demands of 
publicity and reciprocity.  
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Introduction 
 
‘You all did love him once, not without cause;  
What cause withholds you then to mourn for him?  
O judgement, thou art fled to brutish beasts,  
And men have lost their reason.’1 
 
Shakespeare has Antony direct these words to the Roman public, from a 
forum in which they have gathered to hear the senator Brutus explain the reasons for 
Julius Caesar’s assassination by the Roman senate. Brutus, like Antony, was a close 
friend of Caesar’s. Unlike Antony, he was complicit in Caesar’s murder. In the public 
outrage that follows Caesar’s assassination, Brutus promises his fellow citizens that 
‘public reasons shall be rendered for Caesar’s death.’2  
In offering such public reasons, Brutus stays remarkably close to what 
contemporary political liberals would have considered public reasons suitable for 
political justification. He begins with an account of his private love and friendship 
for Caesar the man. However, Brutus quickly turns to defending the murder, 
claiming that his love for his country, his Roman pride and his firm belief that all 
Roman citizens ought to be free, compelled him to curtail the life of an ambitious 
man who sought to become an emperor and place all Romans in a position of 
                                                          
1
 William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar (III.ii.110 – 113). 
2
 Ibid. (III.ii.8).  
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servitude.3 Although privately facing a divided conscience, he acted by separating 
his private affections for Caesar from the political commitments shared by all 
Romans. Which Roman citizen would prefer slavery with Caesar on the throne, to 
the freedom promised by Caesar’s death?4 In Brutus’ view, Caesar died for the 
freedom of his country, a death Brutus himself is willing to die.5  
Brutus offers a justification which at first appears to appease the Roman 
public. Minutes thereafter, Brutus is forced to flee the capital. Antony takes the 
pulpit and reminds the Roman citizens how Caesar’s conquests had filled the Roman 
treasury,6 and how Caesar loved his fellow Romans.7 He tells them that in his final 
testament, Caesar wrote that all his abundant lands should be used upon his death, 
for the common enjoyment of the Roman populace. 8 Holding up Caesar’s blood-
stained mantle, Antony describes in grisly detail the event of Caesar’s murder. He 
shows the citizens where each of the noble senators had stabbed the dying Caesar9 
and coming upon the cut made by Brutus, Antony declares that it was Caesar’s pain 
at his friend’s betrayal, more so than any physical submission to the will of his 
killers, which finally ‘burst his mighty heart.’10 The once pacified public, now moved 
to pity, is quickly incited to anger.  
Many modern day defenders of public reason would doubtless be moved to 
pity at Brutus’ plight. These defenders uphold the view that when justifying one’s 
                                                          
3
 Ibid. (III.ii.30 – 34). 
4
 Ibid. (III.ii.30). 
5
 Ibid. (III.ii.46 – 48).  
6
 Ibid. (III.ii.97). 
7
 Ibid. (III.ii.151). 
8
 Ibid. (III.ii.258 – 261).  
9
 Ibid. (III.ii.180 – 200).  
10
 Ibid. (III.ii.196). 
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political positions to one’s fellow citizens, one must only appeal to those reasons that 
he or she believes one’s fellow citizens will accept given their status as reasonable 
and rational citizens of a polity in which all citizens are free and equal.11 Public 
reasons are those which appeal to political values and constitutional essentials, (e.g. 
to principles of justice, civil rights or processes of democratic institutions),12 as well 
as those that derive from common sense and the findings of modern science.13 In 
essence they are the shared reason of all citizens qua citizen. 
The ‘qua citizen’ highlights the fact that public reasons are not exhaustive of 
all the reasons a citizen might have for supporting a particular policy. In addition to 
public reasons, a citizen might consider private reasons such as self-interest, and 
non-public reasons such as those found within his or her religious, philosophical or 
moral outlook, or taught by associations to which he or she belongs. However, it is 
understood that the actual process of justifying one’s political position should 
exclude reasons which are not public.14  
In the scene from Julius Caesar just described, Brutus uses public reasons and 
only public reasons to defend his deeds as a Roman senator. Patriotism, Roman 
pride, and commitment to freedom ought to be public values that all Romans can 
embrace qua Roman citizen. From the liberal perspective, Antony appears to use all 
the wrong sorts of reasons. He appeals to the citizens’ self-interest by reminding 
them that Caesar filled the Roman treasury with his conquests. He then appeals to 
                                                          
11
 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 217; John 
Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,’ The University of Chicago Law Review 64 (1997): 765-
807, at p. 770; Samuel Freeman, ‘Public Reason and Political Justifications,’ Fordham Law Review 72 
(2003):2021-2072, at pp. 2031-2032 and p. 2054. 
12
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.223.  
13
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 224. 
14
 Ibid. pp. 217-218. 
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their vanity and their admiration, hoping that Caesar’s love and generosity will win 
their affections. Finally, by flourishing the mantle and painting a horrific picture of 
Caesar’s death, he carefully goads and provokes them until they are inflamed by 
rage. In short, Antony is effective in persuading the Roman populace precisely 
because he does not use public reasons in justifying his position.  
This dissertation is by no means a defence of Antony’s use of emotional and 
rhetorical devices in the public forum. However, it takes seriously an observation of 
Antony’s that Brutus fails to recognize. Antony tells the Roman citizens, ‘You are not 
wood, you are not stones, but men,’ and it is in their capacity as men that the Roman 
citizens are moved to anger and rage on Caesar’s behalf.15 Similarly, this dissertation 
argues that when justifying political positions in accordance with public reasons, 
individuals as well as political institutions do not fully appreciate the fact that the 
conscientious, sympathetic and responsible features of liberal citizenship ought to be 
built into a liberal account of public justification. The standard view of liberal public 
justification focuses on citizens as reasonable and rational agents who are unwilling 
to force fellow citizens to be subject to political powers regulated by other people’s 
private beliefs.16 Although conscientious, sympathetic and responsible agents would 
also hesitate to subject their fellow citizens in this way, they are individuals who 
wish to see the immense power of their political institutions directed towards ends 
which they not only find ‘reasonable’, but also noble, compassionate and indeed, 
right and good. They will be moved by such considerations in addition to concerns 
                                                          
15
 Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, (III.ii.152).  
16
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 48 – 51, 54 – 66.  
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of the reasonableness of public justification. This dissertation argues that they ought 
to be so moved.  
This dissertation offers a critique of pure public reason, but does so while 
defending the view that some form of public reason ought to serve as the normative 
criterion of political legitimacy. By ‘pure public reason,’ I refer to a structure of 
public reason that is reflected in the standard Rawlsian account, along with some 
basic variations of liberal public justification which may be said to fall within the 
Rawlsian paradigm. In this paradigm, public reasons are those reasons which are in 
accordance with a political conception of justice that all citizens can endorse in their 
capacity as free and equal, reasonable and rational agents, engaged in fair social 
cooperation.17 The political conception of justice is informed by the values inherent in 
the public democratic culture of a liberal society.18 They include values like the 
liberty and equality of all citizens, toleration of an array of reasonable religious 
beliefs, and certain views on substantive justice (e.g. the wrongness of slavery.)19 
Public reasons include these public values, and in addition include appeals to the 
constitutional essentials and ideas of basic justice which a political conception of 
justice specifies as legitimate sources of collective power.20  
This dissertation argues that public reason, so conceived, is not sufficiently 
demanding. Far too many political positions become justifiable when public reasons 
are limited to those that stem from a political conception of justice. This leads to high 
levels of reasonable disagreement within political society. Reasonable disagreement 
                                                          
17
 Ibid. pp. 137, 217.  
18Ibid. pp. 8, 14. 
19
 Ibid.  
20Ibid. pp. 137, 217. 
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occurs when reasonable individuals disagree on certain political positions, but accept 
that those who disagree with them maintain a reasonable viewpoint.21 Since a 
reasonable position with which a citizen disagrees is still ‘reasonably justifiable’ to 
the citizen, many citizens become subject to laws with which they disagree on 
reasonable terms. By making public reason more demanding, there will exist fewer 
reasonable disagreements in the public sphere, thereby ensuring that fewer 
individuals are subject to laws with which they reasonably disagree.  
 For example, consider a reasonable and rational citizen who is opposed to 
the death penalty on grounds that it is wrong to take a human life. By the standards 
of pure public reason, although it may be reasonable to oppose the death penalty, it 
is not a requirement of reason to be opposed to it. Reasonable individuals can 
disagree about the merits of capital punishment. Therefore, if an opponent of the 
death penalty lives in a polity where the death penalty is legitimate law, and yet she 
is offered public reasons as to why some reasonable individuals support the death 
penalty, then as far as pure public reason is concerned the death penalty has been 
reasonably justified to her.     
In order to make public reason more demanding, I will propose an alternate 
account of liberal citizenship. In this account citizens are free and equal, reasonable, 
rational, and sympathetic agents, engaged in fair social cooperation. This will make 
public reason more demanding because political positions which may be justifiable 
on traditional Rawlsian grounds may not be justifiable if citizens were to invoke 
other standards of evaluation. Suppose, for example, that the citizen opposed to the 
                                                          
21
 Ibid. p. 55.  
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death penalty feels a kind of moral indignation when she learns of an instance of 
capital punishment. If liberal citizens are conceived as merely free and equal, 
reasonable and rational agents, then the moral indignation felt at the time of the 
execution will not contribute to concerns regarding its justifiability. If public reason 
could somehow demand that all citizens feel such moral indignation, even to a small 
degree, then citizens would have a publicly justifiable reason to oppose the death 
penalty on grounds of their moral indignation. This does not mean that they would 
agree with it. It simply means that they would understand why a reasonable person 
qua citizen could be strongly opposed to it on moral grounds. Furthermore, if 
supporters of the death penalty could be required to respond to such indignation in 
their public justifications, and reassure citizens who feel this indignation that their 
positions as free and equal, moral agents was respected while legitimating such a 
practice, then it would become far more difficult to offer public justifications in 
defence of the death penalty.  In essence, this is what the faculty of sympathy 
contributes to processes of public decision-making.  
The view of sympathy I defend was developed by Adam Smith in ‘The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments.’22 The faculty of sympathy enables a person to imaginatively 
project himself or herself into the shoes of another, to determine the appropriateness 
of the other person’s response to a given situation.23 This means that if a person is 
feeling moral indignation, his or her fellows can imaginatively project themselves 
into the situation of the person feeling indignation, to determine whether this is an 
appropriate response. While the measure of ‘appropriateness’ can still be informed 
                                                          
22
 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press; 2002).  
23Ibid. I.i.1.2. 
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by whether such feelings are reasonable or rational, they can also be measured along 
other domains, such as whether a person is justified in feeling such a response given 
his or her personal struggle in reaching a reflectively stable moral view point. 
Therefore, in lieu of pure public reason, I offer sympathetic public reason as 
the normative criterion of justification in the public sphere. However, I share several 
of Rawls’ moral commitments, such as the idea of political society as a fair system of 
cooperation, and the view that fair terms of cooperation reflect relations of 
reciprocity between citizens.24 By adding the assumption that liberal citizens are 
essentially sympathetic agents, I aim to show that the Rawlsian paradigm is 
equipped to support a criterion of public justification that is more sensitive to 
citizens’ moral sensibilities. My account of sympathetic public reason is meant to 
revise the Rawlsian paradigm of public reason from within a Rawlsian perspective. 
Therefore, I will begin by explaining the moral foundations of pure public reason 
and then go on to outline the nature of my revisions.   
0.1: The Moral Foundations of Pure Public Reason  
This Rawlsian paradigm which supports pure public reason is characterized by a 
contractualist moral grounding of public justification,25 a cognitive account of public 
justification,26 and what may be called a non-cognitive account of political 
                                                          
24
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 16-17.  
25
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 49; Samuel Freeman, ‘The Burdens of Public Justification,’ Politics, 
Philosophy and Economics 6 (2007): 5-43, at pp. 9 and 11.  
26
 Fred D’Agostino, ‘Some Modes of Public Justification,’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 
(1991): 390-414, at pp. 391 – 393; Freeman, ‘Public Reason and Political Justifications,’ pp. 2029 – 
2033 and pp. 2035 – 2045. 
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reasonableness.27 (I will describe these features of public justification in the following 
section.)  
The need for public justification arises from the fact that liberal citizens are 
committed to ensuring that coercive political power reflects the collective power of 
the citizenry.28 They uphold a principle of legitimacy that requires that the 
fundamental principles of justice, along with the constitution and the institutions of 
government, are justifiable to every reasonable citizen.29 In Rawls’ well-known 
formulation, the liberal principle of legitimacy states that: ‘our exercise of political 
power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a 
constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to 
endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and 
rational.’30 
The following is the standard argument against allowing non-public reasons, 
such as those from private morality, into processes of public justification.  When 
citizens face complex ethical or metaphysical questions, they are required to form 
judgments by interpreting vague concepts, assessing complex evidence and making 
difficult practical decisions about the relative weights placed on conflicting reasons.31 
Given the complexity of coming to such judgments, reasonable individuals are likely 
to form judgments which conflict. Such conflict will occur even if reasonable citizens 
are asked to assess the same set of evidence, since each will weigh and interpret it 
                                                          
27
 Freeman, ‘Public Reason and Political Justifications,’ p. 2049; John Rawls, ‘Reply to Habermas,’ 
The Journal of Philosophy, 92 (1995): 132- 180 at pp. 142 – 145. 
28
 Rawls, ‘Reply to Habermas,’ p. 136. 
29
 Ibid. p. 136, 217. 
30
 Ibid. p. 217. 
31
 Ibid. pp. 55 – 56.  
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differently. Given the diversity of personal experience found amongst those who live 
in liberal democracies, the ‘evidence’ on metaphysical and moral questions will also 
be diverse, indicating even less possibility for agreement. Therefore, it must be 
accepted that reasonable people will disagree on questions regarding the 
requirements of morality. A reasonable citizen is someone who acknowledges these 
‘burdens of judgment’ placed on his or her fellows, and will be open to reasonable 
disagreement.32  
Citizens of a liberal polity must determine a way to enable justification 
despite such disagreement. Given the burdens of judgment, however, such 
justification will not succeed if citizens only use their non-public reasons when 
offering justifications. In consequence, reasonable citizens are those who take it as a 
part of their duty as citizens to justify their political positions not only by appealing 
to their own reasons, but also by appealing to public reasons that they believe others 
can accept. This duty is known as political liberalism’s ‘duty of civility.’33 One way 
citizens may fulfil their duty of civility is by adopting public reason as a common 
framework of justification. 
The duty of civility requires citizens ‘to be able to explain to one another on 
those fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate and vote 
for can be supported by the political values of public reason.’34 Citizens accomplish 
this task when they (i) are ready to adopt and explain a criterion of justification 
which they believe other free and equal citizens can accept as a standard by which to 
                                                          
32
 Ibid. pp. 61 – 63.  
33
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 217 and 226. 
34
 Ibid. pp. 217, 226, and 253.  
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justify all political positions;35 and (ii) when they appeal to values which they believe 
‘in good faith’ are acceptable to reasonable and rational citizens.36 This does not mean 
that all reasonable citizens must agree with the content of the justification in order 
for it to fulfil the demands of civility. However, it does require the belief that other 
citizens will be able to see why the view is reasonable.37  
The duty of civility is a moral duty, not a legal duty.38 Its defence requires a 
five step argument, which takes us across a broad spectrum of Rawls’ moral 
commitments for political liberalism. However, it is important to understand this 
defence of the duty of civility, as it illustrates the moral framework in which pure 
public reason is anchored.  
The first step is the idea of political society as a system of fair social 
cooperation amongst free and equal agents. Such cooperation consists in the set of 
rules and procedures that establish the terms of cooperation (i.e. what Rawls would 
call an articulation of the political conception of justice),39 as wells as an ideal of 
reciprocity according to which all are willing to follow the rules of cooperation, if 
they believe others will as well.40 Such an ideal is a necessary condition for 
cooperation to take place. Without it, members of a liberal society would not be able 
to engage in cooperation since in every instance of cooperation, rational citizens 
could face an unfair system of free-riding.  
                                                          
35
 Ibid. p. 226.  
36
 Ibid. p. 236.  
37
 Ibid. p. 253.  
38
 Ibid. p. 217.  
39
 Ibid. p. 16. 
40
 Ibid. pp. 16, 49-50.  
19 
 
In order to see why this is the case, suppose that establishing a practice of 
taxation within a polity requires at least eighty per cent of citizens to be willing to 
pay taxes at any given time. The trouble comes in determining which of the twenty 
per cent of citizens could successfully evade taxation without harming political 
cooperation so far that a revenue system would not be established. If it were left to 
each citizen to determine whether he or she should evade taxes, then presumably all 
citizens would evade taxes knowing that everyone else was likely to do the same. 
However, if some political authority determined which citizens would be excused 
from tax payments, then those citizens forced to pay taxes would feel unfairly 
treated. Those not paying taxes could be said to be free-riding upon those who are. 
Due to these beliefs of unfair treatment, reasonable and rational agents would not 
freely enter into such cooperative enterprises. Therefore, given Rawls’ view of 
political society, every citizen must be committed to adopting the requirements of 
reciprocity, which include offering fair terms and following them if all others do.  
The second step establishes the two moral powers as preconditions for 
reciprocity. The two moral powers are a sense of justice which restrains individuals 
from free-riding upon others’ willingness to follow the rules, and a rational capacity 
to form, revise and pursue a conception of the good.41 Both powers are necessary for 
social cooperation. If a person were rational, but did not possess a sense of justice, 
then she would certainly have incentives not to follow the terms of cooperation and 
not to fulfil the demands of reciprocity. As we have seen, the purpose of reciprocity 
is to enable citizens to overcome problems they would face if they were purely 
                                                          
41
 Ibid. p. 19.  
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rational. This requires a sense of justice as fairness (i.e. the thought, ‘if others have to 
follow the rules, then so must I.’) On the other hand, if citizens possessed a sense of 
justice but no rational conception of the good, their political conception of justice 
would be marked by impartiality, not reciprocity. Reciprocity differs from 
impartiality in that it promises citizens at least some degree of mutual advantage.42 If 
the conception of the liberal citizen were of individuals without the rational moral 
powers, then the promise of mutual advantage would be unnecessary.  
Step three reflects the idea that political institutions must show restraint 
when subjecting citizens to coercive powers, in light of the two moral powers which 
reasonable citizens possess. Having moral powers gives citizens a status which 
Rawls maintains is analogous to the status of having natural rights.43 There are 
different accounts of why moral personhood grants such status. Rawls’ own 
explanation is that having the moral powers is sufficient to affirm the principles of 
justice, and enter the original position.44 The original position is a hypothetical 
situation that reflects conditions for fair political bargaining.45 Those who possess the 
moral powers must therefore be treated like those who formed the initial agreement 
on the political conception of justice. It is in light of their hypothetical participation in 
the hypothetical agreement which requires treatment as equal citizens.46 Moreover, 
                                                          
42
 Ibid. p. 16. 
43
 John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 505fn.  
44
 Ibid p. 505. 
45
 Ibid. pp. 118 – 119.  
46
 Ibid. pp. 505; Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University), p. 20.  
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citizens must be free in order to exercise their rational powers of pursuing a 
conception of the good.47  
One might find such an explanation problematic insofar as the necessary 
preconditions for forming an agreement (even a hypothetical one) in a pre-political 
setting, does not explain why these features ought to translate into political freedom 
and political equality as understood by civil rights and democratic values. After all, 
there are many theories of social contracts in which citizens alienate their natural 
liberty in order to reap the benefits of political society. Hobbes,48 Spinoza49 and some 
interpreters of Rousseau,50 see citizens as being free in the state of nature, but subject 
to sovereign authority within the public sphere, without an account of civil rights as 
Rawls would imagine. Further explanation is required to complete the Rawlsian 
story as to why those who choose to engage in free and equal cooperation would 
expect to maintain this status during the cooperative enterprise. Other liberals have 
tried to supply such explanations. Charles Larmore, for example, offers one such 
explanation by utilizing a neo-Kantian interpretation of the Rawlsian framework.51 
He argues that the requirement of political restraint comes from respecting the 
capacity for reasoning found in those with the two moral powers. Using coercive 
                                                          
47
 Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, pp. 21-22. 
48
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 
Chapter 28. 
49
 Benedictus de Spinoza, Political Treatise, ed. R.H.M. Elwes (New York, NY: Cosimo Inc., 2005). 
On p. 302 Spinoza writes, ‘We see then, that every citizen depends not on himself, but on the 
commonwealth, all whose commands he is bound to execute, and has no right to decide, what is 
equitable or iniquitous, just or unjust. But, on the contrary, as the body of the dominion should, so to 
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force upon reasonable and rational agents without their consent would be treating 
them ‘merely as means, as objects of coercion, and not also as ends, engaging directly 
their distinctive capacity as persons.’52 However, employing a Kantian argument is 
not necessary. The idea that citizens must all have civil liberties and political equality 
is so fundamental to political liberalism, that we may simply take it as a starting 
position.  
Step four of the defence of civility aims to determine a conception of the 
legitimate uses of coercive power that is compatible with the restraints that political 
institutions are required to show towards reasonable citizens, in light of their moral 
status. One way to do this would be to require that all legitimate uses of political 
power must emanate from the reasonable consensus of the citizenry. However, given 
that liberals acknowledge the burdens of judgment, they must also acknowledge the 
existence of a plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, where a 
comprehensive doctrine articulates all the values (public, non-public and private) 
which a citizen might adopt.53 It is consistent with liberalism to think of reasonable 
pluralism as a ‘fact’ that must be accommodated in theories of legitimacy, in order to 
show respect for the free and equal status of all citizens of a liberal polity.54  
Reasonable philosophical and moral pluralism is a ‘fact’ of liberal society in at 
least two ways. From the perspective of the individual, they reflect the ‘burdens of 
judgment’ which individuals face when coming to reflectively stable attitudes on 
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their moral and philosophical views.55 However, reasonable pluralism may also be 
seen as a fact of free human reason itself.56 When citizens are free to reflect and 
deliberate on their views, they will be able to accept that many different sorts of 
beliefs can be supported by common human reason. In this second view, pluralism 
demonstrates that the political institutions of liberal society are indeed the 
institutions of a free society, not ‘an unfortunate condition of human life.’57 The more 
moral disagreement a liberal polity can accommodate while maintaining political 
stability and a general level of respect for the views of each citizen, the more liberals 
can be certain that citizens are free to ‘form, revise and pursue their own conceptions 
of the good,’ and equal to all other citizens in such a pursuit.58 Therefore, it is 
important to have a conception of legitimacy which is consonant with institutions 
that can nurture and sustain a plurality of moral and ethical viewpoints within their 
society. 
The way political liberals reconcile the conflicting objectives of reasonable 
consensus with reasonable disagreement is to mandate that all uses of political 
power are at least justifiable to all reasonable citizens.59 This forms the essence of the 
liberal principle of legitimacy. It offers citizens a platform by which to subject their 
fellows to the coercive powers of institutions they support, while respecting their 
fellows as free and equal, reasonable and rational. One of the core concerns of 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation is the extent to which pure public reason achieves the 
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reconciliation of pluralism and consensus sought by the liberal principle of 
legitimacy.  
Finally, it is only when one accepts the necessity of the liberal principle of 
legitimacy that the moral force of the duty of civility becomes apparent. If citizens 
must seek to justify the coercive power of their political society on reasonable terms, 
they must be willing to justify their own positions to others, and they must do so on 
terms that other reasonable citizens can identify as good reasons for action. These 
terms serve as the content of pure public reasoning. They include constitutional 
essentials, the principles of justice and the political conception of justice.60 The 
political conception of justice in turn, includes the basic institutions of political 
society and the correlative ethical principles and norms by which they are 
governed.61 These principles and norms secure their normative force from the fact 
that public political culture already has at its disposal several democratic ideas and 
values that are shared by all citizens.62  
Rawls writes that his account of public reason (what I am calling ‘pure public 
reason’) is public in three ways. It is public insofar as all citizens can access its 
content by appeal to a shared conception of justice (which includes democratic 
values and constitutional procedures). It is public insofar as its subject is the content 
of constitutional essentials and political justice. Finally it is public insofar as it is the 
reasoning which has normative authority in the public sphere.63 Ultimately, then, the 
content of pure public reason will always be the values of public democratic culture. 
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This once again highlights the fact that public justification is justification to a citizen 
qua citizen and not to a citizen qua individual. An individual may or may not fully 
agree with every value of public democratic culture. A public value like ‘freedom of 
expression’ or ‘the right not to testify against one’s spouse’ might be something that a 
citizen takes for granted as having normative force. Although a citizen may find 
these values reasonable, she may not have actually gone through the process of 
determining how precisely these rules fit into her private moral or philosophical 
views.  
This also means, however, that when a public value conflicts with a private 
belief, a reasonable justification will only be couched in terms of public values. For 
example, if a person were opposed to abortion on grounds that her moral beliefs led 
her to believe that abortion was murder,64 then if there was public deliberation on 
whether or not to prohibit abortion, she could not appeal to her moral commitments 
as a reason to prohibit abortion. In fact, from the perspective of pure public reason, it 
would be unreasonable for this citizen to reject any justification supported by public 
reason, on grounds that it did not take into account the possibility that abortion was 
murder. She could argue that the practice of abortion showed a miserable lack of 
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respect for human life,65 but the moral claim of the murderous nature of abortion 
would not be a suitable concern for public reason.  
In a critique of this view of public justification, Raz writes that 
‘reasonableness, or its absence, is measured by the content of the views held, not the 
rationality of holding them.’66 It is a critique in the sense that one is left to wonder 
whether the justificatory requirement has actually been fulfilled. In the case of our 
citizen with strong moral views against abortion, even if all she had been taught and 
had experienced in life made her believe that abortion was murderous, she would 
have to accept abortion as justifiable if it were sufficiently supported by public 
reasons.67 This in short, is what is meant by political reasonableness being non-
cognitive.68 No citizen needs to believe that a politically reasonable justification is 
justified from the perspective of his or her own psychology or capacity for rational 
evaluation. It is not reasonableness from the perspective of any given citizen. Rather, 
just as economists might conceptualize homo economicus to be a rational, utility-
maximizing agent, political liberals understand reasonable citizens as possessing 
political reasonableness; a kind of reasonableness that is reflected in the pure public 
reason of their particular polity. This derives from their conception as free and equal 
agents participating in social cooperation.69 
However, Rawlsians avoid this problem by offering a cognitive account of 
public justification itself. In a cognitive account of justification, a particular 
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proposition is justifiable because an individual has reasons that necessitate her 
acceptance of the reasons given for justification. More precisely a public justification 
is cognitive when we hold that given a proposition P:  ‘[P] is publicly justified for A 
and for B when we have identified beliefs which mandate the acceptance of [P]. (A 
and B accept [P] because doing so is demanded by their belief(s).’70 If P is in accord 
with political reasonableness, and the duty of civility demands that citizens be 
politically reasonable, and all reasonable and rational citizens have private reasons 
by which they can accept the duty of civility, then P must be publicly justified.  
This conveys a cognitive account of political reasonableness from the 
Rawlsian conception of a liberal citizen. Rawls can also guarantee that pure public 
reason meets the criteria of a cognitive account of public justification, given the 
beliefs of actual citizens. This is because a political conception of justice must be 
justified in accordance with three forms of justification, only one of which is public 
justification in accordance with political reasonableness. In addition, a conception of 
justice must be ‘freestanding’ such that anyone who possesses common human 
reason can find it justifiable. The idea is that citizens of any liberal polity should be 
able to understand why the political conception of justice in all other liberal polities is 
reasonable, even if such conceptions are different from the conception of justice 
which they have experienced growing up. For example, although the constitution of 
the United States grants residual powers to states, while the constitution of Canada 
grants residual powers to the federal government, the citizens of the United States 
should be able to recognize the reasonableness of the Canadian constitution from the 
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perspective of common human reason, in a way that they would not be able to 
recognize the reasonableness of the justificatory criterion of say, the Spanish 
Inquisition. Rawls calls this sort of justification pro tanto justification.71 
In addition to political reasonableness and pro tanto justification from the 
perspective of common human reason, Rawls declares that political conceptions of 
justice must also undergo full justification. This occurs when all reasonable citizens 
can situate a political conception of justice within their reasonable comprehensive 
doctrine.72 This does not mean that a political conception of justice must be 
acceptable from every reasonable perspective. Sometimes a citizen may be required 
to revise her private beliefs in order to accommodate the political conception of 
justice. If a political conception of justice has undergone full justification, then all 
citizens really do possess beliefs that cognitively justify any politically reasonable 
justification. This is because citizens have justified the political conception of justice, 
and pure public reason is embedded within this political conception.  
Therefore, in the case of the citizen who finds the practice of abortion 
murderous, a Rawlsian would argue that since this citizen (as a liberal citizen) 
believes in reasonable disagreement, and since she anchors political legitimacy in an 
ideal of reciprocity and fair social cooperation, and because the political conception 
of justice is fully justified, this citizen must also be committed to pure public reason 
as a shared criterion of justification.73 When weighing her reasons for accepting a 
public justification against her private reasons for not accepting it, the citizen might 
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privately (and cognitively) believe the content of public justification is unjustified. 
However she is aware that the criterion used in this evaluation is her private moral 
perspective. At the same time, she is aware that there is another evaluative criterion 
which finds abortion justifiable, namely pure public reason. As a reasonable citizen 
who affirms a public conception of justice, she also believes that when weighing the 
two criteria against each other, it ought to be public reason which has normative 
authority in the public sphere and not her private moral doctrine. Moreover, she 
believes this both as a reasonable citizen and as a private citizen with the two moral 
powers.  
Rawlsians believe that this is what gives public reason its normative authority 
over non-public reasons when reasonable citizens are making political decisions. 
Samuel Freeman explains this authority of public reason as follows:  
 
‘[N]ot all reasonable people or reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines are always capable of accepting the politically 
reasonable resolution to constitutional disputes provided by 
public reason as informed by a political conception of justice. 
Is this a problem for Rawls? It will be a problem only if, as a 
result of their inability to accept the political resolution by 
public reason for one or more constitutional issues (e.g. 
regarding abortion), they are led to reject public reason itself 
in all other cases.’74 
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Finally acting in accordance with pure public reason reflects a contractualist 
account of moral motivation. Scanlon’s well-known contractualist criterion of 
wrongness claims that ‘an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances 
would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour 
that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general 
agreement.’75 According to Rawls, his account of political reasonableness shares the 
same psychological motivation as Scanlon’s contractualist criterion.76 This is the 
motivation that the individuals in question have a desire ‘to live with others on terms 
that they could not reasonably reject insofar as they also are motivated by this 
ideal.’77  
The five-step Rawlsian defence of the duty of civility establishes precisely 
this, although Rawls believes liberals can also build this desire into the psychology of 
a reasonable citizen.78 The five step procedure shows that liberal legitimacy and the 
duty of civility are generated by citizens’ common objective of engaging in a 
cooperative enterprise with fellow citizens, while treating them as free and equal, 
reasonable and rational agents. The willingness to justify uses of political power to 
each other on reasonable terms and the willingness to resolve their political 
differences in a manner consonant with an ideal of reciprocity also reflects the 
mutual recognition by citizens of their free and equal status and their united 
cooperative enterprise of constructing a political society regulated by a public 
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conception of justice. I will say more about this relationship in Chapter 6 of this 
dissertation.   
0.2: An Overview of the Argument of the Dissertation  
In this dissertation, I argue that public reason in its standard Rawlsian form is too 
weak a criterion for justification. It holds positions justifiable that ought not to be 
publicly justified. It does so by not offering citizens engaged in public reasoning 
enough ‘defeaters’ in their public deliberations. If someone holds the view P on 
grounds RA, a ‘defeater’ is a reason RB which gives that person a reason not to hold 
P.79 In order for RB to defeat RA, it must be the case that the person who holds RA 
actually also holds RB, that RA and RB are logically consistent with each other, and that 
the conjunction of RA and RB provide reason not to believe P.80  
The abortion example utilized by Rawls and Raz can show how such 
‘defeaters’ are meant to work in public reasoning. If a person is pro-choice on 
grounds that in the first trimester the equality of women is clearly a more significant 
concern than respect for the life of the foetus and the continuity of the political 
population,81 then we could call the pro-choice stance P, and RA would be the greater 
weight placed on equality for women, than on respect for life and intergenerational 
political continuity. However, suppose modern science were to discover that foetuses 
have psychological capacities or biological functions much more akin to infants than 
we at first realized. Suppose this discovery suggests that foetuses might have 
interests that we originally would not have ascribed to them, and that it is reasonable 
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to believe that the government ought to protect these interests. For some people, this 
new evidence could serve as a reason RB which would ‘defeat’ RA by becoming the 
more serious consideration in their views regarding abortion.  
In this dissertation, I aim to show that there exist many reasons that are 
consistent with the Rawlsian justificatory framework and that would operate as 
defeaters in several instances, which cannot do so because their normative authority 
in the public sphere is not properly recognized. Although compatible with the 
Rawlsian justificatory framework, they are mistakenly considered non-public. The 
sorts of reasons that I have in mind are those that derive from the sympathetic 
imagination of liberal citizens. These reasons include the moral outlook of individual 
citizens as considered from the perspective of other citizens. I will argue that these 
reasons can be sufficiently public in the Rawlsian sense described above.  
Chapter 1 begins with the observation that citizens of a liberal polity feel 
responsible for the legitimate actions of their own political institutions in a way that 
they do not feel responsible for the legitimate actions of other political institutions. I 
argue that if the legitimacy of a government’s action is merely determined by 
justification in accordance with pure public reason, then this sense of responsibility is 
unwarranted. However, the wording of the liberal principle of legitimacy makes 
pure public reason a necessary but insufficient condition for political legitimacy (i.e. 
an exercise of power is justified ‘only if’, but not ‘if’, it is in accord with public 
reason.)82 Since pure public reason is not a sufficient condition for legitimacy, there 
may be reasons independent of pure public reason which warrant beliefs regarding 
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citizens’ responsibility. My strategy for determining whether such responsibility is in 
fact warranted is to examine different candidates for responsibility and determine if 
any are consistent with those felt by citizens of a liberal polity. If one conception of 
responsibility is consistent with liberal legitimacy and follows from the moral 
foundations of political liberalism (i.e. reciprocity, legitimacy, fairness, etc.), then we 
can be certain that feelings of such responsibility are warranted. After all, in such a 
case, reasons for feeling responsibility would derive from the same preconditions as 
the content of political reasonableness, indicating that responsibility would exist 
whenever political reasonableness did.  
I identify the kind of responsibility felt by liberal citizens as a form of 
outcome-responsibility. This means that citizens believe themselves to be responsible 
for the actions of their political institutions on grounds that they have somehow 
contributed to the state of affairs in which their government has legitimately pursued 
a particular course of action. There are three conceptions of outcome-responsibility 
which could be suitable candidates for liberal responsibility: collective outcome-
responsibility, in which citizens are responsible for the legitimate actions of their 
government by virtue of being members of a particular collective; hierarchical 
outcome-responsibility in which citizens are responsible for the legitimate actions of 
their government by virtue of being representatives of the liberal polity or 
representatives of a subgroup of the polity; and personal outcome-responsibility, in 
which citizens are responsible for the legitimate actions of their government as a 
consequence of their own agency. 
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 I show that politically reasonable, liberal citizens cannot believe themselves 
to have collective outcome-responsibility or hierarchical outcome-responsibility. I 
then argue that there exists an account of personal outcome responsibility which is 
not only consistent with political liberalism, but logically derives from the ideal of 
reciprocity and the liberal principle of legitimacy. According to this derivation, it is 
necessarily the case that every reasonable and rational citizen who is a free and equal 
member of a liberal political society must be held personally responsible for the 
legitimacy of every legitimate use of political power. In well-regulated liberal 
societies where a government only pursues a course of action if it is legitimate, this 
derivation would make every reasonable and rational citizen responsible for every 
legitimate use of political power.  
This indicates that not only is it warranted that liberal citizens feel a sense of 
responsibility for the legitimate actions of their political institutions, but moreover, 
anyone committed to the values of reciprocity and the liberal principle of legitimacy 
must therefore accept that citizens have this form of responsibility. Certainly every 
reasonable citizen should recognize this kind personal responsibility. Since pure 
public reason derives from these same conceptions of reciprocity and liberal 
legitimacy, whenever the preconditions for pure public reason hold, the account of 
liberal responsibility I propose must also hold.  
In the final section of Chapter 1, I argue that this leads to what I call the 
Problem of Conscience. The Problem of Conscience arises when an individual’s 
moral judgment is at odds with what the individual finds politically reasonable and 
publicly justifiable. Given my argument in Chapter 1, although pure public reason 
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can justify actions which are contrary to some citizens’ nonpublic moral views, such 
citizens are still asked to take responsibility for the legitimacy of these actions. It is no 
longer the case that those who find abortion or just wars or high tax rates immoral 
are simply required to determine their political reasonableness. My argument in 
Chapter 1 shows that they are also required to take personal responsibility for the 
political legitimacy of these practices.  
There are three variations of the Problem of Conscience: the Tragic 
Conscience, the Brutish Conscience and the Clear Conscience. The Problem of the 
Tragic Conscience arises when citizens accept responsibility for the legitimacy of the 
actions of their political institutions, and in consequence confront a moral dilemma 
about affirming these same institutions’ legitimacy. If citizens believe that political 
institutions are committing morally abhorrent acts in the form of allowing abortion, 
fighting just wars, or creating big government, they may feel the need to cope with 
their guilt by being unreasonable and not accepting that justification in accordance 
with pure public reason ought to have normative value in the public sphere. By 
being politically unreasonable, they no longer need to accept responsibility for the 
legitimate actions of legitimate institutions.  
In doing so they will no longer have the contractualist moral motivation 
Rawls ascribes to them. They will be unwilling to offer fair terms of cooperation, 
since they know that these terms will lead to the legitimacy of practices that defy 
their conscience. However, in becoming unreasonable citizens, they will defy another 
feature of their own conscience, namely their sense of justice. Their consciences are 
thereby divided. I term this state of conscience ‘Tragic’ in the sense that a citizen 
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must make a tragic choice between affirming politically reasonable courses of actions 
along with the institutions that execute them, and the commitments of their own 
private morality.  
The Problem of the Brutish Conscience arises when citizens’ private 
moralities contradict the legitimate actions of their political institutions, and yet these 
citizens do not feel the guilt, regret or moral confusion faced by those with the Tragic 
Conscience. Consider again the citizen who was privately anti-abortion on the 
grounds that abortion was murder. Suppose she found the practice of abortion 
politically reasonable, and therefore did not feel any guilt at taking responsibility for 
the legitimacy of such practices. Other citizens who also believe that abortion is 
murderous are then left to wonder how this citizen can be willing to take 
responsibility for its legitimacy. Their alarm is not just based on their own belief that 
abortion is wrong. They believe that the citizen in question must be a brute because 
she recognizes a practice as murder, and yet has no qualms about taking 
responsibility for its legitimacy.  
Finally, the Problem of the Clear Conscience arises when a liberal citizen has 
to make several sacrifices in order to reconcile her private conscience with the 
acceptance of public responsibility. For example, suppose our pro-life advocate who 
affirms pure public reason can no longer accept herself as a true Churchgoer. She 
leaves her church, and in doing so alienates her family, friends and neighbors, and 
has to pursue a completely new life independently of many things she values and 
holds dear. She has a clear conscience in the sense that she has been able to reconcile 
her religious beliefs with the duty of civility. However, given the level of her 
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sacrifice, her fellow citizens might rightly question whether it is right to burden her 
so. The clear conscience of this one citizen burdens the consciences of all her fellow 
citizens.  
Chapters 2 – 5 of my dissertation are devoted to determining an appropriate 
solution to these Problems of Conscience. Liberals have often tried to resolve 
disparities between citizens’ public and private reasoning by appealing to ‘higher-
order’ frameworks of impartiality to achieve reconciliation between reasonable 
disagreements.83 In Chapter 2, I consider procedural legitimacy as a reasonable and 
publicly justifiable ‘higher-order’ framework by which to impose obligations on 
others in a fair manner. The existence of weighty moral obligations to follow the law 
could potentially solve the Problem of Conscience, by making it clear that in most 
cases of discrepancy between private and public reasoning, private morality would 
require deference to public reason.  
This strategy does not always circumvent the Problem of Conscience but at 
first sight, serves to diminish it considerably. One can see this by considering a 
simple case: Suppose that individuals who have disagreed on a particular course of 
action all agree to flip a fair coin in order to determine a course that all could accept 
as fair. This coin flip now serves as a procedure of fair decision-making. Given a 
particular outcome of the coin flip, we could say that by virtue of having agreed to 
the coin flip, all concerned are causally responsible for the fact that the outcome has 
normative authority. There is a reason why every member of the collective ought to 
follow the procedure’s dictates. However, in assigning responsibility for the 
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normative authority of the outcome, we would say that each individual was 
personally responsible for the normative authority of the collective decision-making 
procedure, not the normative authority of the collective decision itself. The 
normative authority of the collective decision stems from the ‘pure procedural 
legitimacy’ of the legitimate procedures. This means that collective decisions are 
authorized only because they are the result of legitimate procedures.  
This diminishes the Problem of Conscience in the sense that those with tragic 
or brutish consciences are no longer taking responsibility for the legitimacy of 
abortions or just wars or large governments. They are simply taking responsibility 
for the constitutional essentials and democratic procedures which generated these 
outcomes, and recognizing a moral duty to abide by them. As for the Problem of the 
Clear Conscience, although reasonable pluralism requires citizens to impose burdens 
on their fellow citizens, and makes each citizen responsible for any problems of 
conscience which arise, citizens might take some comfort in knowing that they at 
least treated their fellow citizens in a manner that was fair from the perspective of 
every reasonable citizen, including the citizen suffering from a burden of conscience. 
This sense of fairness arises from the fact that the procedures by which citizens 
choose to resolve conflicting claims are ‘legitimate procedures’ that they have reason 
to believe could be reasonably justified to all citizens subject to them.  
In Chapter 2, I argue that invoking pure procedural legitimacy raises several 
problems and does not sufficiently solve the Problem of Conscience. I show that a 
justificatory framework of public decision-making cannot simultaneously respect all 
of the following: (i) individuals’ burdens of judgment; (ii) the moral duty to obey 
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legitimate procedural outcomes; and (iii) the rights associated with questioning 
legitimate authority (e.g. civil disobedience or conscientious refusal). Accepting all 
three elements into a framework of legitimacy makes it ambiguous when there is a 
moral requirement to follow the law and when this requirement can be permissibly 
undermined by competing claims. I argue that liberals must give up a strong 
commitment to (ii), the duty to obey legitimate procedural outcomes.  
Therefore, Rawlsians must resolve the Problem of Conscience without 
appealing to pure procedural legitimacy. A second way to solve the Problem of 
Conscience is to add conditions to pure public reason that do not legitimate so many 
practices that are contrary to conscience. The problem with pure public reason, as I 
see it, is that it is not sufficiently demanding for a criterion of justification. Pure 
public reason is weak. Further conditions must be added to a criterion of justification 
in order to make it stronger. By placing further conditions on pure public reason, we 
ensure that some of the views standardly considered politically reasonable are not 
publicly reasonable in a framework of fair cooperation. We strengthen pure public 
reason by making it more demanding. This, in turn, enables us to go much farther 
towards solving the Problem of Conscience.  
Consider once more the issue of abortion. The traditional formulation of the 
problem of abortion is that it is publicly justifiable and politically reasonable, despite 
the fact that the practice conflicts with individuals’ consciences. I will argue that 
there exists a normative theory of justification that is consistent with reciprocity, 
fairness and publicity, which also takes the aforementioned burdens on individuals’ 
consciences into account. Reasonable and rational citizens with the two moral 
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powers can affirm this second criterion of justifiability as easily and conscientiously 
as they can affirm pure public reason. This alternative criterion of justification meets 
all of the moral demands of pure public reason. However, it has the additional 
benefit that it does not legitimate all practices without taking due consideration for 
individual conscience. This means it has all the virtues of pure public reason, plus 
resolves the Problem of Conscience.  
The alternative to pure public reason which I offer is ‘sympathetic public 
reason.’ I develop the idea of a sympathetic liberalism in Chapter 3. After giving a 
brief overview of Adam Smiths’ theory of sympathy, I draw three parallels between 
Smith’s account of sympathy and Rawls’ account of fairness. The purpose of drawing 
these parallels is to show Rawlsians that their basic moral and political commitments 
will be respected if they adopt sympathetic public reason as their criterion of 
justifiability. As sympathetic public reason is a restriction of pure public reason, all of 
the moral foundations of pure public reason must be respected in the sympathetic 
account.  
The first of these parallels involves Smith and Rawls’ conceptions of justice. I 
argue that Rawlsian justice as fairness shares an important feature with Smiths’ 
moral theory, namely that both are meant to supply rules that regulate fair social 
cooperation. The second and third parallels involve Smith’s impartial spectator, a 
heuristic by which Smith explains the impartiality of moral judgment in human 
psychology, as well as in the nature of human conscience.84 I first show that the 
normative status of Smith’s impartial spectator meets the demands of justice based in 
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reciprocity. Then I argue that the standpoint of public reason (whether pure or 
impure) can be interpreted as a kind of spectator theory.  
In the Rawlsian paradigm, political reasonableness and public justification 
operate at two levels. Firstly, during public deliberation on particular collective 
decisions (e.g. the decision to make abortions legally permissible or to wage a just 
war) reasonable citizens appeal to others’ political reasonableness when trying to 
justify their political positions to each other. This is what enables citizens to fulfil 
their duty of civility in accordance with reciprocity.85 At another level, political 
reasonableness and public justification are meant to affirm the conception of justice 
itself, along with its derivative democratic values and constitutional procedures.86 In 
this regard, Rawls separates public justification from pro tanto justification (from the 
perspective of common human reason) and full justification (from the perspective of 
individuals’ comprehensive moral doctrines). Public justification is strictly from the 
political perspective.87  
I take the sympathetic public reason I propose to be one form of empathetic 
judgment-formation. In Chapter 4 I follow Martha Nussbaum and Robert Goodin in 
arguing that individuals’ capacity for empathy can serve as the basis of reasonable 
judgments. However, I argue that if a Citizen A comes to an empathetic judgment 
whose subject is a Citizen B, then in order for such a judgment to be publicly 
justifiable, it must be the case that a third citizen, Citizen C, is required on politically 
reasonable grounds, to consider the situation of B, merely because of A’s empathy for 
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B. I then show that this condition of public justifiability is met when an empathetic 
judgment is shown to respond to the demands of liberal ideals of publicity and 
reciprocity.  
In Chapters 4 and 5, I argue that sympathetic public reason also enables 
justification at these two distinct levels. In Chapter 4, I consider the publicity of 
sympathetic justification during political deliberation. In particular, I consider two 
ways in which sympathetic judgments might fail to satisfy the criterion of public 
justification which I defend in Chapter 3. I call these two types of failures, failures of 
judgment and failures of publicity. Failures of judgment occur when Citizen C 
believes that the sympathetic judgment formed by Citizen A is unreasonable or 
inappropriate. Failures of publicity occur when Citizen A forms a reasonable and 
appropriate sympathetic judgment, but cannot actually make it public because the 
judgment is based on a subjective emotional experience.  
I address these issues in Chapter 4 and conclude by showing what sorts of 
considerations must be taken into account in justifications that are in accord with 
sympathetic public reason. I argue that the imaginative capacity built into 
sympathetic public reason enables much greater weight to be placed on the reasons 
generated by individuals’ personal narratives. In particular, the deliberative 
struggles that lead to the formation of stable moral comprehensive doctrines become 
public with the introduction of sympathy into public reasoning. In effect, this 
expands the pool of reasons which may be said to be shared by reasonable citizens.  
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Finally, in Chapter 5, I consider the moral obligations that would inform a 
conception of justice, were it to be justified in accordance with sympathetic public 
reason as opposed to pure public reason. I argue that two obligations would be 
generated by what I call a ‘sympathetic liberalism.’ The first obligation I defend 
ensures that an account of political reasonableness is consistent with those aspects of 
an individual’s personal narrative that are identifiable as experiences common to and 
appropriate for free and equal reasonable citizens. The second obligation requires 
citizens to show each other a form of respect consonant with the self-worth each 
citizen would need to bring to the cooperative enterprise, if the citizen were to be 
viewed as an equal partner.  
After defending these obligations, I show how sympathetic public reason 
within the framework of the sympathetic liberalism I propound resolves the Problem 
of Conscience. I show that while sympathetic liberalism requires the collective to 
give individuals liberty in matters of personal morality, it also requires individual 
choices regarding issues like abortion to be the subject of intense public deliberation. 
The purpose of such deliberation is not to badger individuals towards making 
particular choices, but to make certain that individuals understand and respect the 
sorts of moral concerns that reasonable fellow citizens have about the choices that 
they make.  
Furthermore, sympathetic liberalism aspires to justify collective decisions to 
individuals qua individuals and not merely qua citizens; but it also spells out the sorts 
of obligations a collective might have towards an individual who cannot accept the 
justification offered. For example, a Pacifist may not receive justification for just 
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wars, but sympathy-based respect for the Pacifist requires the collective to 
accommodate pacifism in other aspects of legitimate decision-making. There is more 
room for negotiation within justification in accordance with sympathetic public 
reason, but the negotiation is undertaken on grounds of respect for citizens, an 
understanding of their private moral views, concern that these views are expressed 
in collective decisions to the greatest degree possible, and an attitude of sympathy 
towards the life narratives that generated such views. Overall, I argue that 
sympathetic public reason moves closer to a respectful convergence of beliefs that 
citizens can accept as individuals, and not just as citizens.   
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Chapter 1: Legitimacy and Responsibility88 
 
Let us begin to look at the question of citizens’ responsibility by considering a case in 
which reasonable citizens of a liberal polity respond with feelings of pride, guilt or 
shame at the legitimate conduct of their political institutions. The case I would like to 
consider is that of civilian attitudes towards legitimate humanitarian intervention in 
just wars. The case I will be considering is an idealized case, since in any actual 
military enterprise there may always be some reasonable disagreement about the 
justness of participation. However, the case is meant to reflect attitudes and beliefs 
that we might reasonably expect reasonable citizens of a liberal polity to possess 
towards wars they all agree are just. I will describe the case in some detail, as I intend 
to refer to this particular case in later chapters of the thesis. I will call the case, ‘The 
Humanitarian and the Pacifist.’ 
Imagine a liberal polity with at least two reasonable citizens. The polity 
decides to engage in a military effort that is widely regarded as a humanitarian 
intervention. Prior to making the decision to go to war, there is public deliberation in 
which public reasons are offered by both reasonable advocates and reasonable 
opponents of the war. The decision to go to war is made through all the legitimate 
institutional channels, as described by the polity’s constitution. Furthermore, every 
assurance is given to citizens that the war can and will be fought with appropriate 
regard for the rules of the Geneva Convention and other military codes which pure 
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public reason maintains are acceptable standards for intervention. Finally, all 
reasonable citizens agree that the war is a just war.  
From the perspective of pure public reason, the war is politically reasonable 
and therefore the decision to fight the war is legitimate. Reasonable citizens can still 
disagree on whether or not the polity ought to go to war since some reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines may judge all wars to be unethical (e.g. Quakerism or 
Pacifism). All reasonable citizens must agree, however, that under the circumstances 
going to war is politically reasonable. This means that such an action would be 
justifiable from the perspective of citizens who accept the fact of reasonable 
pluralism and the need to offer fair terms of cooperation to their fellow citizens.  
Suppose that one of the reasonable citizens is a Humanitarian. This citizen 
believes that it is not only politically reasonable to fight the war, but also morally 
required, since without engaging in the war, innocent people will suffer 
dehumanizing treatment. One of the Humanitarian’s fellow citizens is a Pacifist. 
From the Pacifist’s non-public moral perspective, fighting any war is morally 
impermissible. Grounding the Pacifist’s view is the belief that intentionally 
performing actions which can take away a human life is morally impermissible. 
When it is pointed out to the Pacifist that people will necessarily die if there is no 
humanitarian intervention, the Pacifist replies that causing human casualties is much 
worse than allowing casualties to occur.89 However, even the Pacifist agrees that it is 
politically reasonable to fight such a war.  
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Given the above scenario, let us make one further assumption for the purpose 
of analysing civic responsibility. Let us imagine that while the Humanitarian takes 
pride in the actions of the polity (call it Polity A), the Pacifist feels guilty at the 
prospect of her country inflicting casualties on other people. However, when the 
Humanitarian and the Pacifist each learn that citizens of another polity, Polity B, 
have reached the same collective decision on similar grounds, they do not feel similar 
levels of pride or guilt.  
What is noteworthy is that in both Polity A and Polity B, the reasoning which 
justified the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention was the result of pure public 
reasons embedded in a political conception of justice. Such conceptions of justice are 
freestanding,90  which means they are accessible from the perspective of common 
human reason.91 Therefore, the Humanitarian and the Pacifist can recognize the 
reasonableness of intervention from the perspective of both Polity A and Polity B. If 
they are acquainted with the political culture of Polity B, they can also assess the 
reasoning from the perspective of Polity B’s public democratic culture. Once they do 
this, they realize that the reasoning which justified the legitimacy of war in both 
Polity A and Polity B is not the actual reasoning of either the Humanitarian or the 
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Pacifist. The Humanitarian believes that both polities ought to go to war because 
military intervention is morally required. The Pacifist accepts that the polities ought 
to go to war because fairness and the duty of civility demand intervention. However, 
she believes that all war is morally wrong.  
If a reasonable liberal citizen can have an emotional response to the 
legitimacy of a public decision in her own country and not the legitimacy of the same 
decision in a foreign country, then we are left with a puzzle. When the Humanitarian 
and the Pacifist were offered public reasons justifying intervention in Policy A, the 
reasons they were offered were reasons which stemmed from a political conception 
of justice that they could reasonably be expected to endorse.92 While they recognized 
the normative force of the public reasons to guide decisions in the public sphere, they 
each had non-public, moral reasons which they considered far weightier than the 
public reasons offered. We would therefore assume that the Humanitarian and the 
Pacifist would have similar attitudes towards the war effort, regardless of whether it 
was Polity A or Polity B that chose to go to war. Why then should they have an 
emotional response in one case and not the other? Could such a discrepancy between 
emotional responses be warranted by the beliefs that citizens feel responsible for the 
legitimate decisions of their own polity, in a way which they would not feel 
responsible for the decisions of foreign polities?  
No doubt there could be myriad explanations as to why such emotions might 
exist. A citizen may feel guilty or proud because she has influenced the process 
which led to intervention. She may believe that her association with those who made 
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the decision makes her culpable or liable by association. A third explanation for such 
feelings is what Joel Feinberg would call a kind of ‘vicarious liability.’ He claims that 
if we are close enough to a person who is the object of shame or contempt, we feel 
‘for him’ even if he is unaware of our attitudes.93 Feinberg claims, for example, that 
the foolish actions of a stranger might generate contempt, even though those same 
actions performed by a friend would affect us with a level of vicarious shame.94 In 
this view, it is possible to have such feelings towards one’s compatriots.95 This would 
explain the asymmetry in the Humanitarian and Pacifist’s responses by the fact that 
they simply do not have the requisite association with the citizens of Polity B to 
respond emotionally to their decision.  
My concern, however, is that emotions like pride and guilt can be interpreted 
as forms of self-appraisal.96 Such appraisal could either be caused by the direct 
involvement with a particular act, or belief that one is associated with an action in a 
particular way. The question before us is not whether in the case of the 
Humanitarian or the Pacifist, such feelings are necessarily ‘emotions by association,’ 
but rather whether they could reasonably be reflections of feelings of responsibility 
felt by liberal citizens. On what grounds would it make sense to feel responsible or 
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partially responsible for the legitimate decisions made by one’s own polity, in a way 
one would not feel responsible for those of another polity? 
If we can identify any form of responsibility that citizens can consistently see 
themselves as having while maintaining that pure public reason is the source of 
legitimacy, and if this account of responsibility explains the discrepancy in emotional 
response and attitude between the legitimate actions of one’s own polity and that of 
another, then we can answer the question above in the affirmative.  My strategy for 
determining whether there exists any such account of responsibility will proceed in 
two steps. First I will try to eliminate broad classes of responsibility that are clearly 
incompatible with the emotional responses of liberal citizens. Then I will argue that 
of the remaining kind of responsibility, there is one which would be compatible with 
pure public reason, and which explains the discrepancy in attitude between the 
actions of one’s own government and that of foreign governments.  
In the third section of the chapter, I will also show that the account of 
responsibility that I have in mind derives from the relations of reciprocity amongst 
liberal citizens. This means that not only is such an account consistent with pure 
public reason, but that whenever pure public reason is the criterion of justification 
used for purposes of determining legitimate public policy, such responsibility exists. 
The account of responsibility that I have in mind is a form of personal outcome 
responsibility. In essence, my argument shows that every reasonable citizen of a 
liberal polity can take personal responsibility for the legitimacy of a particular use of 
power. This is what warrants feelings of pride and guilt, not just by association, but 
as a direct consequence on citizens’ actions. 
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1.1: Taxonomies of Responsibility  
Suppose the actions of one or more agents brought about a state of affairs S. In 
determining who is responsible for this state of affairs, we may have several moral 
concerns in mind. If S caused harm to an individual A, we might want to assign 
responsibility to someone in order to determine who should compensate A. If no one 
has been harmed, we might still want to assign moral or legal responsibility to 
someone if we believe that S was brought about by breaching a law or moral 
principle. Such responsibility would be assigned to stipulate that someone has 
reason to feel regret at the consequences of S. While the first account of responsibility 
is called ‘remedial responsibility’, and responds to the question of who ought to 
remedy a bad state of affairs,97 the latter form of responsibility correlate more closely 
with the concept of ‘outcome responsibility’ which responds to the question of who 
is to blame for the fact that a certain outcome S has arisen.98  
Once we have determined that we are concerned with the problem of 
remedial or outcome responsibility, there remains the further question of whom to 
attribute such responsibility. If S has been brought about by the joint actions of 
individuals X1, X2…Xn we might want to assign responsibility to the entire collective 
of N individuals, without inculpating any individual member of the collective in 
particular. Alternatively, we might assign responsibility to one representative 
member of the collective, say the head of a bureau or institute. In the political sphere, 
the first type of ascription is called ‘collective responsibility’ while the second is 
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called ‘hierarchical responsibility.’99 It may also be the case that those to whom we 
assign outcome responsibility are not those to whom we assign remedial 
responsibility. For example, if the N individuals whose actions jointly created state S 
are all members of a single political bureau, we might assign hierarchical outcome 
responsibility to the head of the bureau, but remedial collective responsibility by 
insisting that the bureau pays for the harm caused. This means that the head takes 
the blame for what has happened, but the entire bureau compensates for it.  
Who ought to be assigned responsibility when many individual agents were 
jointly involved in bringing about an outcome? This problem has relevance for 
liberal legitimacy, firstly because the liberal principle of legitimacy requires all 
reasonable citizens to find political institutions and procedures justifiable in order for 
them to have legitimacy, and secondly because the way in which particular 
legitimate outcomes arise is the consequence of several different reasonable and 
rational agents deliberating, lobbying and voting on a host of issues. Neither 
collective nor hierarchical responsibility necessarily tells us whose actions 
contributed to the ensuing outcome, or whether those actions were done with proper 
intent.  
We can see this when we consider a state of affairs S which was brought 
about by the joint actions of only two members of a large bureau. In assigning either 
collective or hierarchical outcome responsibility, both of these individuals could 
potentially avoid responsibility.  If collective outcome responsibility is ascribed then 
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the bureau at large is collectively responsible for bringing about the given outcome. 
Any particular member avoids responsibility. By contrast, if hierarchical outcome 
responsibility is ascribed, then the two members who brought about the state of 
affairs also avoid blame unless one of them is actually the head of the bureau or the 
representative chosen to take blame. In ascribing responsibility to those who actually 
brought about the event, what we seek is an account of personal responsibility.  
We are left to decide whether hierarchical responsibility, collective 
responsibility or personal responsibility, are conceptions of outcome responsibility 
that are warranted in the public sphere. It is important to note that in theory it is 
possible to assign all three forms of responsibility simultaneously, and that they may 
be assigned to the same group or to different subsets of the population. However, 
hierarchical responsibility seems unsuitable for the purposes of ascribing the 
legitimacy of collective decisions to particular citizens. We are presupposing that all 
citizens are free and equal, as a consequence of which there is no formal political 
hierarchy. We might choose to assign hierarchical responsibility to representatives of 
citizens or other elected officials, but since they represent the voters who voted for 
them, any responsibility attributed to them could also be attributed to their 
constituents or their constituencies, as long as they are truly representing their 
constituents’ views and not utilizing their position for their own private objectives.  
Rawls seems to advocate for the collective account of responsibility. Not only 
does he characterize the institutions of justice as requiring a ‘collective notion of 
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responsibility,’100 he also writes that the type of reasoning that guides the legitimate 
exercises of political power is ‘the reason of equal citizens as a collective body.’ 101 
However, in Political Ethics & Public Office, Dennis Thompson cautions against the 
inquisition-like nature of ascribing responsibility to anyone remotely affiliated with a 
collective that is responsible for causing a blameworthy state of affairs.102  One way to 
characterize Thompson’s worry is to say that when a collective brings about an 
outcome through the agency of individual members, it should not be the case that 
every member of the collective is held responsible merely as a consequence of their 
membership. Individuals ought to be held responsible insofar as they contributed to 
the outcome brought about by a particular collective. Such contributions might 
include acts of omission, informal influence and so forth, but the contribution itself 
should form the basis of the responsibility.  
Consider, for example, a bureau which employs five government officials, 
who share ten advisers and two interns. Suppose one of the officials is handed 
jurisdiction over a project to which five advisers contribute formal statements. One of 
the other officials has an informal chat with a sixth adviser and sends a note to the 
official with jurisdiction, encouraging a particular course of action. Thompson’s 
concern is firstly that the official with jurisdiction should not be handed full 
responsibility for the ensuing decision, simply by virtue of her formal capacity. 
Secondly, Thompson would not want all seventeen employees of the bureau to be 
given responsibility simply because they are members of the bureau. There is 
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ambiguity in Thompson’s framework about the degree to which non-advisory staff 
ought to be given personal responsibility for the outcome. The intern who delivered 
the letter from one official to the other may have contributed to the outcome, yet, 
practical judgment tells us that placing a high degree of responsibility on the intern 
would be superficial for such cursory involvement. In order to gain a better sense of 
who is personally responsible for which features of an outcome, I will try to develop 
an account of the sufficiency conditions for personal responsibility.  
I will follow Thompson in viewing personal responsibility as a kind of 
outcome responsibility that results from a conjunction of causal responsibility and 
volitional responsibility.103 That is, a particular agent Xi is personally responsible for a 
state of affairs S1 when Xi performs an action which causes a state of affairs S1 to come 
about, and does so free of compulsion and without culpable ignorance.104 Thompson 
offers this account of personal responsibility as a solution to what he calls the Many 
Hands Problem.105 
  In the Many Hands formulation, several agents’ actions taken jointly cause a 
state of affairs S to come into being. According to Thompson, ‘Because many 
different officials contribute in many ways to decisions and policies of government, it 
is difficult even in principle to identify who is morally responsible for political 
outcomes.’106 Some of the agents involved may have performed actions which, when 
taken alone, are insufficient to bring about state of affairs S1; others may have 
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performed actions which were not necessary for S1 to come about; and still others 
may have performed actions which were neither necessary nor sufficient for S1 to 
come about. However, in telling a causal story about how S1 came about, each agent’s 
actions and volitions played some role. How is personal responsibility to be 
determined?  
Thompson provides a theory of personal responsibility by applying causal 
and volitional concepts of responsibility to the public sphere. Thompson’s theory 
says little about his causal criterion of responsibility, save that its aim is merely to 
connect the wilful agency of an agent to the end state for which the agent is 
responsible.107 Thompson writes that in his view of causality, an action causes a state 
of affairs ’if the action would have been necessary to produce the outcome, had no other 
action sufficient to produce the outcome been present.’108 This formulation of causality is a 
akin to a more widely held notion of causality in which a cause is defined as a 
necessary element of a sufficient set of conditions (or a NESS-condition) required to 
bring about the resulting state of affairs.109 However, in Thompson’s view the cause 
need not be a necessary condition; it is only necessary if and when there are not other 
sufficient conditions to bring about the state of affairs.110 
We can see the intuition behind this in terms of assigning responsibility for a 
collective decision made by a majority vote. Suppose our state of affairs S1 is the 
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consequence of a policy affirmed by such a majority vote. An action would be 
sufficient for securing such a majority, as long as voters were evenly split between 
the options at hand, and the action in question served as the ‘deciding vote.’ 
However, in the absence of any other voter providing the ‘deciding vote’ it would be 
necessary for any given proponent of the policy to vote in its favour in order to bring 
about S1. Therefore, every voter who voted in favour of the policy would in fact be 
held personally responsible for S1 under Thompson’s condition.  
Thompson is quick to point out that this definition of cause is a sufficient 
condition for ascribing responsibility, as opposed to a necessary one. He writes that 
actions which meet the criteria above ‘qualify’ as causal responsibility, but that other 
factors may also require consideration.111 Thompson also acknowledges that his 
notion of causality is mainly formulated to ‘connect’ the action of the agent to the 
outcome under some causal description.112 Once such a connection is made, he relies 
on causal excuses (such as those of Joel Feinberg or HLA Hart and Tony Honoré113) 
to determine whether the cause merits any kind of responsibility. 
While the purpose of ascertaining causal responsibility is to establish a 
connection between a person’s action and the harmful outcome of the action, it is 
Thompson’s criterion of volitional responsibility which determines the degree of 
responsibility.114 Thompson points out that traditionally, there are two broad cases in 
which an agent, having deliberated on an action, is still not considered responsible 
for the outcomes it generates. Firstly, if the person acted in ignorance, and did not 
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have a responsibility to know the relevant information of which she was ignorant115, 
then despite choosing to act in the way that she did, she ought not to be held 
responsible. Secondly, if the person was compelled to act by an external force (say he 
acted under threat or duress) then he is also not volitionally responsible for the 
action.116  
For the Many Hands Problem, two difficulties arise out of this understanding 
of volitional responsibility. The first difficulty reflects the old Aristotelian problem of 
deliberation serving as grounds for responsibility, regardless of the practical realities 
faced by the decision-maker in question. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle gives an 
example of a ship’s captain, who decides to throw the ship’s cargo overboard during 
a thunder storm, in order to save the ship from sinking and the passenger’s from 
drowning.117 According to a strict reading of volitional responsibility, the captain 
may be said to be responsible because he could have done otherwise. He willed to 
bring about the state of affairs in which the cargo had been thrown overboard. 
While this may seem like an extreme example, Thompson argues that it is 
relevant to public life insofar as institutionalized norms and practices often restrict 
the choices available to public officials when making difficult decisions. He offers the 
example of Abe Beame, the Mayor of New York City during the fiscal crisis of 
1975.118 Beame was accused of contributing to the city’s financial woes by his refusal 
                                                          
115
 In political matters Thompson writes that it is particularly important that this clause is identified as 
precluding exculpation, as officials often instruct their staff not to provide information on matters that 
could ultimately dirty their hands (Political Ethics and Public Office, p. 60).   
116
 Thompson, Restoring Responsibility, p. 19.  
117
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 1999), 
p.30.  
118
 Thompson, Restoring Responsibility, p. 27.  
59 
 
to publicize the faulty accounting practices which eventually led to fiscal disaster. 
The practices had been in place at the time Beame took office, and Beame argued that 
had he publicized them, or even attempted to reform them, it would have risked 
bankruptcy.119 However, prior to becoming Mayor, Beame had spent several years 
working on New York City’s finances – first as a Budget Director and then as City 
Comptroller.120 He had contributed to shaping the financial practices, although he 
had not imposed the practices singlehandedly.  
 Thompson claims that although Beame volitionally brought about a state of 
affairs which eventually led to financial disaster, we might limit the degree of 
responsibility that we place on him for the ultimate decision not to publicize the 
faulty accounting, in light of the fact that the practices were already in place when he 
took office. However, we must still place responsibility on Mayor Beame for shaping 
the practices to be what they are. He must be held accountable for contributing to the 
institutionalization of such norms, but not for acting in response to them.121  
The second concern with volitional responsibility is that in evaluating 
volitions, we include those whose participation really has been too minuscule or 
tangential to assign proper responsibility. Imagine for example that two public 
officials are in the process of making a deal, which requires a young intern at one of 
their offices to deliver a parcel to the office of the other. It would seem rather harsh to 
assign this young intern the same level of personal responsibility for the deal as the 
two officials simply because her action, freely chosen, made a volitional contribution 
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to bringing about the particular outcome. As far as our common sense intuitions go, 
we assign the intern less responsibility for the outcome of the deal, not because of the 
scale or importance of her participation, but because we imagine that her role is to 
function as the parcel-deliverer, not to reflectively determine whether the parcel 
ought to be delivered. In this respect, the real agent is the person whose public role 
offered the capacity to decide with authority, whether or not the parcel delivery 
should take place. It is this authority as the original decision-maker, not authority as 
jurisdiction, upon which Thompson’s sense of personal responsibility lies. This 
becomes clear when we consider the fact that had the intern chosen NOT to deliver 
the parcel, but instead to dispose of it in another fashion, she would be held 
responsible for the state of affairs in which the deal did not go through.  
How is it that in defying authority, the intern becomes the new authority? 
One consideration is that she is taking on a capacity not offered by her role as intern. 
According to Thompson one must take into account the official role played by the 
agent when making judgments on responsibility.122 While as an intern she was 
operating on someone else’s behalf the moment that she chooses to act upon her own 
judgment and not deliver the parcel, she becomes the agent rather than the pawn of 
another agent. Yet surely the choice to become an intern, to go to work on the given 
day, to feel a sense of commitment or even excitement for her job would sufficiently 
characterize causal and volitional responsibility for the ensuing state of affairs? Nor 
should we take into account the fact that another intern could have done the same 
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job and that her role was substitutable. Our condition for causal responsibility is that 
the action was necessary in the absence of another sufficient act.   
A more likely explanation of our intuition lies in the description of the precise 
objective that constitutes the intern’s will. Although the intern is causally and 
volitionally leading to the making of a deal, her objective is not to make the deal but 
to do her job well. Therefore, although we recognize causal responsibility, we do not 
attribute any personal responsibility for the outcome. Thompson declares, however, 
that making officials responsible for nothing more than the content of their will 
relieves them of the responsibility of taking adequate precaution that the outcomes 
of their will are not exploited by others towards harmful ends.123 If this consideration 
applies to officials, it is not at all clear why it should not apply to interns who work 
for them.  
Upon reflection, it is not the case that we believe that the intern did not 
contribute to bringing about the state of affairs or that she could not have reflected 
upon her duty and done otherwise. What is missing from an account of the intern’s 
actions is not agency but authorship.  Her action does not reflect an earnest attempt 
to shape the world in accordance with a vision of what she wishes it to be. While she 
is freely and voluntarily bringing about a state of affairs, her action is not a creative 
act. By contrast, those who are drafting legislation or bargaining over them are not 
just willing a state of affairs into existence. They are attempting to mold a particular 
state of affairs into existence. Therefore, they are far more responsible for the 
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resulting state of affairs than the intern, for in addition to causal and volitional 
responsibility, they take responsibility of authorship for the ensuing state of affairs.   
1.3: Argument for Personal Responsibility 
In order to defend the view that every reasonable citizen is personally responsible for 
a state of affairs in which a particular use of power is legitimate, I will begin with the 
following four premises: 
Premise 1: Reciprocity as the source of fair terms of cooperation:  
Rawls begins with the idea that reasonable and rational citizens find 
themselves situated in societies with other reasonable and rational 
individuals, who are mutually self-interested but not purely egoistical.124 
These societies already have practices that are meant to adjudicate between 
the conflicting claims of self-interested citizens. However, there are times 
when citizens gather to decide whether or not they wish to reform the rules 
of the practices, according to which their conflicts are adjudicated. The 
terms to which all reasonable citizens agree in such situations are ‘fair 
terms,’ but only if they agree as individuals who are free, equal and willing 
to engage in fair social cooperation.125 When citizens views conflict, these 
terms are then used as the reasons which justify which course of action to 
take.  
Premise 2: The Duty of Civility: 
                                                          
124
 John Rawls, ‘Justice as Reciprocity’ in John Rawls: Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman 
(Cambridge, MA and London, UK: Harvard University Press, 1999) p.198. 
125
 Ibid. pp. 198 -199.  
63 
 
As written in the Introduction, the moral duty of civility derives from the 
liberal principle of legitimacy and the ideal of reciprocity. The ideal of 
reciprocity refers to the foundational assumption of Rawlsian political 
liberalism, which is that all reasonable and rational citizens are situated 
towards each other as free and equal citizens engaged in fair terms of 
cooperation.126 The Duty of Civility requires each citizen to justify her 
political position to all others by (i) specifying a criterion of justification 
which she believes can be reasonably endorsed by all citizens; (ii) sincerely 
believing that the values to which she appeals during public justification are 
those which all reasonable citizens could find reasonable; and (iii) showing 
the willingness to accommodate other people’s reasonable moral views 
when they conflict with the one propounded in her own public 
justification.127  
Premise 3: The Liberal Principle of Legitimacy:  
Rawls states this principle as follows: ‘our exercise of political power is 
proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a 
constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected 
to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as 
reasonable and rational.’128 
Premise 4: The conjunction of causal and volitional responsibility is sufficient for the 
existence of personal responsibility:  
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An individual is personally responsible for a state of affairs S1, if she is 
causally responsible and volitionally responsible for bringing about S1, 
where ‘causal responsibility’ indicates that she performed an action which is 
a causal predecessor for S, and ‘volitional responsibility’ indicates that the 
action was performed freely and not in ignorance.   
Premise 5: Thompson’s Account of Causal Responsibility 
An individual is causally responsible for a state of affairs S1, if she 
performed an action such that had there not been a sufficient set of factors 
that brought about state of affairs S1, would have been sufficient to bring 
about state of affairs S1.  
Given these premises, I now proceed to show why the reasonable citizen is 
personally responsible for the legitimacy of all legitimate uses of power.  
Let us begin by considering what follows from the conjunction of Premise 1, 
Premise 2 and Premise 3. If a set of fair terms of cooperation have been agreed upon 
by all citizens as stipulated in Premise 1, then they meet the requirements of the 
Liberal Principle of Legitimacy. Since reasonable citizens have actually accepted those 
terms of cooperation, we can expect them to find those terms reasonable and 
rational. Therefore, the fair terms of cooperation are suitable candidates for 
constitutional essentials, and acceptable grounds for justifying courses of action.  
For example, if citizens decide that in the event of widespread disagreement 
on whether or not to engage in a just war, the conflict will be resolved by a majority 
vote, then the fact that military intervention is the outcome of the majority vote 
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justifies going to war. All citizens, whether or not they agree with military 
intervention, can agree that the fair terms of cooperation justify intervention.  
Furthermore, since every citizen already knows that all other reasonable 
citizens agree with the fair terms of cooperation, using these terms to justify their 
political positions (i) specifies a criterion of justification with which all citizens can 
agree, (ii) justifies political positions in accordance with reasons that all other 
reasonable citizens can be expected to endorse, and (iii) shows a willingness to 
accommodate other people’s reasonable moral views, insofar as the fair terms of 
cooperation would be considered reasonable by individuals who had reasonably 
endorsed them as means to overcome conflicts of interest. Therefore, justifying one’s 
political position by appeal to fair terms of cooperation meets the demands for the 
Duty of Civility. 
This shows that if F1 is a fair term of cooperation, then F1 is suitable grounds 
for public justification. This means that it is appropriate for politically reasonable 
citizens to offer FI as a reason to support their political position. Unfortunately, it is 
not the case that if a reason, F2, meets the conditions for legitimacy and civility, then 
it is a fair term of cooperation. This is because legitimacy and civility are only 
necessary conditions for public justification, not sufficient ones. It may be that there 
are certain constitutional essentials that everyone could reasonably be expected to 
endorse, but which are not reasonably endorsed because they conflict with other 
reasonable constitutional essentials. As mentioned previously, it is just as reasonable 
to grant residual powers to states or provinces within a nation, as it is to grant 
residual powers to the nation itself. Whether or not granting such powers to a 
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province is legitimate depends entirely on whether one is in a country such as the 
United States, which observes the right to grant residual powers to states; or one is in 
a country like Canada where residual powers are not granted to states.  
However, individuals within the United States and Canada can still 
reflectively determine whether or not granting residual powers to states is a term to 
which they would agree. If they refuse to agree with such a term, then it would not 
be a fair term of cooperation. This in turn, reflects back on the Duty of Civility. Is it 
civil to use justifications based on terms that others could agree with, but have refused 
to do? The answer to this question generally lies in the political and legal context in 
which such justification is offered: if citizens are engaged in the process of trying to 
amend the constitution, or motivate an amendment, then it certainly would seem 
reasonable to offer terms that others could, but have not endorsed. On the other 
hand, if a federal judge refuses to recognize a law because another law could have 
existed which trumps the ones actually in existence, we would clearly find the 
justification uncivil.  
In general, changing the terms of cooperation ought to come from reasonable 
citizens qua citizen, and not from reasonable citizens qua institutional representatives. 
Aside from the insidiousness of institutions changing terms of cooperation on 
grounds that citizens could have agreed with them, but did not, there is a 
straightforward reason why changes in fair terms of cooperation must come from the 
people. The political conception of justice is said to be regulated by an ideal of 
67 
 
reciprocity.129 This means that the procedure of choosing fair terms, as described in 
Premise 1, is meant to regulate the very conception of justice, and not simply its 
applications for law and policy. If the authority to regulate a just political order is 
found within reciprocity, and reciprocity is defined as agreements between free and 
equal citizens engaged in fair social cooperation, then using institutional power to 
interpret and apply laws that could have been accepted, but were not, goes against 
the political conception of justice. On these grounds, it must defy both civility and 
legitimacy.  
I conclude that the conjunction of Premise 1, Premise 2 and Premise 3 
requires that F1 serves as a fair term of cooperation if and only if it meets the 
requirements of legitimacy and civility, unless political society is heading for 
constitutional reform motivated by reasonable and rational citizens. Call this Proposition 6. 
Now consider the conjunction of Premise 1 and Premise 4. If we assume that 
every citizen is a free and equal partner in social cooperation and that in order to 
engage in such cooperation they must accept terms to which they will reasonably 
disagree, then they freely choose to accept those terms. However, these terms serve 
as causal preconditions for legitimate outcomes of public decision-making, with 
which citizens reasonably disagree from their non-public perspective. Reasonable 
citizens accept fair terms of cooperation, because they need to be able to reconcile 
their differences, if political society is to succeed as a cooperative enterprise.130 
Therefore, they agree to fair terms of cooperation in a way which satisfies 
Thompson’s conditions for volitional responsibility. Therefore, from Premise 1 and 
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Premise 3, we see that each reasonable citizen is volitionally responsible for the fair 
terms of social cooperation. Call this Proposition 7.  
Now let us examine the conjunction of Premise 1 and Premise 5. Suppose F 
refers to the set of fair terms of cooperation. Consider what would have happened if 
reasonable citizens had not chosen to accept F1, which is an element of F. If only one 
citizen had chosen not to accept F1 then F would not have been the set of fair terms of 
cooperation. Therefore, every citizen is personally responsible for the set of fair terms 
of cooperation. Call this Proposition 8.   
From the conjunction of Proposition 6 and Proposition 8, we find that every 
reasonable citizen is causally responsible for the legitimacy of every legitimate use of 
power: As we have seen, the liberal principle of legitimacy requires every citizen to be 
able to find the terms reasonable and rational in order for institutions and 
constitutions to secure legitimacy. Therefore, if only one citizen had not agreed upon 
the terms then by Thompson’s account of causal responsibility, the terms would 
never have been agreed upon and the powers of the constitution never given any 
legitimacy. More precisely, Thompson’s account of causal responsibility indicates 
that every reasonable citizen is causally responsible for a state of affairs in which it is 
not the case that the constitutional essentials are not legitimate. If a term X were 
proposed, and a citizen’s action Ax was the act of rejecting that term as reasonable, 
then X would not be accepted as a term of cooperation. That in turn would indicate 
that a particular public policy could not be publicly justified only on ground X if it 
were to meet the criteria of the duty of civility. From Proposition 6 we find that all 
legitimate policies are those which do meet the criteria that have been accepted as 
69 
 
fair terms by reasonable citizens. This entails that every reasonable citizen is also 
causally responsible for a state of affairs in which the grounds for justification are 
legitimate. Call this Proposition 9.  
Furthermore, the conjunction of Proposition 6 with Proposition 7 shows that 
citizens are also volitionally responsible for the legitimacy of the constitutional 
essentials which grant political institutions their legitimate powers. Since Rawls’ 
ideal of reciprocity situates all citizens on free and equal terms, none are forced to 
agree to the terms of cooperation against their will. Rather, it is because equal 
citizens freely choose to engage in social cooperation, despite foreseeing reasonable 
disagreement, that they are willing to accommodate reasonable disagreement into 
their political frameworks. Furthermore, it is because each citizen is willing to 
accommodate such terms of disagreement that they agree to terms knowing that they 
will legitimate uses of power, some with which they will reasonably disagree. 
Therefore, they are volitionally responsible for the legitimacy of all such uses of 
power, even if they reasonably disagree with it. Call this Proposition 10.  
From the conjunction of Proposition 9 and Proposition 10, we find that all 
reasonable citizens are personally responsible for the legitimacy of all legitimate uses 
of political power.  
Finally, if we assume that a government only uses its powers in a legitimate 
way then each reasonable citizen is also causally responsible for every use of power. 
Each legitimate use of power is only legitimate because each citizen has contributed 
to its legitimacy. Since all free and equal citizens engaged in social cooperation 
actually want the government to use powers in this way, they are also volitionally 
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responsible for every legitimate use of power. Therefore, regardless of whether a 
reasonable citizen agrees or disagrees with how a government is using the powers, as 
long as the government is doing so legitimately, the reasonable citizens are 
responsible for such uses of power.  
One factor to consider, however, is that in reality, citizens are not free and 
equal agents engaged in social cooperation. They are conceived to be so as liberal 
citizens, but in fact are typically born into liberal societies. However, they do make 
the choice to act like reasonable citizens by taking up the perspective of pure public 
reason. Arguably, if they did not uphold the values of reasonable citizenship when 
engaging with each other in the political sphere, we might not hold them responsible 
for the legitimate actions of government (although we arguably would hold them 
responsible for not fulfilling the duty of civility, or merely for being unreasonable.) 
What this shows is that the choice to be a reasonable citizen comes at a heavier price 
than originally believed. It requires a willingness to take upon oneself a degree of 
personal responsibility which originally which unreasonable or uncooperative 
citizens would not need to undertake.  
Going back to our original example of the Humanitarian and the Pacifist, this 
would indicate that both are personally responsible for the legitimate uses of power 
by the government, regardless of whether such legitimate powers are those with 
which they reasonably agree from their private perspective. They are responsible 
insofar as we conceive them as free and equal citizens engaged in social cooperation 
which lends legitimacy to the legitimate uses of power. Even if the Pacifist is wholly 
against any sort of militaristic involvement or use of force, the fact that she can 
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recognize it as politically reasonable and is willing to accept this as grounds for the 
legitimacy of intervention, is sufficient to make her personally responsible for the 
action.  
Rawlsians do grant those whose private moral doctrines are opposed to 
public reason the chance to engage in a practice of ‘witnessing.’ Witnessing indicates 
that although a citizen finds a course of action legitimate, she is unable to accept that 
the justification offered by pure public reason as justifiable.131 If a polity chooses not 
to engage in militaristic action, which goes against a Humanitarian’s sense of justice, 
the Humanitarian may choose not to accept the justification afforded by public 
reason. However, this does not in any way undermine the legitimacy of the course of 
action, because the criterion of justification granting normative authority to a 
legitimate course of action is pure public reason, and when engaged in witnessing, 
citizens are voluntarily choosing not to adopt the perspective of pure public reason.  
It may be thought that by not taking the perspective of pure public reason 
they are absolved of responsibility. However, this is not what I meant when I said 
that the choice to be politically reasonable is the deciding factor in responsibility. 
Those engaged in witnessing still affirm the normative authority of pure public 
reason in the public sphere. They still engage in political cooperation most of the 
time, and as a result are still responsible for accepting the terms of cooperation, and 
the legitimacy of actions which stem from it. It is only on particular issues that they 
do not accept the justification offered by political reasonableness. They do this as a 
form of private expression, which in no way affects the legitimacy of the outcome.  
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The digression of witnessing is meant to highlight that ultimately the 
personal responsibility each citizen bears for the legitimacy of all legitimate uses of 
power, comes from engaging in fair social cooperation as a free and equal citizen. 
The willingness to take up the perspective of the public is the way we identify which 
citizens are engaged in social cooperation. If on a handful of issues citizens cannot, 
for private reasons, accept political reasonableness as privately justifiable, this does 
not alter the fact that their general willingness to take the perspective of public 
reason, their general willingness to be reasonable citizens and engage in cooperation, 
is what offers pure public reason its justificatory force.  
The situation of witnesses is very much like the situation of Mayor Beame, 
who was not personally responsible for the faulty accounting practices under his 
administration, but was responsible for the development of the normativity of such 
practices throughout his career. What witnesses have done is to contribute to pure 
public reason having normative authority to determine which uses of power are in 
fact legitimate. They have therefore causally and volitionally contributed to the 
legitimacy of those very acts to which they are bearing witness.  
We can see this by invoking the causal and volitional criteria described above. 
If every reasonable citizen were to engage in witnessing on every political issue that 
arose, it would be sufficient to lend pure public reason its normative force as long as 
one citizen often (though not always) was willing to take up the perspective of pure 
public reason and affirm its political reasonableness. According to Thompson’s 
causal criterion, this means that any citizen who generally takes up the perspective of 
pure public reason is causally responsible. The volitional argument looks much like 
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the original volitional argument, with the caveat that the citizen is generally willing 
to take up the public perspective (although not always). This means that even a 
witnessing citizen is personally responsible for the legitimacy of all legitimate uses of 
political power.  
 
1.4: The Problem of Conscience      
The argument of the previous section concluded that any citizen who chooses to take 
up the perspective of public reason and recognize the legitimacy of a particular 
course of action from that perspective, may be said to be personally responsible for 
the legitimacy of that course of action. I now wish to outline a problem which such 
responsibility generates. I call this the Problem of Conscience, and spend Chapters 2 
through 5 of this dissertation attempting to resolve it.  
The Problem of Consciences arises when a reasonable citizen recognizes the 
legitimacy of a particular use of political power, but also finds that particular use of 
power unjustifiable from the perspective of her private reason. It is possible, for 
example, to recognize the right to have abortions as politically reasonable, but 
privately believe that the practice is murderous. A reasonable citizen who holds such 
beliefs is called upon to bear personal responsibility for the legitimacy of the practice 
of abortion, despite the fact that the practice is murderous from her moral point of 
view.  
However, calling someone personally responsible for the legitimacy of a 
practice is quite different from calling someone responsible for the act itself. This 
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indicates that holding a citizen responsible for the legitimacy of abortion, when she 
believes abortion to be murder, does not necessarily entail calling her a murderer. A 
woman may succeed in having an abortion, regardless of whether or not she is given 
the right to have one by law. Therefore, reasonable citizens cannot be said to bear 
causal responsibility for all abortions that occur in polities where such a right exists. 
They may bear volitional responsibility for an increase in the number of abortions, 
but not for particular abortions, unless they know prior to recognizing a law that a 
given abortion would only occur in circumstances where the practice is legitimate. 
Rather, responsibility for legitimacy means that the person is willing to align the 
force of law against anyone who denies a fellow citizen the right to an abortion.  
Additionally, in a liberal political society, the legitimacy of a given law or 
statute imposes a pro tanto moral obligation upon others to live in accordance with 
the law.  In the standard Rawlsian characterization, the duty to obey the law is not 
only a political duty but a moral duty deriving from the moral duty of fair play.132 If 
one assumes that political society is a cooperative enterprise amongst free and equal 
persons, then fairness requires that each reasonable person only offer terms of 
cooperation to others which he or she believes that others could reasonably accept.133 
Legitimate procedures are those which reflect these terms. Hence, fair play requires 
citizens to abide by political obligations created through legitimate procedures, on 
grounds that legitimate procedures are rules of collective decision-making to which 
everyone has subscribed while giving due consideration to their free and equal status 
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relative to each other. In effect, legitimating a particular political statute implies that 
a citizen accepts that every citizen is morally required to abide by the law or 
stipulation in question, as a matter of fair play. 
 Therefore, if a reasonable citizen believes that abortion is murderous, but 
recognizes the political reasonableness of abortion, then she also imposes a pro tanto 
moral obligation on every other citizen to live in accordance with such a practice. 
Such an obligation is imposed not only from the perspective of pure public reason, 
but also from a non-public moral perspective. It follows that the reasonable 
supporter of the pro-life standpoint is not only accepting fair terms of cooperation in 
choosing to be responsible for the legitimacy of the right to abortion. She is also 
accepting personal responsibility for aligning the force of law against any other 
citizen who wishes to interfere with a woman’s right to choose, and for imposing a 
pro tanto moral obligation upon each citizen to obey the law. If she finds either of 
these responsibilities too burdensome to bear, then her only alternative is to be an 
unreasonable citizen.  
This situation gives rise to three ways in which conscience might become a 
problem for a liberal citizen. The first version of the Problem of Conscience is the 
Problem of the Tragic Conscience. Given that the duty of fair play and the duty of 
civility are moral duties, when a Humanitarian is forced not to engage in 
intervention, or a pro-life advocate is obliged not to interfere with practices that she 
considers murderous, they are in fact confronted with a deep-seated moral dilemma. 
On the other hand, if a citizen were somehow able to break the law and prevent 
others from having abortions to which they have a legal right, this interference with 
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the law would strain upon her own conscience, as it means that she would not be 
fulfilling the duties of civility and fair play. This means that citizens either have to 
leave their moral duties of civility and fair play unfulfilled, or they have to allow 
immoral courses of action to occur. The Problem of the Tragic Conscience refers to 
the fact that in cases where the law does not reflect a citizen’s non-public beliefs, the 
choice to observe the law and the choice to break the law will both be burdensome 
upon the citizen’s private conscience, as both will require some moral duties to go 
unfulfilled.  
The second version of the Problem of Conscience I call the Problem of the 
Brutish Conscience. This occurs because there is a reasonable expectation on the part 
of all citizens that if someone believes that grievous harm will be the result of 
undertaking a particular course of action, then she ought not to behave in such a way 
that makes her responsible for such events occurring. However, the responsibility 
assigned to reasonable citizens who have moral commitments means that they are at 
once identifying abortions as murder, or humanitarian intervention as morally 
required for the respectful treatment of human life, and yet are willing to accept 
personal responsibility for legitimating practices that are murderous and 
dehumanizing. Others who subscribe to their non-public moral views can rightly ask 
how they can be so abhorrent as to recognize a practice as murderous and 
dehumanizing, and yet not hesitate to take responsibility for it. The Brutish 
Conscience is also reprimand from within a person’s moral community, for the 
choice to be politically reasonable when values such as respect for human life are at 
stake. The reprimand comes from within a moral community in the sense that those 
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outside of it may not know or may not believe that what they are doing is morally 
harmful. The brutishness arises because someone claims to know about the serious 
harms a policy causes, and still feels perfectly at ease taking responsibility for them.  
Finally, there is what I call the Problem of the Clear Conscience. This occurs 
when an individual has to make incredible sacrifices in order to reconcile the 
problems which arise from the Tragic Conscience. If a citizen who was originally 
Catholic felt the need to leave her Church in order to accommodate the personal 
responsibility for the practice of abortion, and in doing so were to alienate herself 
from a moral community which included her family, lifelong friends and other peers, 
we might argue that the burdens of conscience were imposed upon her too heavily. 
Similarly, if a Humanitarian felt despicable at having to stand by and witness the 
heinous crimes inflicted upon others, and the negative consequences of such feelings 
had unbearable effects upon her self-respect and sense of personal dignity, her state 
of affairs might seem incredibly burdensome to her fellow citizens.  
 In general, burdening people’s consciences with blameworthy acts for which 
they are responsible hardly seems problematic. Why should we trouble ourselves 
with the burdens of conscience placed upon members of a reasonable citizenry who 
contribute to legitimate uses of political power which harm the environment, 
diminish health and educational benefits, or limit economic opportunities? The 
argument that some of these citizens have attempted every course of action possible 
to prevent such states of affairs from occurring is clearly incorrect. Simply by calling 
into question the justifiability of said procedures, the citizens could have 
undermined the legitimacy of such acts. Calling into question the legitimacy of the 
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procedures is far simpler than the practices of activism or civil disobedience, initially 
justified by liberalism. Rather than marching, demonstrating or campaigning against 
a repugnant state of affairs, all a citizen is called upon to do in such a scenario is 
conclude that he or she could not reasonably accept procedures of public decision-
making that could lead to such outcomes. As citizens’ faith in procedures diminish, 
so do those procedures’ legitimacy.134 
Take for example a legislative or judicial procedure that seems to 
systematically discriminate against those of a particular race, class or gender. This 
particular procedural imperfection may not have been obvious when the procedure 
was at first held to be legitimate, but at some point may seem beyond doubt. 
Although this imperfection in procedure is a substantive evaluation, that is, an 
evaluation from within a private comprehensive doctrine rather than from the 
perspective of public political culture, such substantive evaluations are permitted 
given that political society is a cooperative enterprise towards the security of justice, 
and the procedures considered above go against justice.135 
Rawls and other liberals would argue that justice is a shared purpose of 
human reason, and hence a political system that discriminates arbitrarily against 
those of a certain class goes against the shared enterprise which united political 
society from the start. Yet, liberty of conscience embodied in the freedom to ‘form, 
pursue and revise’ one’s own conception of the good is the foremost of rights chosen 
behind the veil of ignorance and fundamental to any liberal creed. No liberal would 
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argue that a political society which restrained an individual from expressing their 
moral choices was a liberal one. Why then are all liberals compelled to accept 
political procedures that violate moral ideals other than justice? 
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Chapter 2: A Critique of Procedural Legitimacy136  
Although citizens may be responsible for the legitimacy of all legitimate uses of 
political power, we may be able to argue that their responsibility is minimized due to 
how legitimacy is determined. A common method of achieving legitimacy is through 
the use of procedures that all reasonable citizens can accept as a reasonable way to 
engage in collective decision-making. These procedures are those embodied in the 
institutes of governance (i.e. the legislature, the judiciary, etc.) By using these 
procedures to aggregate collective outcomes, citizens can distance themselves from 
assuming a high level of responsibility for any given outcome. To take a simple case, 
suppose that the decision to engage in humanitarian intervention is determined by a 
majority vote. Since the democratic procedure is chosen not just for this one case, but 
for a whole range of policies, citizens can argue that they found the procedure of 
majority voting reasonably justifiable because of the positive outcomes it tends to 
generate. Although they may accept causal responsibility for this particular outcome 
of the procedure, they can limit their volitional responsibility to reasonably 
endorsing a procedure that generally produces outcomes that they can reasonably 
endorse.  
 In this chapter I will argue that procedural legitimacy is not a justifiable way 
of determining the legitimacy of political positions in the liberal public sphere. In 
section 2.1, I will give an account of legitimacy as justification and then explain what 
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makes democratic decisions procedurally legitimate. In section 2.2, I will consider the 
relationship between procedural legitimacy and the obligation to obey a law. Should 
a reasonable agent feel obligated to obey the dictates of a legislative or judicial 
process, simply because it was determined through a procedure that all reasonable 
individuals find politically reasonable? I will offer Rawls’ account of legitimate law 
as a pro tanto duty, and argue that the requirement for the performance of such 
duties lies with the duty of civility and the concept of justice as fairness. I will further 
argue that both civility and justice as fairness are achieved when reasonable citizens 
recognize that particular exercises of political power are justifiable.   
Finally, it remains to be seen whether the outcomes of legitimate procedures 
are in fact justifiable. In Section 2.3, I will examine whether the reasonableness of a 
procedure of decision-making serves to justify the outcomes of said procedures. By 
the ‘reasonableness of a procedure’ I mean to indicate that reasonable citizens believe 
that a given procedure is a reasonable way to aggregate individual judgments in 
order to determine what the collective ought to do. There are two ways in which the 
reasonableness of the procedure might indicate the justifiability of the procedural 
outcome. First, it could be the case that a reasonable person ought to feel bound by 
the outcomes of a legitimate procedure simply because she herself found the 
procedure reasonable. For example, if a procedural outcome logically follows from a 
given procedure then it might be the case that the reasonableness of a procedure 
indicates the reasonableness of a procedural outcome, and that the reasonableness of 
the outcome provides sufficient normative force for each reasonable citizen to be 
bound by the procedural outcome. In section 2.3.1 I use a variation of Wollheim’s 
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Paradox to show that this is not the case. A person who finds the procedure 
reasonable is not also required to find procedural outcomes reasonable, much less 
justifiable due to this reasonableness.   
Alternatively, it could be the case that the fact that the procedure was 
collectively chosen is a strong pro-tanto reason for each individual to abide by a 
procedural outcome. This is the Rawlsian account of justice as fairness applied to 
procedural legitimacy. In section 2.3.2 I show that this account is undermined by 
Rawls’ own defense of the normative weight of public reason and the space he 
affords in the public sphere for reasonable pluralism.  
2.1: Political and Procedural Legitimacy  
The liberal principle of legitimacy is often cited as the paradigm expression of 
political liberalism’s appeal to reasonable justification as a source of legitimacy.137 
This is the principle which states that states that: ‘our exercise of political power is proper 
and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials 
of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.’138 As we saw in the Introduction, it is from 
this notion of legitimacy that Rawls derives the duty of civility, which requires all 
uses of political power to be justified to reasonable citizens subject to it.139 
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When John Rawls first introduced the idea of public reason as an element of a 
political conception of justice,140 he did so by defending his resolution to what he 
called the ‘Paradox of Public Reason’. The paradox asks: ‘How can it be either 
reasonable or rational, when basic matters [of justice] are at stake, for citizens to 
appeal only to a public conception of justice and not to the whole truth as they see it. 
Surely, the most fundamental questions should be settled by appealing to the most 
important truths, yet these may far transcend public reason!’141  
After nearly twenty years of debate and discussion on the scope, uses and 
normative force of public reason, the concerns stated in the paradox hardly seem 
paradoxical at all. Reasonable citizens will not attempt to settle questions of basic 
justice by appealing to ‘the most important truths’ because they know that by 
pursuing such a strategy, questions of basic justice will never be settled. A reasonable 
citizen, according to Rawls, recognizes the burdens of judgments placed on all 
reasonable citizens when trying to come up with good answers to complex moral, 
metaphysical and philosophical questions. Recognition of the burdens of judgment 
means that a citizen understands the difficulty of forming judgments on matters 
requiring the consideration of abstract principles and their application to complex 
empirical circumstances.142 The complex nature of the judgments formed means that 
reasonable citizens are likely to disagree on them.  Reasonable citizens know that a 
cooperative relationship must be forged in spite of this. In recognition of these 
burdens of judgment, Rawls believes reasonable citizens will demonstrates a 
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willingness to offer fair terms of cooperation to other citizens despite the fact that 
other citizens disagree with them.143 They will do so as long as they believe that other 
citizens are willing to do the same for them (i.e. as long as other citizens are willing 
to cooperate.)144   
Cooperation, as far as Rawls in concerned, has both a pragmatic function and a 
moral impetus. Its pragmatic function is to ensure political stability by securing 
consensus on a political conception of justice as the legitimate source of political 
power. The consensus in question is the overlapping consensus of moral 
comprehensive doctrines, from which collective uses of power can be justified from 
within individual comprehensive doctrines. According to Rawls, ‘All those who affirm 
the political conception start from within their own comprehensive view and draw on the 
religious, philosophical, and moral grounds it provides.’145 At the same time, the political 
conception of justice is also justified from the perspective of public democratic 
culture reflecting ‘fundamental ideas viewed as latent in the public political culture of a 
democratic society.’146 
When speaking of justification as opposed to justice, Rawls demarcates three 
modes of justification: pro tanto justification from the perspective of common human 
reason, full justification from within reasonable individuals’ comprehensive 
doctrines, and public justification from the perspective of public political culture. Pro 
tanto justification of a conception of justice is from the perspective of common 
human reason. It specifies that justice is amongst other things well-ordered and 
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complete, and can answer almost all basic political questions.147 Full justification 
proceeds from individuals’ ability to embed pro tanto justification into their private 
comprehensive doctrines.148 Finally, public justification by political society (or 
political justification) occurs when citizens realize that they along with all other 
reasonable citizens have engaged in full justification, and can therefore collectively 
engage in social cooperation regulated by the conception of justice.149 While the first 
two forms of justification ensure stability (i.e. enable each reasonable citizen to see 
why a particular use of power is justifiable), all three are necessary to determine 
legitimacy.  
One of the tasks Rawls sets himself in Political Liberalism is to establish 
legitimate political authority in liberal political associations in such a way that the 
uses of political authority can be reasonably justified to those subject to it. Political 
legitimacy embodied in such authority reflects each citizen’s participation in the 
exercise of collective political power and in doing so, secures every citizen’s status as 
free and equal to every other.150 It ensures that the use of coercive power is always 
that of the collective body of the people, and that each individual has an equal share 
in this collective power.151 The objective for Rawls then is to situate legitimate 
political authority in the collective body of the people, while acknowledging that 
securing consensus every time political authority is exercised is precluded by 
reasonable pluralism.  
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Reasonable pluralism refers to the inevitable emergence and co-existence of 
conflicting religious, moral and philosophical comprehensive doctrines amongst 
citizens living under free institutions.152 Reasonable pluralism also reflects what 
Rawls calls ‘the burdens of judgment’ placed on all reasonable individuals.153 This 
means that given the complexity of weighing evidence, coming to terms with vague 
moral concepts and making inferences, it is likely that reasonable people will often 
disagree given the same set of information. As a result, liberal legitimacy cannot 
obtain if it equates legitimate uses of political power with the reasonable consensus 
of every citizen in every instance. Rawls believes it is sufficient, however, to secure 
agreement on the procedures of public decision-making in order to meet the 
requirements of liberal legitimacy. The legitimate status of procedural outcomes, or 
procedural legitimacy, is the concept under investigation in this chapter.  
The idea of substituting consensus on procedures for consensus on outcomes is 
a familiar one in situations of collective decision-making. We are all familiar with the 
practice of flipping a coin or taking a majority vote when members of a group 
presented with a variety of options cannot find bases of substantive agreement on 
any. Rawls appeals to a similar intuition regarding reasonable public decision-
making. The constitution referred to in his principle of legitimacy reflects the values 
of public political culture, such as basic rights or ideas of justice on which all citizens 
agree, but it also outlines the basic structure of political institutions which wield 
political authority. These institutional structures, which have the reasonable 
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endorsement of all citizens, are then given the legitimate authority to use coercive 
power on behalf of the collective body of citizens.  
When Rawls says that legitimate exercises of power are in accord with 
constitutional essentials, and that these in turn are supported by reasonable and 
rational principles and ideals, this is a type of justification. If a particular policy 
results from constitutional procedures that were constructed in accordance with 
constitutional values, and those procedures and values were reasonable and rational, 
then justification for implementing the policy could stem from the fact that is was 
generated by a reasonable procedure.  
However, this is not the sort of justification to which Rawls alludes when he 
says legitimate power is ‘proper and hence justifiable.’ The policy described above 
only meets the necessary conditions for legitimacy, whereas the ‘proper and hence 
justifiable’ clause suggests that justifiable policies are those which follow from the 
appropriate uses of power.  
In addition to justification through appeal to universally justifiable 
constitutional essentials, a policy is justified only if it is justifiable in relation to the 
relevant constitution.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, we can see this easily if we 
compare the legitimate uses of power in two different liberal democratic societies. 
Consider stipulations of residual powers in the constitutions of the United States and 
Canada. Both the Canadian constitution and the constitution of the United States are 
reasonably justifiable from the perspective of common human reason. However, 
according to the Tenth Amendment of the United States’ Constitution, powers not 
expressly delegated to the federal government are automatically retained by the 
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states. In Canada, by contrast, the federal government commands all powers unless 
they are granted to the provinces by the constitution. Although both constitutions are 
supported by reason and rationality, and are therefore justifiable from the 
perspective of common human reason, in the case of residual powers they also 
contradict each other. The legitimacy of state powers cannot be determined 
independently of the particular constitution which specifies the law of the land in 
which state power is being exercised. This goes beyond the condition that exercises 
of power accord with a constitution supported by reasonable and rational principles. 
They must also be in accordance with the relevant constitution. Only justification 
from the public political culture of a democratic society corresponds with the idea 
that a use of power is ‘proper and hence justifiable’. In addition to being in line with 
reasonable and rational ideals found in Rawls’ statement of the principle, legitimacy 
requires justifiability in terms of the appropriate normative framework of 
justification.  
In general then, the logical structure of the liberal principle of legitimacy can be 
split into two parts. First, the principle stipulates that if a particular use of power is 
proper (i.e. legitimate), it follows that it is justifiable. Secondly, the constitutional 
essentials supported by rational principles and ideals are necessary (not sufficient) 
conditions for the proper use of power. The wording of the liberal principle of 
legitimacy says very little about the connection between constitutional essentials and 
the justifiability of particular exercises of power. The most we can glean from the 
statement of the principle is that accordance with reasonable and rational 
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constitutional essentials is necessary for legitimacy, and quite independently, the 
absence of justifiability is sufficient to determine lack of legitimacy.   
Procedural legitimacy derives this more general idea of liberal legitimacy. The 
fact that the procedures in question are validated by the constitution, which is itself 
justified from both the perspective of common human reason and the perspective of 
public democratic culture, means that it is legitimate to use these procedures as a 
way to determine legitimate law. However, the outcomes of these procedures may 
not be justifiable, from either of the two shared perspectives. This is because 
procedures of decision-making can be impure and imperfect. They are impure in the 
sense that public procedures of decision-making can often be manipulated. When a 
jury is weighing complex evidence for or against a conviction, they are allowed to 
weigh different subjective weights to different pieces of evidence, as long as they can 
do so on justifiable grounds. Hence, although one jury might find a defendant guilty, 
another might find the same defendant innocent. Similarly, an innocent person may 
still be convicted of a crime after a trial of due process. This means that procedures 
are imperfect. It cannot always promise to generate the correct result.154 
There is a further problem with the purity of procedures. Even when 
procedural virtues succeed in being pure, their very purity can conflict with other 
reasons embedded in public democratic culture and common human reason. For 
example, if the innocent convict were truly convicted after a procedure of due 
process, then punishing said convict would be fair although it would not just. It 
would be fair in the sense that as a defendant, she was given the same rights as all 
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other citizens  in her position, and subject to the same restrictions. A further aspect of  
the fairness of punishing this convict would lie in the fact that procedures have been 
previously agreed upon by all reasonable citizens (including the convict if the 
convict were reasonable), and each of those reasonable citizens had found the 
procedures justifiable. However, the claim that it would be just to punish said 
convict on these grounds would be abhorrent. This means that at times, in Rawls’ 
theory of legitimacy, if legitimate laws are meant to be put in place, justice has to be 
sacrificed.  
Rawls agrees with this general claim, but is optimistic about how pernicious 
such a state of affairs might be for a liberal political regulated by the liberal principle 
of legitimacy. ‘Democratic decisions and laws are legitimate, not because they are just,’ 
writes Rawls, ‘but because they are legitimately enacted in accordance with an accepted 
legitimate democratic procedure.’155 The legitimacy of the democratic procedure derives 
from it being specified in a legitimate constitution as the legitimate procedure of 
public decision-making. Rawls continues to say that: ‘At some point, the injustice of the 
outcomes of a legitimate democratic procedure corrupts its legitimacy, and so will the 
injustice of the political constitution itself. But before this point is reached, the outcomes of a 
legitimate procedure are legitimate whatever they are. This gives us purely procedural 
democratic legitimacy and distinguishes it from justice, even granting that justice is not 
specified procedurally.’156  
In the Rawlsian framework, determining whether a law is democratic and 
legitimate is a purely procedural matter. The legitimacy of democratic laws derives 
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from the fact that they are the result of legitimate democratic procedures. Similarly, 
Rawls believes that the conditions under which the procedures of legislative and 
judicial decision-making are enacted is sufficient to ascribe legitimacy to the 
outcome. These conditions are specified in Rawls’ defence of the legal obligation to 
obey the law. They are based on moral requirements deriving from reciprocity and 
fairness. In the next section I will state these requirements more precisely, and 
explain why Rawls believes that legitimate law is justifiable law.  
2.2: The Legal Obligation to Obey the Law 
In his early work, Rawls defends the view that there exists a pro tanto obligation to 
obey the law. 157 Two features of pro tanto obligations play an integral role in Rawls’ 
account of legal obligation. Firstly, pro tanto obligations are conditional obligations 
rather than universal obligations. They are conditional upon the practical 
circumstances in which individuals find themselves.158 While an obligation like 
mutual respect might be universal in the sense of being binding on all people on any 
occasion,159 duties like promise keeping or fair cooperation are conditional upon an 
agent having voluntarily made a promise to someone else.160  
Secondly, due to the fact that pro tanto obligations are not universal, they can 
be overridden by weightier obligations that are demanded by practical 
circumstances. This does not mean that pro tanto obligations cease to exist in the face 
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of a weighty obligation. It simply means that in the case of conflict, the weightier 
obligation overrides the less weighty one. This second characteristic is formalized in 
MBE Smith’s definition of pro tanto, or prima facie duties as: ‘a person S has a prima 
facie obligation to do an act X if, and only if, there is a moral reason for S to do X which is 
such that, unless he has a moral reason not to do X at least as strong as his reason to do X, 
S's failure to do X is wrong.’161  
When pro tanto obligations are weighed against each other to determine the 
actual obligation given the practical situation, that obligation is termed the ‘all things 
considered duty.’162 In Rawls’ view, when there exists a duty to obey the law, it is a 
moral obligation of the all things considered variety. It does not exist unless the pro 
tanto obligation to obey the law is the weightiest moral concern identifiable in a 
practical situation. It is for this reason that Rawls believes it is justifiable to disobey 
the law and engage in civil disobedience when the constitutional process produces a 
decision that is in violation of justice, equality, liberty or another weighty public 
value.163  
Rawls offers three arguments in defence of the existence of a pro tanto 
obligation to obey the law. All depend on moral laws which he believes to be 
acceptable to anyone capable of practical reason. In his early work, Rawls defends 
the pro tanto obligation to obey the law in terms of the principle of reciprocity and 
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the duty of fair play.164 The principle of reciprocity defends the view that there is a 
pro tanto obligation to obey the law when citizens of a constitutional democracy see 
their relation to each other as mutually self-interested agents.165 This is slightly 
different from the prima facie obligation generated by the duty of fair play, which 
understands free and equal citizens to be engaged in a cooperative enterprise.166 Then 
in A Theory of Justice, Rawls’ defence relies on what he calls the moral principle of 
fairness. 167 The weight of this defence relies on viewing agents as reasonable moral 
agents engaged in a convention or practice they all deem justifiable.   
For Rawls, self-interested individuals with competing interests who are willing 
to engage in only those common practices deemed acceptable from ‘the general point 
of view’ are willing to view each other on the basis of reciprocity168. In an account of 
justice where the principles of justice are developed through mutual agreement, 
reciprocity places the constraints of ‘having a morality’ upon the agreed rules of 
justice.169 This constraint is specified as ‘the acknowledgement of principles as impartially 
applying to one’s own claims as well as to others, and the consequent constraint upon the 
pursuit of one’s own needs.’170 In essence then, reciprocity is the moral impetus for the 
impartial application of rules that are agreed upon as general. 
Given that the terms of the agreement has been chosen by free, self-interested 
individuals who have accepted the principle of reciprocity, and that all who have 
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agreed upon it have agreed that it is just or fair, Rawls points out that they have no 
reasonable complaint against the chosen principles171. Rawls then claims that a prima 
facie obligation has been generated insofar as the terms of the agreement were 
voluntarily agreed upon172.  
While the argument from reciprocity requires each citizen to view others as 
equal and therefore rules as impartial to all citizens, fair social cooperation requires 
citizens to see each other as agents pursuing a mutually advantageous course of 
action. The two views are meant to be consistent when determining the duties of 
citizens given the coercive power of legitimate law. Rawls’ principle of fairness states 
that, ‘a person is under an obligation to do his part as specified by the rules of an institution 
whenever he has voluntarily accepted the benefits of the scheme or has taken advantage of the 
opportunities it offers to advance his interests.’173 The preconditions required for this 
principle to become operative are twofold. Firstly, it must be the case that voluntary 
actions of an individual generated the obligation. Secondly, the institution which 
determines the rules must be a just institution.174  
Rawls illustrates the principle of fairness using the rule of promise keeping. If 
there exists a just institution of promise keeping, then a person generates a pro tanto 
obligation to keep a promise when he or she freely makes a promise to another 
person.175 In order for an institution like that of promise keeping to be just, it would 
require the publicity of the rules of promise keeping (i.e. common knowledge of 
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when promises arise, such as through the speech act ‘I promise to X’) and the 
freedom of individuals to invoke the rules voluntarily.176  The obligation to keep 
one’s promise is generated from the autonomous choice to make the promise as well 
as the fact that one either has or intends to benefit from the institution. Importantly, 
Rawls follows Ross in stating that this does not make promise-keeping a perfect 
duty.177 That is, individuals are sometimes justified in breaking promises when 
weightier concerns are at stake. If A agrees to meet B for coffee at 3 o’clock, but by 
being fifteen minutes late she will have time to take her ill neighbour to the hospital, 
then she may be justified in not keeping her promise. This does not erase her pro 
tanto obligation to keep her promise, it just indicates that there are more serious 
concerns at stake.  
This parallels the second sense of the pro tanto obligation to obey the law is 
also pro tanto in second important sense. Namely, when it conflicts with a more 
stringent duty (say the prevention of injustice) the duty to obey the law can be 
overridden. Just like in the case of promises, it does not indicate that the strength of 
the law diminishes in certain circumstances. Rather, it indicates that weightier 
considerations make refusing to obey the law justifiable.  
The obligation to obey the law is therefore a pro tanto or prima facie obligation 
in the sense that it is conditional upon certain preconditions being realized. Unlike 
overriding obligations which hold generally and universally, a pro tanto obligation is 
conditional upon certain states of the world being realized.178 The justness condition 
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is particularly important as it indicates that individuals cannot be bound by 
obligations created when they voluntarily participate in unjust institutions.179 
Rawls offers a third defence of the pro tanto duty to obey the law based on the 
moral principle of fairness. This is similar to the notion of fairness discussed when 
Rawls advanced the defence from fair social cooperation. However, it utilizes the 
idea of fairness from within a practice or convention that is not chosen but certainly 
justifiable. It is meant to reflect the idea that people do not choose to be born into 
political associations regulated by conventions of justice, but that they can recognize 
the value of such conventions.  
Rawls argues that certain conventions exist because their general observance 
promotes benefits for society. However, it does not follow that their observance in 
particular circumstances will also promote any benefit for society. Promise-keeping 
is one such convention. It may be the case that in some instances, keeping one’s 
promises generates results that benefit nobody. However, given that the convention 
of promise-keeping promotes general welfare, fairness requires that each person 
follow the requirements of the rules of the convention.  
The convention-based account of law as a pro tanto obligation builds upon the 
other two accounts, because it demonstrates that at times a person will have an all 
things considered duty to obey unjust laws. Just as promises must sometimes be kept 
out of respect for the institution, regardless of the fact that no one will benefit from 
the promise or that the promise seems immoral on some other grounds, laws may 
sometimes require obedience regardless of the fact that they are unjust. Unlike in the 
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case of fair terms of cooperation where a law’s injustice was sufficient reason not 
follow it, the convention-based account indicates that even when all agree that a 
particular use of political power is unjust, this is not sufficient grounds to question its 
legitimacy.  
Rawls gives the example of several minority groups who have been suffering 
from unjust laws despite the overarching authority of a just constitution. Rawls 
write: ‘...other things being equal, two minorities are similarly justified in resorting to civil 
disobedience if they have suffered for the same length of time from the same degree of injustice 
and if their equally sincere and normal political appeals have likewise been to no avail.’180 
However, in the example offered by Rawls, if all minority groups were to engage in 
civil disobedience at once, ‘Serious disorder would follow which might well undermine the 
efficacy of the just constitution.’ 181 In this instance, Rawls argues that civil disobedience 
would not be appropriate for some minority groups as it is a requirement of the 
natural duty of justice that those who wish to see justice done sometimes show 
restraint in its implementation.182  
Put in terms of the convention-based account, the just constitution indicates the 
existence of a convention through which political society is generally well-ordered 
and just. However, this does not indicate that procedures of legislation and judicial 
decision-making are perfect procedures. There will always be unjust laws, and if 
every unjust law were undermined simultaneously then the well-ordered political 
society could also be undermined. This does not mean that citizens should never 
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engage in civil disobedience, but that they must consider the practical consequences 
of this engagement so as not to overturn the entire convention. 
Rawls seems more willing to concede that legitimate institutions could 
themselves evolve to align with general concerns about injustice. He writes in his 
later debates with Habermas that: ‘…with well-framed and decent democratic institutions, 
reasonable and rational citizens will enact laws and policies that would almost always be 
legitimate, though not of course just. Yet this assurance of legitimacy would gradually 
weaken to the extent that the society ceased to be well ordered…the greater [the 
constitution’s] deviation from justice, the more likely the injustice of outcomes. Laws cannot 
be too unjust if they are to be legitimate.’183  
The gradual weakening of legitimacy essentially means that reasonable citizens 
will eventually lose faith in the institutionalized procedure’s ability to perform its 
task (e.g. to determine guilt or innocence). After several instances of witnessing the 
procedure’s failure, such citizens might conclude that it would be more reasonable to 
invoke some manner of institutional reform. It also indicates that it is the constitution 
itself eventually becomes unjustifiable without reform, rather than a particular 
instantiation of it. The change of the constitution signifies changes to the convention 
regulating justice.   
Yet the possibility of institutional reform hardly exhausts the problem, given 
that all actual procedures of justice are imperfect. The problem is that reasonable 
citizens can never hope that the judicial or legislative procedures in place will always 
generate outcomes that reasonable individuals would consider just. Such faith in 
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procedures would amount to the claim that the procedures were perfect procedures 
of justice that always generated the just outcome and could never be called into 
question. Rawls on the other hand encourages citizens to question procedural 
outcomes as they legislate and adjudicate on behalf of each citizen . He claims: ‘the 
enactments and legislation of all institutional procedures should always be regarded by 
citizens as open to question. It is part of citizens’ sense of themselves, not only collectively but 
also individually, to recognize political authority as deriving from them and that they are 
responsible for what it does in their name.’184 
We must therefore determine the circumstances in which reasonable citizens 
would be willing to concede to the procedure’s authority at all, knowing that they 
will inevitably be bound to the authority of unjust procedural outcomes.     
2.3: Procedural Legitimacy and Justification  
It might be helpful at the outset to distinguish between what makes a coercive act 
reasonable, and what makes it justifiable. In the last section I introduced the idea of 
reasonable pluralism, the notion that reasonable people can disagree on judgments 
that require complex calculations and interpretations of abstract principles. In 
common parlance, it seems acceptable to say that all these reasonable positions are 
justifiable in the sense that a justification can be offered as to why a given act should 
be the act undertaken through the coercive use of power. In political liberalism, 
however, a justification is limited by the criterion of reciprocity.185   
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The criterion of reciprocity demands that reasonable citizens trying to justify 
their positions offer only those reasons they reasonably believe others could 
reasonably accept as sufficient for a justification186. For example, we might expect the 
victim of a robbery to understand the reasons a thief had for committing the robbery, 
but not reasonably accept those reasons. If the thief were to try to justify the crime by 
telling her victim, iI stole your wallet because I wanted to access the money inside of 
it,i the criterion of reciprocity would point out that this perfectly good explanatory 
reason does not justify the crime because the thief could not reasonably believe that 
the victim would accept this explanation on reasonable grounds.   
In the political sphere, the criterion of reciprocity is satisfied ‘when those terms 
are proposed as the most reasonable terms of fair co- operation, those proposing them must 
also think it at least reasonable for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not as 
dominated or manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social position.’187 
The question before us now is whether disobeying an outcome of a legitimate 
procedure could ever be justifiable when our reasoning is constrained by the 
criterion of reciprocity.  If not, then the obligation to obey legitimate law is a 
requirement of the criterion of reciprocity.  
I first show why it is the case that given perfect or imperfect procedures of 
justice, a reasonable citizen may find the outcomes of legitimate procedures 
unjustifiable. The conclusions of this analysis are relatively similar to the one offered 
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by Rawls in his defence of civil disobedience in light of legal obligation. However, 
the analysis itself aims to present the logical structure of weighing reasons which 
underlies Rawls’ own defence. This structure becomes important when I move on to 
assess procedural outcomes of collective decisions for which public democratic 
culture does not identify a procedure independent correct answer. Here it is 
demonstrated that in a good many cases upon which citizens rely on legitimate 
procedures to produce justifiable outcomes to which citizens must be bound as 
matters of fair cooperation, are indeed not justifiable.  
2.3.1 Perfect and Imperfect Procedures of Justice 
The idea that there can be tension between an individual’s endorsement of a 
procedure and her disapproval of an outcome is a well-known problem. Perhaps the 
best-known formulation is Richard Wollheim’s Paradox in the Theory of 
Democracy.’188As there are remarkable similarities between Wollheim’s democrat 
and our liberal, I will use his formulation as a springboard off which to build my 
analysis. However, there are two important distinctions between Wollheim’s 
democrat and the Rawlsian liberal that are also worthy of consideration. The first is 
the reasonable citizenship of the liberal which is the basis of the reasonable 
endorsement of a procedure. The second is the nature of the commitment attributed 
to the procedural endorsement in light of the demands of reasonable citizenship, and 
the derivative obligations of said commitment.  
Wollheim constructs his paradox of democracy by asking us to imagine the 
relationship between a democrat and a democracy machine. The democracy machine 
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is set up to take a series of inputs (the choices of citizens in a democracy) and 
generate an output in accordance with a democratic rule. Wollheim characterizes the 
output of the machine as a ‘choice of its own,’ that reflects democratic principles like 
aggregation and majority-voting.189 The democrat in question is a particular citizen in 
whose judgment the democracy machine ought to be the mode of collective decision-
making. In Wollheim’s account this is an evaluative judgment of the democrat’s and 
not simply a judgment of his preference190. The paradox arises when in a particular 
instance the democrat offers an input into the democracy machine of a choice of 
Policy A over Policy B. This too is an evaluative judgment and not a judgment solely 
based on personal desire. The democracy machine, however, chooses Policy B over 
Policy A. Wollheim’s paradox results from that fact that the democrat in question 
now seems to hold that Policy A should be enacted instead of Policy B, and that 
Policy B should be enacted instead of Policy A. This is in effect the situation of all 
counter-majoritarians who also consider themselves democrats.  
The parallel with the case of the liberal should be apparent. The liberal has 
accepted the reasonableness of a particular procedure by which to come to collective 
decisions. In reasonably endorsing said procedure, he or she has formed a judgment 
based on the fact that there is justifiable reason to endorse the procedure given the 
demands of reciprocity and political reasonableness. The inputs of the liberal 
machine are not choices A and B, but sets of reasonable grounds RA or RB which 
correspond to particular choices. These reasonable grounds are salient insofar as they 
are relevant to the circumstances under which the policy alternatives are considered, 
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and also insofar as they are constrained by the requirements of reasonable 
citizenship. Note that the set of reasonable grounds RA which justify policy A to the 
individual in question can also contain reasons for why the collective ought not to 
undertake policy B. Note also that these sets of reasonable grounds are person-
specific; different individuals may have different sets RA and RB which yield 
justifications for policies A or B.  
So the liberal uses her capacity for reasonable citizenship in evaluating what 
the procedural outcome ought to be, but constructs her inputs as a set of reasonable 
grounds corresponding with a particular policy choice. This evaluation is put into 
the procedural apparatus. However, instead of a set of reasons being the output of 
the liberal machine, a policy decision is the output. So for example, the liberal puts 
RA into the procedure (believing outcome A ought to be the collective outcome) and 
instead the machine generates B. The procedural outcome differs from that outcome 
corresponding to the liberal’s input. The grounds RB for the liberal to adopt the 
procedural outcome are the reasons for which the liberal endorses the procedure (e.g. 
on grounds of political reasonableness). However, if RA includes reasons for 
dismissing B, the liberal now has reasons for both finding the procedural outcome B 
justifiable and reasonably disagreeing with it.  
The coherence of this position comes from the fact that the legitimate 
procedure ‘is a process of social decision that does not produce a statement to be 
believed...but a rule to be followed.’191Following the dictates of the procedure is one 
of the terms of social cooperation. In this sense, the liberal’s case hardly seems as 
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paradoxical as the democrat’s.  The liberal has a set of reasonable grounds RB which 
cause him or her to believe that the procedural outcome is grounded in justifiable 
claims. He or she also has a set of grounds RA which make her believe that it is 
unreasonable to support the procedural outcome. While the democrat is being asked 
to make a judgment on the output (Policy A or Policy B) and ends up in a 
paradoxical situation, the liberal is asked to evaluate the inputs (reasons for the 
procedural outcome or reasons against it) and can coherently outline different sets of 
reasons for doing either. Clearly, the democrat can also offer reasons for why he 
supports A instead of B and vice versa. The key difference is that offering reasons is 
not the democrat’s job. The democrat is simply asked to evaluate which policy is 
better. By contrast the inputs of the liberal machine are not policy choices but a set of 
grounds which justify a policy choice. As these grounds need not be the same in the 
two sets, the liberal can simply seek an over-riding reason to arbitrate between these 
two justifications if at all necessary.  
However, supposing that the procedural outcome is B and the liberal’s input 
reasons are RA, the liberal is declaring well-reasoned support for the statements ‘yes 
to policy B’ and ‘no to policy B’ because ‘yes’ and ‘no’ explicitly refer to whether or 
not policy B can be reasonably justified. RB of course provides reasons justifying B, 
and I have already stated that RA must include reasons not to adopt B in order to 
determine that A is the better option. Given that the democrat’s reasons for 
supporting A and B are different, there is a paradox regarding which policy to 
support but no inconsistency in reasoning. The democrat simply does not know how 
to weigh his support for the procedural outcome against his support for the input he 
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placed into the procedure. By contrast there appears to be a genuine inconsistency in 
the reasoning of the liberal. If RA includes reasons not to support B which make B 
unjustifiable, then the liberal is at once declaring Policy B to be the legitimate 
outcome on reasonable terms, and Policy B to be completely unreasonable. There is 
no paradox in the liberal case, because the problem is obvious: the liberal is at some 
level being inconsistent.  
Rawls, however, construes such a situation as a conflict of prima facie duties: 
acting in accordance with the reasonable and acting in accordance with the law192 . 
He writes of the liberal: ‘In this situation he simply has to balance his obligation to oppose 
an unjust statute against his obligation to abide by a just outcome.’ While acknowledging 
that sometimes this may lead to civil disobedience Rawls writes that, ‘Normally, it is 
hoped that the obligation to the constitution is clearly the decisive one.’193 
In other words, Rawls’ conceives of the liberal’s dilemma as similar to that of 
Wollheim’s democrat; the belief that the policy not adopted is superior and yet must 
be accepted because it is the result of fair terms of cooperation194. Rawls’ way out of 
the paradox is to claim that a belief in the superiority of the adopted policy is not 
required. Yet the problem of the liberal is not that the policy not adopted is merely 
superior; it is the more complex belief that the adopted policy is not justifiable.  
Within the liberal framework of legitimacy, it seems that the liberal is 
committed to the procedural outcome in virtue of the fact that there is reasonable 
consensus on said procedure despite reasonable pluralism and recognition of the 
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burdens of judgment placed on reasonable citizens. Implicit in all this is the idea that 
any reasonable disagreement with the procedural outcome cannot be sustained by 
way of political reasonableness. This is because political reasonableness includes 
recognizing the burdens of judgment, and accepting that there will never be 
consensus on procedural outcomes.   
However, I am assuming that the liberal cannot find the outcome justifiable 
from the perspective of public democratic culture. The liberal has already taken the 
public perspective into consideration when forming the disapproving evaluation. 
More precisely, a liberal claiming she cannot deem the procedural outcome 
justifiable is in fact claiming that RB is a subset of some set of reasonable grounds RA2 
which still leads the liberal to believe that A is the correct answer. Prior to the liberal 
machine generating outcome B, the liberal’s reasons for supporting policy A were 
represented by RA. When the liberal claims that she continues to find only policy A 
reasonable despite the procedural outcome, it can no longer be on grounds RA 
because there is another reason to consider now, namely that B is the procedural 
outcome. In fact what she is claiming is that RA and RB (which I claimed 
corresponded to the reasons for adopting a procedure) are both subsets of some 
different set of reasonable grounds RA2 which still lead the liberal to find only A 
reasonable and B unjustifiable. (Remember, the liberal cannot find B justifiable 
because RA must have reasons not to adopt B; it is the very fact that B cannot be 
justifiable which gives A politically reasonable support post-procedurally). Since 
each particular reason in a set of reasons can represent a different claim, concern or 
value, it is no longer inconsistent that some of the reasons our liberal is considering 
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might justify one policy or another, but taken as a whole the salient reasons point 
directly to the reasonability of one and only one outcome. 
Consider again the case of our innocent convict. Suppose a liberal knew the 
convict to be innocent, and found herself in a situation where she could help the 
convict avoid punishment by evading the demands of authority. In trying to 
determine whether or not to help an innocent convict escape punishment, if the 
individual’s reasons were simply (i) due process was used, (ii) due process typically 
generates the correct outcome, (iii) due process found the individual guilty, and (iv) 
the punishment suits those who are guilty, then the reasons would presumably 
justify letting the convict be punished. These four reasons are in effect what I was 
referring to as RB. Note that (i) represents fair terms of cooperation, (ii) reflects the 
grounds for the reasonable endorsement of the procedure, and (iii) expresses what 
reciprocity would require in this situation. Now, in addition to reasons (i) – (iv) the 
individual has to consider reason (v) the convict is innocent. Considering all five of 
these reasons together still generates a justification of the procedure and no 
overriding justification for the outcome.  
It might be intuitive to think that this fifth reason alone is the primary reason 
which the liberal uses in determining the procedural outcome to be unjustified. 
However this is not what the individual is claiming when she finds the procedural 
outcome unjustifiable. An individual who claimed that the reason (v) is sufficient to 
overpower RB is not respecting fairness, political reasonableness or reciprocity. She 
would in effect be saying given the set of reasons to adopt the procedural outcome 
RB, which consists of reasons {(i), (ii), (iii), (iv)}, and the set of reasons not to do so, 
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{(v)} which is equal to RA, RA outweighed RB. By contrast someone could appeal to set 
of reasons RA2which is the set of all five reasons taken together, i.e. {(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), 
(v)}. It is absolutely integral that all the reasons in RB are taken into account in order 
for the reasonable disagreement to be justifiable. We can also now see that there is no 
inconsistency in holding policy B justifiable on grounds RB and not on grounds RA2. 
The confusion is that RA and RA2 are both justifications given by an individual for not 
adopting the procedural outcome. However, only the latter is a justification for not 
complying with procedural authority since it takes into account fairness, political 
reasonableness and reciprocity.  
It is in this sense that there is no inconsistency in the reasoning of the liberal 
who believes the procedure is justifiable but not the procedural outcome. It is 
possible that the set of reasonable grounds justifying the procedure is a subset of the 
reasonable grounds for finding the procedural outcome unjustifiable. This is what 
our construction of justified reasonable disagreement amounts to. The liberal, when 
motivated by the objectives of reasonable citizenship (i.e. political reasonableness 
and reciprocity) cannot justify the procedural outcome. However, it is also the 
objectives of reasonable citizenship that prompt him or her to endorse the procedure.  
A natural question which now arises is whether a reasonable citizen has ‘truly’ 
endorsed a procedure if she can find the procedural outcomes unjustifiable from the 
general point of view of public democratic culture (i.e. holding RA2).  Reasonably 
endorsing a procedure means ratifying a constitution and coming to an agreement 
on legislative and judicial processes of decision-making on grounds that all find 
reasonable. What, one might ask, is the purpose and function of this ratification 
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process if the outcomes of constitutional procedures may ultimately be viewed as 
unacceptable with the addition of one or more other considerations? 
I would answer that in reasonably agreeing to a particular procedure of 
decision-making, a reasonable citizen is merely accepting that the outcomes 
generated by said procedure meet the demands of political reasonableness and 
reciprocity. Compare the reason (v) from the above example, that the convict is 
innocent, with a reason (v*) which says that although guilty, those convicted of 
crimes ought to be shown mercy, because it is God and not man who punishes the 
wicked.  Now (v*) is a completely reasonable position, but it is not politically 
reasonable. It is the reason of a private comprehensive doctrine.  
Another way to think of this is that if people took (v*) seriously then the 
procedure would either not be legitimate (since those individuals who accept (v*) 
cannot accept (iv) and hence the criterion of reciprocity would not be met) or the 
judicial procedure would depend on a higher level procedure for its legitimacy (say 
the procedure by which the legislature determines acceptable punishment). In either 
case, we would not have to confront a scenario in which a liberal found the 
procedure reasonable and the outcome unjustifiable. What (v) contributes to the set 
RA2  which (v*) could not, is the argument that although the punishment does suit 
those who are guilty, this consideration is not applicable in this instance because the 
individual convicted is not guilty.   
In short the demands of reasonable citizenship are necessary conditions for 
justifiability, but not sufficient ones. In the example given, the conditions of 
reasonable citizenship are met regardless of whether an innocent convict is punished 
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or not. The conditions of justice, however, are met only when no individual is 
punished for a crime he or she did not commit. Such a judgment, of course, is one of 
substantive justice and exactly the sort of judgment that typically violates the 
recognition of the burdens of judgment. (Recall that the need for procedural 
legitimacy arises out of reasonable pluralism, the claim that there will be inevitable 
disagreement on substantive claims.) However, in this case, this is a substantive 
claim made while respecting the demands of reasonable citizenship. The person who 
deems it unjustifiable to punish an innocent on substantive grounds cannot be 
accused of failing to offer reasons that she could reasonably expect other to find 
acceptable from a general point of view. Anyone with a sense of justice can see that it 
would be unjust to carry out punishment when the person about to be punished is in 
fact innocent.  
The argument above rested on the fact that the conjunction of the demands of 
reasonable citizenship and (v*) would not be sufficient to question the justifiability of 
a procedural outcome, since (v*)  is located exclusively within a reasonable 
individual’s private comprehensive doctrine. However, there is a third class of 
concerns on par with (v), but which may be the subject of reasonable disagreement. 
That is, they may be viewed as reasonably acceptable by all reasonable citizens but in 
conflict with other reasonably acceptable values. The sort of concern I am thinking of 
involves arguments from public values like ‘inhumanity’ or ‘respect for persons’. 
Suppose that a reasonable citizen believed that although the convict was guilty, the 
punishment was far too harsh, too inhuman, to fit the crime. This too would be an 
attack on (iv), the argument that from the perspective of public democratic culture, 
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the punishment does not fit the crime. The difference between the claim regarding 
inhumanity and the argument from religious conviction, however, is that the former 
claim is one that the public democratic culture must respect. Treating all individuals 
with humanity is a public value in the sense that it is required by both the criterion 
and principle of reciprocity.  
 Therefore, even when the necessary demands of reasonable citizenship are 
met, there are still two types of private judgments which may make the procedural 
outcome unjustifiable. The first are judgments regarding the relevance of the reasons 
reflected in the procedure to the situation at hand. This includes judgments like a 
convict’s innocence in cases where we are concerned with punishing the guilty. 
These judgments contend that although there is nothing wrong with the procedure 
in general, it does not come to the intended conclusion in the situation at hand. The 
second sort of judgment notes that although the procedure and the values it reflects 
are publicly justifiable, there are other public values that make the procedural 
outcome unacceptable.  
2.3.2 Fairness – burdens of judgment, the strength of a pro tanto obligation   
Thus far, my analysis has centered on the situation of a liberal who finds a procedure 
of public collective decision-making reasonably justifiable, but who is hesitant to 
defer to its authority in a particular case because she believes that the procedural 
outcome in the particular case is unjust. I have pointed out that although Rawls may 
be correct in claiming that there are several reasons for her to defer to the 
procedure’s dictates, there may also be additional reasons for her to disobey its 
authority. One of the limitations of my argument thus far, has been that the main 
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example I have offered has provided procedure independent reasons for questioning 
the authority of the procedural outcome. Regardless of private judgment, there must 
be a fact of the matter with regards to a person’s guilt and the justness of punishment 
depends entirely on this fact.   
What about cases in which there is no procedure-independent fact of the 
matter with regards to justice? There are two sorts of cases that I have in mind. In the 
first, individuals’ beliefs regarding the justness of the procedural outcome depend 
entirely on the procedure by which the outcome is generated. For example, whether 
or not the toss of a die is fair depends on nothing more than whether or not a fair die 
is used. Similarly, whether or not the outcome of a gamble freely taken is fair simply 
depends on whether or not the gamble itself is fair, not on the distribution of wealth 
in the aftermath of the gamble.195 These cases of ‘pure procedural justice’ translate 
into the political framework when all agree that there is no ‘correct’ outcome except 
that designated by the decision-framework. The most familiar application of pure 
procedure justice to the distribution of goods when legal and economic institutions 
are just, and in being just the outcomes of economic transactions are perfectly 
competitive.196 However, pure procedural justice can also apply in the political 
sphere, for example when determining the winners of election in which all 
candidates were legally eligible to run. 
The second sort of example I have in mind is one in which individuals’ 
comprehensive doctrines have clear views on what a just outcome ought to look like, 
but political society as a whole cannot deliberate between the two in a way that 
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generates a definitive outcome as to what is just. I have in mind deeply divisive 
political issues like the debate on abortion in the United States, or the 2004 decision 
in France to disallow the wearing of religious insignia on the grounds of state 
schools. Proponents of the decision in France cited secularism, gender equality and 
nationalism in defense of the ban197. Those opposed also cited an important political 
value, namely that the decision was appallingly intolerant of individuals’ liberty of 
conscience. While political society can identify both secularism and liberty of 
conscience as reasonable values, it cannot provide an account of how citizens ought 
to weigh the two against each other in practical deliberation. Those weights are 
informed by individual citizens’ comprehensive moral and religious doctrines, and 
subjective deliberation. 
What this case has in common with cases of pure procedural justice is 
dependence on the procedure in question to determine both the legitimacy and the 
justifiability of a political position. In the case of distributive justice, Rawls writes: 
‘Given a just constitution and the smooth working of the four branches of government, and so 
on, there exists a procedure such that the actual distribution of wealth, whatever it turns out 
to be, is just. It will have come about as a consequence of a just system of institutions 
satisfying the principles to which everyone would agree and against which no one can 
complain...There are indefinitely many outcomes, and what makes one o these just is that it 
has been achieved by actually carrying out a just scheme of cooperation as it is publicly 
understood.’198 In cases of pure procedural justice it seems impossible to agree with 
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the procedure and not the procedural outcome, because the reasons by which 
individuals evaluate the justness of a procedural outcome are the features of the 
procedure itself. The wealth distribution after a series of fair bets made by a free, 
rational agent is fair, regardless of how inequitable the distribution is199. Similarly, 
the wealth distribution in a market economy is fair as long as the economy consists 
of free rational agents operating in an economic framework supported by just 
institutions200. The just institutions in fact, serve as the ‘just scheme of cooperation’.  
There is an analogy here between fair institutions supporting a free market 
economy, and those legislative and judicial institutions through which legitimate 
procedural decisions are made. The legitimate procedures constitute a just scheme of 
cooperation as well, insofar as they can be justified by reasons that all find justifiable. 
Recall that according to Rawls, individuals recognizing the burdens of judgment and 
willing to offer fair terms of cooperation will relinquish the objective of realizing 
‘truth’ in the political sphere and will settle for realizing the reasonable. This is 
because, ‘Our individual and associative points of view, intellectual affinities, and affective 
attachments, are too diverse, especially in a free society, to enable those doctrines to serve as 
the basis of lasting and reasoned political argument.’201 A reasonable individual therefore 
has to recognize the possibility of reasonable disagreement amongst reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines.202 The purpose of constructing procedures of decision-
making is to adjudicate between these disagreements.203 
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In the case of evaluating political outcomes, this means that despite the fact 
that reasonable citizens may hold private substantive beliefs regarding the justness of 
certain procedural outcomes, from the public political sphere the justness is purely 
procedural. From the perspective of public pure procedural justice, RA2 would 
include the fact that the outcome was generated by a fair procedure, but also that the 
outcome is fair in and of itself from the public perspective. Yet this does not mean 
that holding RA2 requires an individual to consider the outcome politically 
reasonable. Those who find the decision in France intolerant want to argue that it is 
not a politically reasonable outcome. This means that if by fairness we mean 
recognizing divergent reasonable viewpoints and upholding some semblance of a 
justificatory requirement, it is not automatically apparent that the outcome of a pure 
procedure of justice is also just. The sort of fairness public pure procedural justice 
generates is neutrality between competing reasonable comprehensive doctrines. It 
ensures that there is no bias in favor of any comprehensive doctrine in the public 
sphere, and hence is fair. However, this is a far cry from calling the outcome just.  
Now, we have already established that the set of reasons for adopting the 
procedure constitute those set of reasons we have for believing a particular outcome 
unjustified. However, in our previous assessments the operative assumption was 
that in addition to the reasons for adopting the given procedure, we have other 
reasons explaining why the procedure fails in a particular circumstance. Now if these 
reasons relate simply to the circumstances in which the procedure is applied (i.e. in 
the case of the criminal trial in which an innocent individual is found guilty) we can 
see that the reasons for upholding the procedure in general are still sufficient to 
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justify it. In a criminal trial following due process we assume that regardless of the 
outcome and without any systematic defect of the procedure, the trial still reflects the 
best feasible process. As a result, the sorts of reasons we use in determining whether 
or not there are justifiable grounds for adopting a particular procedure are 
compatible with the existence of reasons for holding the outcome of a procedure to 
be unjustifiable in a given instance.  
This is not the case when reasonable individuals have divergent views on the 
weighting of public values. When the French Parliament decided to ban religious 
insignia from its state schools, it was not simply upholding the reasonableness of 
solidarity as a source of public justification, it was denying that justificatory role to 
religious expression. This means it is possible to make that claim that a particular 
outcome, despite being just, still may not be justifiable to the individual when all 
grounds are considered. The individual, after all, has substantive views of justice 
quite independent of the fact that from the public perspective, the procedure is the 
best determination of fairness. We can quite coherently say that having taken into 
account the constraint of offering fair terms to each person (a criterion that the 
procedure meets) we may still question the legitimacy of the procedural outcome on 
grounds of extra-procedural reasons. We may see this as follows:  
In our working example of religious insignia in French schools, suppose that 
after the legislation is passed, and religious insignia are outlawed on school grounds, 
one reasonable citizen finds the consequences to be appallingly intolerant. Hence the 
individual’s RA2 essentially considers: (i) the claim that the procedure recognizes fair 
terms of cooperation and the burdens of judgment; (ii) the claim that the outcome is 
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fair insofar as it reflects a fair scheme of cooperation which respects the burdens of 
judgment; (iii) the claim that the outcome does not respect religious expression; and 
(iv) the claim that the outcome is just from the perspective of democratic culture 
because the procedure is one of public pure procedural justice. Due to the priority of 
(ii) it seems that the citizen must accept the procedural outcome if motivated by 
reasonable terms. The situation of this person is slightly different from that of the 
person in the imperfect procedural case. This person not only recognizes that the 
outcome is the result of a fair procedure, but also intrinsically fair in and of itself due 
to its generation from a pure procedure of justice (for which there is no independent 
criterion of just evaluation). If this citizen is to recognize both fair terms of 
cooperation and the burdens of judgment on others, it seems she must recognize the 
fact that the procedural outcome is justifiable. What happens then, if she thinks the 
fairness is outweighed by the need for religious expression?  
It seems odd, of course, to say that a procedural outcome is both just and 
intolerant. Presumably our public conception of justice (particularly substantive 
justice) includes considerations of tolerance, equity, freedom, rights, opportunity and 
so forth. Therefore, it would be more accurate to say that reasonable individuals 
agree that the procedural outcome is just at the level of being fair (i.e. procedurally 
just), and disagree about the level at which it is intolerant or unjust.  
A final question is whether a reasonable advocate of a public value that is in 
the common good but not shared could find similar reasons for not deferring to the 
procedural outcome. Suppose the value in question is something more akin to 
solidarity, temperance or matters of public health. All of these are in the ‘public 
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interest’ as far as the individual is concerned, and therefore it is reasonable for her to 
expect others to endorse it. Temperance and other matters of public health could be 
of critical importance to groups of people like families, neighbourhoods and 
municipal associations, without having strong consequences for the polity at large; 
and yet reasonable individuals may not support such initiatives at the political level. 
As a result of all this, there is sufficient difficulty in obtaining liberal 
legitimacy, with its justificatory requirement, in the pure procedural case. An appeal 
to pure procedures simply claims that there is one aspect of substantive justice that 
all reasonable citizens agree is characteristic of the procedural outcome (namely fair 
cooperation). Yet with other aspects of substantive justice advocating for different 
outcomes, a person could reasonably find the outcome of a pure procedure of justice 
unjustifiable.  
A common feature of all cases in which different aspects of substantive justice 
are in conflict is that they all require individuals to form a private judgment 
regarding how to apply general rules or principles of justice to a variety of situations. 
Any justification without appeal to procedure or shared values is essentially a 
private judgment; including the attachment of weights to different public values. 
Hence, the judgment that the outcome of a pure procedure of justice is just is still 
substantive. This means, however, that when individuals have non-procedural 
reasons for disagreeing with the outcomes of fair schemes of cooperation, they can 
defend their disagreement on grounds that the fair scheme of cooperation is a pure 
procedure of justice, and in their substantive view of justice, the outcomes is 
unjustifiable.  
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Hence, Rawls’ expressed faith in the idea that when choosing between an 
unjust statute and a just constitution, ‘it is hoped that the obligation to the constitution is 
clearly the decisive one,’204 is untenable. The constitution reflects a fair scheme of 
cooperation, which in turn is a pure procedure of justice for the public sphere. The 
reason to choose the constitution over the statute is therefore expressed in the duty of 
fair play. ‘If one thinks of the constitution as a fundamental part of the scheme of social 
cooperation, then one can say that if the constitution is just, and if one has accepted the 
benefits of its working and intends to continue doing so, and if the rule enacted is within 
certain limits, then one has an obligation, based on the principle of fair play, to obey it when it 
is one’s turn.’205  What I have tried to show is that the clause ‘within certain limits’ is 
wide enough to include any reason that can be traced back to a public value denied 
by a legal statute. This is true just long as individuals privately give said public value 
a lot of weight compared to other public values. The logical structure of such 
weighting, and the ensuing judgment to oppose the statute in question, is exactly 
that of a reasonable citizen refusing to punish an innocent convict for a crime not 
committed. In this regard, the normative strength of any pro tanto obligation to obey 
the law is greatly diminished.  
2.4: Conclusion 
This papers has defended the following three related arguments: 
(i) The outcomes of legitimate democratic procedures derive their 
legitimacy from the fact that such procedures are stipulated by a 
legitimate constitution. When stipulated by a legitimate constitution, the 
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procedures align with the demands of the liberal principle of 
legitimacy.206 This means that the outcomes of such procedures reflect fair 
terms of cooperation and reciprocity. As a result, the outcomes of such 
procedures are subject to the moral requirements of fairness and 
reciprocity, from which are generated a pro tanto obligation to obey the 
law.  
 
(ii) It is not the case that an outcome following from a legitimate 
procedure supported by principles of reason and rationality is ever 
publicly justifiable. Although there might be some public reasons that 
support the outcome, there may be suitably public reasons that deem the 
outcome of a legitimate procedure unjustifiable. This is due to the fact 
that although public democratic culture determines which reasons are 
suitably public, individuals determine the weight placed on balancing 
these reasons against each other. 
 
(iii)  It follows from (i) and (ii) that in Rawls’ view, reasonable 
citizens need not obey any law unless they believe from their non-public 
perspective that they ought to obey a given law. Even if we understand 
the duty to obey the law as a weighty pro tanto duty based in fairness and 
reciprocity, there could always be publicly justified reasons overriding 
citizens’ concerns for fairness and reciprocity. Moreover, they could see it 
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as instrumental to fairness or reciprocity to not obey the law given that 
their reasons are suitably public.  
Taken together, the three lines of argument characterize pure procedurally 
legitimate laws as neither publicly justifiable nor requiring obedience. While 
legitimate law continues to reflect fair terms of cooperation, citizens can also argue 
that disobeying legitimate law reflects fair terms of cooperation if the law 
undermines collective or common goods like right to life, toleration, temperance, 
public health or other significantly weighty public concerns. Coercively enforcing 
procedurally legitimate law can also violate the duty of civility and the criterion of 
reciprocity, given that citizens are offering public justifications for why certain laws 
need not be obeyed.  
What do procedures then contribute to liberal legitimacy? They do little more 
than form an initial working agreement amongst reasonable citizens. This working 
agreement is then subject to public scrutiny, after which reasonable citizens are free 
to disregard the procedural outcome on grounds of fairness, reciprocity, publicity 
and other liberal values. There are no legitimate or justifiable grounds on which 
coercive power may be used to limit the disobedience of reasonable citizens at this 
stage. The disobedience is anchored in public democratic culture, and supported by 
liberal democratic values.  
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Chapter 3: Sympathy and Liberalism  
The arguments of Chapters 1 and 2 revealed that taking pure public reason as our 
criterion of public justification is problematic at the level of individual judgment 
formation, as well as at the level of aggregation through procedural decision-making. 
Chapter 1 showed that by acknowledging the political reasonableness of legitimate 
political practices, reasonable citizens must bear moral responsibility for the 
legitimacy of the practices in question. In cases of deep-seated disagreement, I 
argued that having such responsibilities placed upon reasonable citizens leads them 
to struggle with the Problem of Conscience. This problem occurs when reasonable 
citizens cannot properly reconcile their moral responsibility for legitimate uses of 
political power with their other moral commitments.  
I ended Chapter 1 by outlining three versions of the Problem of Conscience. 
In the Problem of the Tragic Conscience, citizens face a tragic choice between taking 
moral responsibility for the legitimacy of practices that go against their private moral 
commitments, and avoiding such responsibility by refusing to be politically 
unreasonable. I argued that being politically unreasonable also requires reasonable 
citizens to violate moral principles, such as the moral duties of civility and fair play. 
Therefore, regardless of whether a citizen accepts or avoids responsibility, she faces a 
guilty conscience by her own standards. By contrast, the Problem of the Brutish 
Conscience arises when the citizen in question can accept moral responsibility for the 
legitimacy of a practice, and does not feel any guilt despite the fact that it violates her 
private moral commitments. In accepting moral responsibility without hesitation for 
the legitimacy of an immoral practice, the citizen in question presents herself as 
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rather brutish in her moral attitude. Finally the Problem of the Clear Conscience 
arises when a citizen makes changes in her private lifestyle in order to be able to 
reconcile her moral responsibility for legitimate uses of political power with her 
other moral commitments. The problem occurs when the changes appear to be too 
demanding on the citizen. If a citizen has to leave her Church, or alienate her family 
and friends in order to be a reasonable citizen, her fellow citizens might think that 
the citizen has undertaken too great a sacrifice to accept moral responsibility for a 
legitimate law.  
In Chapter 2 I considered the argument that a reasonable citizen can 
minimize her sense of responsibility for a particular use of political power by 
acknowledging that she has reasonably endorsed the procedures by which collective 
decisions are made, as opposed to endorsing each collective decision. Although this 
does not eradicate causal and volitional responsibility for the legitimacy of a given 
law, it diminishes such responsibility because the procedures were chosen for 
general application. A citizen can reasonably argue that the procedures generate 
many good results, and her choice to reasonably endorse the procedures was to 
make certain that those worthwhile procedural outcomes became legitimate. In order 
to ensure that these worthwhile results would be generated, she had to accept the 
fact that some procedural outcomes would go against her moral views.  
I argued in Chapter 2 that procedural legitimacy is itself a problematic mode 
of determining justifiable grounds for legitimate courses of action. Procedures only 
generate pro tanto obligations to follow the dictates of their outcomes. This means 
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that a citizen can still find procedural outcomes unjustifiable post-procedurally, and 
thereby question the outcome’s legitimacy.  
Given the problems that arise with using pure public reason as the criterion 
by which political positions are justified, I would like to propose an alternative 
account of public reason that addresses these issues of responsibility and conscience. 
I call this account sympathetic public reason. Sympathetic public reason differs from 
pure public reason in the sense that it conceives of liberal citizens as reasonable, 
rational and sympathetic agents. This means that the duties of liberal citizenship, 
which previously arose from the view of free and equal, reasonable and rational 
citizens engaged in fair cooperation,207 must now be re-evaluated to determine which 
terms agents would agree upon were they also sympathetic.  
The notion of sympathy that I will incorporate into the Rawlsian justificatory 
framework is the view of sympathy presented by Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments. Before I do so, however, I must justify why it is possible to use Smith’s 
account of sympathy within a Rawlsian framework. Philosophical concepts cannot 
always be uprooted from one theory and easily planted into another. For example, 
we would not expect to be able to assimilate Plato’s Form of the Good into an 
account of utilitarian justice, without giving some account of how this would affect 
the basic assumptions of the utilitarian conceptual framework. Similarly, why should 
we believe that Smith’s account of sympathy and its accompanying views on moral 
psychology can easily fit into a Rawlsian account of political liberalism?    
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The purpose of this chapter is to reassure Rawlsian liberals that they can 
maintain their general beliefs regarding justice, impartiality and equality, while 
embracing the concept of sympathy into their analysis. Regarding views on justice 
and impartiality, I show that Smith’s moral theory makes claims about how we 
understand justice and impartiality in a manner analogous with Rawls’ account. In 
the case of equality, I show that at least one interpretation of sympathy is compatible 
with Rawlsian views on equality, although this interpretation differs substantially 
from other accounts of emotions in political liberalism. 
3.1: Adam Smith’s Theory of Sympathy 
Adam Smith begins his Theory of Moral Sentiments with the observation, ‘How 
selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which 
interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he 
derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.’208 These characteristics of human 
beings make up the psychological capacity for sympathy. Sympathy occurs in 
individuals capable of great selfishness, who require the happiness of others for their 
own happiness, but who feel this sense of happiness so ‘instantaneously’ that its 
realization cannot correctly be described as a self-serving, calculated pursuit of self-
interest.209 Moreover, sympathy occurs in individuals whose senses limit their 
experience of pleasure and pain to their own selves.210 They cannot feel the pleasure 
or pain of others without some further intellectual capacity: the faculty of 
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imagination.211 Sympathy occurs when an individual witnesses another individual 
experiencing a particular event, and imagines how she would feel were she in the 
same situation.212 This process of imagination is not necessarily a purposeful placing 
of oneself into another person’s shoes, but is often the result of an instantaneous 
projection of oneself into another’s position that occurs naturally within a human 
being’s psychological make-up.213 
In Smith’s account, pleasure and pain play a dual role in experiencing the 
emotion of sympathy. Like in most hedonic accounts, pleasure is understood as the 
positive response to those things individuals find desirable or agreeable, while pain is 
a negative response to that which is undesirable or disagreeable. Additionally, Smith 
assumes that mutual sympathy is inherently pleasurable for all individuals.214 In 
situations of distress, for example, having another person sympathize with the distress 
makes the distressful situation easier to bear. Smith writes that sympathy ‘enlivens joy 
and alleviates grief. It enlivens joy by presenting another source of satisfaction; and it alleviates 
grief by insinuating into the heart almost the only agreeable sensation which it is at that time 
capable of receiving.’215 Smith believes that this is why individuals confide their sorrows 
to their friends. They do not aim to spread sorrow by relating their own personal 
tragedies to their friends. Rather, such confidences are beneficial, according to Smith, 
because the state of mutual sympathy is itself a source of pleasure.216  
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Given two individuals, an agent experiencing a certain emotion in a certain 
situation, and a spectator witnessing the agent’s experience, mutual sympathy 
requires three things: (i) it requires the spectator to correctly identify the passions felt 
by the agent through the agent’s expression of the passion217; (ii) it requires the 
spectator to judge that if she were in the agent’s situation, she would be experiencing 
the same passions to a comparable degree (the spectator rarely feels the passions to 
the same extent as the agent)218; and (iii) it requires the spectator to feel pleasure at 
the fact that she and the agent would experience the same passions to a comparable 
degree were either of them in the agent’s current situation.219 If the spectator has 
imagined the agent to feel a passion that the agent does not actually feel or if the 
spectator is indifferent to the agent’s plight despite understanding and empathizing 
with the agent’s situation, then the spectator would not be experiencing any kind of 
sympathy with the agent.  
Note that the spectator can still feel sympathy for the agent by imaginatively 
projecting herself into the situation of the agent, and evaluating how she (the 
spectator) would feel in the agent’s situation. However, this can be done 
independently of witnessing the agent’s reaction. If we are told of a complete 
stranger who enters her damp and dimly lit office on a Monday morning, and is 
greeted with a two foot pile of paperwork, we do not need to see her reaction to 
imagine how she might feel. Our projection of ourselves into her situation instantly 
conveys a feeling of despondence. However, it might be the case that the woman in 
question is actually a cheerful Pollyanna who tries to always look on the bright side, 
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or a dutiful drudge who gets a perverse sense of satisfaction at the prospect of her 
own martyrdom. In this instance, we can sympathize for her and the situation with 
which she is confronted, but we are not in sympathy with her insofar as we do not feel 
the much desired mutual sympathy.  
Smith contends that the desire for mutual sympathy encourages agents to curb 
the expression of their passions so that they align with what spectators believe they 
would feel if they were in the agent’s position.  By expressing a passion too 
forcefully, agents make it impossible for spectators to judge it comparable to the 
passion that they themselves would have felt.220 This is because spectators cannot feel 
precisely what it is the agent is feeling, when the agent experiences an emotion. A 
prime example of this occurs with the ‘passions which take their origin in the body,’ 
(e.g. hunger, thirst, etc.,) which are difficult for spectators to experience to the same 
degree as those who are actually hungry or thirsty.221 Since spectators cannot be 
called upon to feel hungry or thirsty, just because they witness the expression of 
hunger or thirst in an agent, Smith claims that all human beings curb their expression 
of these passions out of a sense of propriety.222 They wish to be in mutual sympathy 
with the spectator. Generalizing this phenomenon, the desire for mutual sympathy 
evokes a sense of the spectator’s propriety in each agent, and it is this awareness that 
enables agents to understand the rules of propriety. Eventually these rules are 
internalized .223  
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Desire for mutual sympathy is further reinforced by an individual’s desire for 
praiseworthiness. The account of this desire for praiseworthiness is complex. 
According to Smith, just as a concordance of one’s opinions with that of another is 
simply what it means to approve of the other’s opinion, concordance of one’s 
sentiments with those of another is simply what it means to approve of their 
sentiments.224 Therefore, mutual sympathy simply is the state of a spectator 
approving of the sentiments of an agent in a particular situation. However, there are 
times when a spectator not only approves of the agent’s sentiments, but finds that an 
agent’s sentiments have taken into account aspects of a scenario that the spectator 
could not properly grasp. In such situations the spectator not only discovers a 
concordance, but views the concordance as the result of an agent being able to ‘lead 
and direct’ the spectator’s views.225 In such cases, the spectator knows that how she 
would have responded to a situation differs from how the agent responded, but feels 
that how the agent responded was in fact superior. When we view others in 
situations where it would be quite natural to respond with fear, and instead we see 
them respond with courage, then we the spectators might feel that although our 
fearful response would have been appropriate, the others’ response was far superior. 
Smith labels this particular sympathetic response, admiration.226  
A desire for praiseworthiness is the result of this admiration. Smith writes, ‘The 
love and admiration which we naturally conceive for those whose character and conduct we 
approve of, necessarily dispose us to desire to become ourselves the objects of the like agreeable 
sentiments, and to be as amiable and as admirable as those whom we love and admire the 
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most.’227 In this respect, we might try to cultivate the bravery and strength to act 
heroically in the next difficult situation, because we too wish to be admirable. Note, 
however, that Smith does not claim that spectators actively seek the admiration of 
others. Rather, when we the spectators feel love for those we admire, we determine 
to become more like them. The desire to be admirable in the same respect as those we 
admire leads agents to curb their behaviour even further.   
Propriety also becomes an important feature of Smith’s moral framework in 
those cases when an individual determines that were she in the situation of another 
agent, her response would be quite different from the feelings most naturally felt by 
the agent, the sense of propriety is generated by the thought that her ow feelings in 
such situations might actually be inappropriate. This encourages individuals to take a 
third-person view of themselves to determine what others would find appropriate in 
their behavior.228 The sense of propriety is founded on the belief that one should use 
one’s self-command to express only those passions that others can find appropriate. 
The motivation to utilize such self-command is the pleasure found in mutual 
sympathy. The agent must be able to imagine how a spectator is imagining the 
agent’s own situation, in order to ensure that her own actions are actually generating 
sympathy from the spectator. Smith describes this capacity for a single individual to 
be both agent and spectator of her own actions, as a ‘mirror’ by which individuals 
can engage in self-approbation or self-disapprobation.229 
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It would seem that once people have the capacity to use their own imagination 
as a guide for which behaviors would earn a spectator’s sympathy, they no longer 
require actual spectators to measure the propriety of their actions. They can evaluate 
the propriety of their own actions from their own perspective. Problems arise, 
however, because individuals are partial and capable of self-deceit. In fact, ‘Our 
views…are apt to be most partial when it is of most importance they should be otherwise.’230 
As Smith states at the outset, human beings are naturally self-interested creatures, 
and self-love is always a strong passion. It is difficult for them to judge their own 
actions as those which fall below that of expectable standards.  
Moral capacities, according to Smith, make up for this weakness by abstracting 
general rules or principles of morality from experiences of judging the actions of 
others.231 What we find abhorrent in others, we determine not to do ourselves, even if 
our self-love would allow us to approve of ourselves were we to perform such acts. 
Scholars read Smith as suggesting that in ordinary cases, self-love will be a stronger 
motive than other altruistic virtues in determining the course of human action.232 In 
this way, sympathy allows individuals to look beyond their own self-interest to that 
of others, without appeal to the altruistic emotions of beneficence, humanity or 
Christian love.233 As far as Smith is concerned, these traditional explanations for 
individuals regard for others are only witnessed in rare cases of extreme virtue.234 
They do not explain the common cases of individuals attending to the interests of 
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others. Therefore, the general sensitivity most humans show to the interests and 
fortunes of others cannot be explained by appeal to such virtues. Smith’s view of 
sympathy offers an alternative explanation based on the notions of pleasure, 
propriety and self-approbation. 
However, the process of curbing the expression of one’s emotion through a 
desire for mutual sympathy, followed by approbation, can be generalized to 
construct a Smithian form of moral development. Smith says that as a part of a 
child’s development, the child tries to win approbation from each person he or she 
encounters. It is only through this process that children first become aware of 
conflicting interests, and the fact that due to conflicting interests, it is impossible to 
please everyone.235 They then determine that they should regulate their conduct in 
accordance with the sympathies of someone whose interests are not at stake given 
the consequences of their actions, and from this develop the heuristic of an Impartial 
Spectator.236 The Impartial Spectator is a hypothetic person capable of approving or 
disapproving of behaviour from a disinterested and indifferent perspective. 
Individuals’ need for approbation is no longer expressed in terms of pleasing others, 
but by maintaining a sense of propriety in accordance with this impartial standard.237 
When we realize that everyone develops a similar sense of propriety, our own 
sense of propriety combined with our desire for mutual sympathy, encourages us to 
view ourselves as others view us. This too is problematic given that we have to 
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contend with others who have interests that conflict with our own.238 Smith suggests 
that although we place greater weight on our personal interests than those of others, 
we at this point also realize that from the impartial perspective of the world at large, 
our interests, preferences or general happiness are neither of greater nor lesser 
importance than that of others.239 Of this realization Smith writes:  
‘When he views himself in the light in which he is conscious that others will view 
him, he sees that to them he is but one of the multitude in no respect better than 
any other in it. If he would act so as that the impartial spectator may enter into 
the principles of his conduct, which is what of all things he has the greatest desire 
to do, he must, upon this, as upon all other occasions, humble the arrogance of 
his self-love, and bring it down to something which other men can go along 
with.’240  
3.2: Smith and Rawls  
In a politically liberal society marked by reasonable pluralism, the final stage in 
Smith’s account of moral development is only undertaken part way. In political 
liberalism, it is not assumed that everyone cultivates the same moral code as a result of 
having a sense of propriety. Rather, the conclusion that a person who views himself 
(or herself) as others do can cultivate interests that others may endorse, and thereby 
engage on terms of mutual sympathy with them, echoes the sort of social cooperation 
in which Rawls grounds his defence of political liberalism. By extending this analogy 
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we will come to see that the cornerstone to liberal ‘propriety’ is behaving with one’s 
fellow citizens in a politically reasonable manner.   
There are three parallels between Smith’s account of sympathy and Rawls’ 
account of justice as fairness that carve a niche for the possibility of legitimating liberal 
authority through an exchange of sympathetic judgments. (I will henceforth refer to 
this as a possibility for a sympathetic liberalism.) In the remainder of this chapter I will 
provide evidence for all three of these parallels, and then consider two objections. 
Firstly, I will argue that the idea of justice as fairness as a means of social cooperation 
is inherent in Smith’s thought, although Smith uses a different set of terminology to 
defend the same basic idea which Rawls eventually does (3.2.1). Secondly, I will show 
that the idea of reciprocity can be equated with cultivating an impartial viewpoint on 
par with Smith’s impartial spectator (3.2.2). Finally, I will show that Rawlsian public 
reason can be interpreted as a type of impartial spectator for political liberalism (2.3). 
Therefore, Smith and Rawls can comfortably accommodate each other’s views on 
justice, reciprocity and publicity.  
Then I will consider the objection that Smith’s account of sympathy does not 
succeed in achieving the requirements of liberal impartiality (3.2.4). Finally, I will 
consider the fact that Smith’s account of sympathy is more demanding than the 
Rawlsian view of political reasonableness.  
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3.2.1 Justice  
Rawls argues that all individuals are subject to a natural duty of justice which 
requires them to comply with the rules of just institutions.241 Individuals assume the 
natural duty of justice involuntarily.242 For example, being born into a just political 
system suffices to require submission to the constitution of the just polity.243 In this 
sense, the natural duty arises independently of any political or social arrangements 
in which an individual might choose to participate.244 According to Rawls, natural 
duties ‘hold between persons irrespective of their institutional relationships; they 
obtain between all as equal moral persons.’245 However, Rawls justifies the natural 
duty of justice by invoking the concept of justice as fairness. That is, the duty to obey 
just constitutions is natural insofar as agents beyond a veil of ignorance would adopt 
it as a natural duty.246 
In addition to natural duties, Rawls argues that many individuals must also 
comply with just institutions through obligations that arise from the Rawlsian 
Principle of Fairness. According to the Principle of Fairness, ‘A person is required to 
do his part as defined by the rules of an institution when two conditions are met: first 
the institution is just (or fair), that is, it satisfies the two principles of justice; and 
second, one has voluntarily accepted the benefits of the arrangement or taken 
advantage of the opportunities it offers to further one’s interests.’247 Unlike political 
duties which arise naturally (i.e. from being born into a particular just political 
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society), political obligations arise through a citizen’s voluntary actions (e.g. by 
accepting a political office or joining the military.)248  
When Smith speaks of complying with the demands of justice, however, he 
does not mean to imply any duty to comply with just institutions, nor any obligation 
to follow the rules of a social practice voluntarily entered into. For Smith, justice is a 
‘negative virtue.’249 It is satisfied whenever individuals restrain themselves from 
inflicting hurt or harm upon others.250 In Smith’s moral framework, if justice is 
violated then a person has suffered an injury as a consequence of an action that 
warrants sympathetic disapproval.251 Moreover, violations of justice correspond with 
those actions whose motivations not only fail to elicit sympathetic approbation in 
impartial spectators, but which evoke resentment in spectators due to the callous 
nature of the actions.252 Rather than an account of justice as fairness, Smith’s account 
of justice designates constraints on moral harm like theft, broken promises and 
murder.  
In this sense, Smith’s account of justice corresponds much more closely with 
the Rawlsian natural duty not to injure or harm,253 not the Rawlsian natural duty of 
justice. Like Smith’s account of justice as a negative virtue, Rawls identifies the 
natural duty not to cause injury as a negative duty.254 Both agree, moreover, that the 
duty in question is pre-civil. For example, Smith considers it a pre-civil, natural right, 
to prevent injury through self-defence, and seek to punish any injury already 
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inflicted upon oneself.255  Rawls adds that natural duties are duties to persons in 
general, rather than through specific social or institutional relations that exist 
between individuals.256  
Rawlsian conceptions of justice align more closely with Smith’s notion of duties 
of gratitude. Smith writes of these duties in connection with the virtue of 
beneficence, a virtue defined as motivating actions which elicit a sympathetic 
response of gratitude in a spectator.257 However, feelings of gratitude can also inspire 
duties of beneficence in an individual.258 For example, if an individual asks another 
for a favour, there exists a special reason for this person to acquiesce to the request, if 
at some former time she herself was the recipient of some favour from the individual. 
In this case the duty of gratitude (to return the favour) supports the duty of 
beneficence (to do the favour).  In Smith’s view, motives of beneficence inspired by 
feelings of gratitude come closest to simulating the existence of obligations.259                                                                
However, Smith also insists that while such duties of gratitude may exist, there 
can be no obligation imposed from an external source to see that an unwilling agent 
performs a duty of beneficence. In our example with the recipient of the favour, if the 
recipient refuses the favour, spectators determine the act to be ‘improper’ and 
thereby not deserving of sympathy. However, they cannot determine the act to be 
‘hurtful’ merely on grounds of ingratitude, and only hurtful actions warrant 
resentment. It would seem then that Smith’s account of gratitude and beneficence 
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departs thereby from Rawls’ views of justice based in reciprocity. According to 
Rawls, the Principle of Fairness requires that if an individual has benefitted from an 
institutionalized social practice, then as a matter of justice, he or she must allow 
others to benefit in their turn, even if it means a sacrifice on the part of the individual 
in question. In the case of the neighbour unwilling to perform a favour, if a practice 
of returning favours has been institutionalized, then Rawls would argue that as a 
matter of justice, the neighbour ought to return the favour.  
It may seem, therefore, that given how differently Smith and Rawls conceive 
the very content of justice, that their views on the matter cannot be reconcilable. 
Interestingly, while the content of justice differs in Rawls and Smith, the function of 
justice in political society play the same role in the views of both thinkers. Both Smith 
and Rawls use their theories of justice to posit the capacity for stable social 
cooperation amongst individuals with diverging self-interests. In important respects, 
they use the same strategy to construct their resolutions. Justice resolves antagonisms 
between individuals, not through legal adjudication, utilitarian calculation or appeal 
to any other codified set of principles, but by determining the evaluations of a person 
with the capacity to take a general point of view. 
Given a situation where individuals with competing interests are asked to form 
a political community, justice ensures that such communities maintain stability in a 
way which has the approval or endorsement of all individuals who possess a sense 
of impartiality or fairness. Moreover, the motivations to be just in Smith and in 
Rawls have analogous bases. In Smith, justice arises out of a willingness to view 
oneself as others do in order to avoid being seen as giving oneself a privileged 
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position in relation to others.260 In Rawls, both justice and fairness arise out of a sense 
of reciprocity, the idea that fair and just rules of social cooperation are those chosen 
by free and equal individuals willing to offer fair terms to each other.261 Both Smith 
and Rawls consider it an aspect of justice that individuals who might naturally seek 
advantages for themselves at the expense of others, restrain themselves from upon 
such interests, due to the fact they are situated equally to all others in society.262 
Smith explains this self-restraint by appealing once more to mutual sympathy. 
Since justice, for Smith, consists in actions that arouse resentment in spectators, a 
person who violates justice is aware that all spectators will disapprove of his 
actions.263 Moreover, Smith believes that when (and if) the violator of justice reflects 
upon his action, she too will be ashamed of her motives.264 After all, a person who is 
capable of seeing herself from the third person perspective and her sense of 
propriety arises from this perspective. It is only in the heat of the moment in which 
her first person perspective takes over. A person who violates justice and who is 
capable of seeing his action the way an impartial spectator would observe it, must 
end up feeling both shame and remorse.265 
It is the reasoning of this violator of justice that is crucial to drawing the 
Rawlsian analogy. Smith writes firstly that although a man may give preference to 
himself, it is in seeing himself from the perspective of the multitude that he realizes 
                                                          
260
 Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, II.ii.2.2. 
261
 John Rawls, ‘Justice as Reciprocity’ in John Rawls: Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman 
(Cambridge, MA and London, UK: Harvard University Press, 1999) p.190.  
262
 Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, II.ii.2.2. 
263
 Ibid. II.ii.2.1. 
264
 Ibid. II.ii.2.3. 
265
 Ibid. II.ii.2.3. 
140 
 
that he cannot treat himself as being in any way superior to it.266 However, he writes 
that the problem does not arise from this mere self-preferential treatment. In fact, if a 
man prefers himself in the quest for power, prestige or happiness, others will be able 
to engage in mutual sympathy with him.267 In Rawlsian terms, it is fair to 
acknowledge that individuals have both rational and reasonable capacities; rational 
capacities that are self-serving and ego driven, reasonable capacities that are willing 
to offer fair terms to others. The trouble for Smith is not then in the rational pursuit 
of one’s own fulfilment, but the thought that by unjustly hurting others in pursuing 
rational endeavours, the violator of justice is not acknowledging that those equal to 
him in skill and merit deserve equal treatment. Smith writes:  
‘[H]e may run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and every 
muscle, in order to outstrip all his competitors. But if he should justle, 
or throw down any of them, the indulgence of the spectators is 
entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair play, which they cannot 
admit of. This man is to them, in every respect, as good as he: they do 
not enter into that self-love by which he prefers himself so much to 
this other, and cannot go along with the motive from which he hurt 
him.’268  
In speaking of violations of justice, Smith is therefore giving an account of 
rational agents interacting within the constraints of rule-governed practices. These 
may not be institutionalized political practices in the sense political liberals have in 
                                                          
266
 Ibid. II.ii.2.1. 
267
 Ibid. II.ii.2.1. 
268
 Ibid. II.ii.2.1. 
141 
 
mind. However, Rawls’ notion of fairness is wider than his account of political 
justice. The practice of promise-keeping, for example, is considered an 
institutionalized practice in which the principle of fairness becomes operative.269 
Where fairness and justice diverge in Rawls, is that the term ‘fairness’ applies to the 
terms of social and institutional practices in which an individual has a choice to 
participate, while considerations of ‘justice’ apply to institutions and practices in 
which individuals finds themselves involuntarily entangled.270  
We can see, therefore, that the three stages of Smith’s argument for choosing 
justice over self-interest, are precisely the three that Rawls himself offers. Firstly, a 
Rawlsian citizen sees himself from the perspective of the multitude because he views 
himself as free and equal to all other citizens. This perspective of the multitude is 
reflected in the original position, the position of public reason, the criterion of 
reciprocity, etc. Secondly, from this public perspective, a man is allowed to pursue 
his own interests (i.e. be rational rather than completely altruistic), however, he is 
constrained by the rules of institutional practices. Third, these rules apply to him 
either because he himself finds them justified from a suitably public perspective (in 
which case he accepts them as a duty), or because he has obtained a relevant 
advantage and needs to fulfil his responsibilities on grounds of fairness (in which 
case he accepts them as obligations). If he is politically reasonable, he accepts these 
rules, in the same way as a Smithian agent looks to the impartial spectator’s 
perspective, if he is capable of taking a third person perspective of himself.   
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Smith does depart from Rawls in the sense that he does not allow for a man to be 
subject to the restraints of justice only because he has taken advantage of the benefits. 
This means that Rawls’ principle of fairness is more expansive than Smith’s account of 
justice, but will accommodate Smith’s justice just as long as Smith’s notion of 
impartiality can be construed as a subset of Rawls’ view of the perspective of the 
multitude. However, in Rawls’ early work, fairness and justice both arise out of a 
sense of reciprocity.271  They measure the degree to which a practice abides by the 
general principles chosen by those practicing it, when practitioners view each other as 
being ‘similarly circumstanced’.272 Rawls makes it clear that the sorts of practices he 
has in mind, include political practices and therefore political institutions as well.273 
Rawls takes as his basic example the institution of slavery. Since all individuals in a 
political community, when equally circumstanced, would be unwilling to accept 
slavery as a general principle (i.e. tolerate it if they were made slaves,) slavery would 
be unjust by the standards of that political community. Thereafter, any slave within 
the political community would have a legitimate complaint on grounds of justice 
against those political institutions within the community permitting slavery. In this 
regard, evaluating the practices of any given set of people on grounds of justice or 
fairness requires not only impartiality or neutrality, but also on reciprocity.  
 In the next two sections I will show that that Smith’s notion of impartiality can 
be situated in the Rawlsian conception of reciprocity, and the Rawlsian notion of 
public reason. This means that the perspective of the multitude described in Smith 
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also applies to the perspective of the multitude in Rawls. This in turn will show that 
the Rawlsian and Smithian accounts of justice can indeed be reconciled.   
3.2.2 Impartiality   
Rawls’ early views of justice were founded on a principle of reciprocity that 
generated a moral requirement to take an impersonal standpoint in determining the 
rules that will guide social cooperation. In this view, reasonable and rational citizens 
pursuing objectives that may conflict with each other, realize that they will have to 
establish a set of standards by which to adjudicate competing claims.274 If an 
impersonal standpoint is not taken in establishing such rules, then in some cases, 
social practices will be governed by rules where  individuals become ‘mutually 
aware’ that one of them is forced to accept conditions or practices that the other does 
not find acceptable. They both recognize the unfairness of this, and conclude that in 
such cases, ‘One of them is, then, either claiming a special status for himself, or 
openly taking advantage of his position.’275  
The fact that a claim of ‘special status’ violates justice as reciprocity is similar to 
Smith’s view that ‘we are but one of the multitude, in no respect better than any 
other in it.’276 The rules that apply to others are those which must also apply to us, 
were we in the other’s position. Importantly the ‘impersonal’ perspective in both 
Rawls and Smith deviates from another interpretation of impartiality in which it is 
sufficient to apply the same rule to everyone. Elaborating on Rawls’ famous example 
in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, Calvin might say to Michael Servetus that 
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burning him at stake would be an ‘impartial’ application of a rule in which all those 
who do not believe in the Trinity must burn at stake.277  However, in Rawls and 
Smith, the standards are impartial in a different and more demanding sense: A rule 
or standard is applied in a way that is impartial (in the way which corresponds with 
justice as reciprocity) only if every individual who is reasonable (for Rawls) or moral 
(for Smith) would agree that were she in the same situation as the person to whom 
the rule will be applied, it would be appropriate to apply the same rule to her. Since 
Servetus would not agree to a rule in which all those who do not believe in the 
Trinity must burn at stake, the rule is not applied in the requisite impartial manner. 
Furthermore, since both Servetus and Calvin are aware that Servetus would not 
accept such a rule, they would both be led to believe that Calvin is claiming a special 
status for himself (which indeed he is – the status of a person who is not a heretic.)   
Rawls characterizes those who violate the principle of reciprocity as being 
politically unreasonable. A reasonable citizen, according to Rawls, is someone who 
will propose and abide by fair terms as long as she believes others are willing to do 
so as well.278 Rawls notes that this account of reasonableness reflects a contractualist 
desire to justify our positions to those with whom we live in a justificatory 
relationship.279 However, the liberal political relationship is essentially characterized 
by relations of reciprocity,280 and it is from the idea of reciprocity that the justificatory 
nature of the liberal relationship derives.281  
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In order for this process to be successful an individual must be called upon to 
imagine herself in the shoes of all others. On what other grounds could she believe 
that those like herself could accept her proposal on reasonable terms? Such an 
imaginative process requires sympathy akin to that of Smith’s impartial spectator; the 
idea is to use the imagination to establish rules that all would agree are impartial from 
a general perspective where no one gives himself or herself any advantage. Just as 
Smith believes that moral awareness emerges by taking a third person perspective 
upon oneself that curbs one’s self-interested actions, Rawls writes that in order for self-
interested individuals to engage in cooperative enterprises on free and equal terms, 
they must offer terms to each other while keeping in mind the general point of view.282 
In the Rawlsian framework, the relationship of reciprocity places a moral constraint on 
each citizens such that any terms agreed upon reflect ‘the acknowledgement of principles 
as impartially applying to one’s own claims as well as to others, and the consequent constraint 
upon the pursuit of one’s own needs.’283  
Reciprocity requires having a particular relationship with others which puts 
greater weight on harmful actions imposed on them than benefits given to them. The 
principle of reciprocity declares that one cannot enslave others because one would not 
want to be a slave. It does not declare, however, that if everyone were a slave that 
political relations would be just. Although this would satisfy the requirements of 
generality and impartiality, the obligations generated by a principle of reciprocity are 
typically constraints placed on a person when engaging in a cooperative relationship 
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with another person. They are derived from the inter-personal relationship, rather 
than from some overarching moral viewpoint.  
Although Smith’s account of impartiality is situated in an overarching 
comprehensive moral theory, it is grounded in the interactions of agent’s who are 
trying first to win the approbation of indifferent spectators who witness their actions, 
and thereafter the approval of impartial spectators that they have internalized. In this 
sense, it also emerges from an inter-personal relationship. The difference is that it is a 
moral theory upon which is built the comprehensive rules of social interaction, rather 
than a sense of fairness by which political interactions are governed.  
This difference, however, can be explained by the fact that in the Rawlsian public 
sphere, approval is not generated by agreement on the content of a sentiment or an 
argument, but by agreement that a particular sentiment or argument is reasonable. If 
one citizen disagrees with the beliefs of another, but accepts that they are the beliefs of 
a reasonable citizen, then he can ‘go along’ with the beliefs in a manner similar to the 
way in which Smithian agents’ go along with the pursuit of rational interests. This is 
because in the Rawlsian public sphere, to form, revise and pursue a conception of the 
good is in each individual’s interest, and therefore no citizen disapproves from an 
impartial perspective when another disagrees with her on reasonable terms.  
In his debates with Jurgen Habermas, John Rawls highlights the fact that 
assuming reasonable pluralism, justification in the political sphere can occur at three 
levels. The first, pro tanto justification, is justification from the standpoint of common 
human reason. Rawls points out that given reasonable pluralism, reasonable citizens 
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can also engage in what he calls full justification, which appeals to individuals’ 
private comprehensive doctrines for justification. Finally, public justification is 
justification from the standpoint of reasonable citizens in a liberal democratic 
culture.284 It engages a mode of reasoning that is public, insofar as it appeals to 
reasons shared by citizens as members of a political cooperative. This tripartite 
model of justification is a useful illustration of the three standpoints from which any 
given citizen might evaluate reasons offered to him or her by fellow citizens. Each 
citizen has access to the universal standpoint of common human reason, the non-
public standpoint of associations, and the public standpoint of public democratic 
culture. What I would like to propose is that this public perspective can be easily 
shown to represent a sort of impartial spectator for political liberalism.  
Rawls’ focus on the normative value of public justification stems from his view 
that the process of public decision-making is ultimately a matter of establishing fair 
parameters for social cooperation amongst reasonable citizens. The fact that we do 
not owe public justifications to those who cannot accept pro tanto justifications 
means that we need not construct political societies that meet the demands of those 
who are opposed to government of any sort, or who cannot see the value of 
reasonable arguments. The fact that we do not owe public justifications to those who 
cannot accept full justifications means that we do not owe justifications to those who 
always give priority to their personal interests, beliefs or moral views, and refuse to 
accept the views of others.285 Those who promote only those reasons supported by 
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their private comprehensive doctrines are charged with being uncooperative. The 
choice to be uncooperative is unreasonable, primarily because cooperation is 
essential for political stability. We only owe public justifications to those who have 
shown a willingness to take on the perspective of public democratic culture in which 
individuals are situated as free and equal citizens.286   
Suppose then we are confronted with a person who conscientiously opposes a 
law or a policy from within his or her private doctrine. We might consider liberal 
Catholics who question the morality of abortions, or liberal Quakers who do not 
believe that just wars are in fact justified. In the liberal framework of political 
justification, reasonable citizens need not be concerned about these objections. While 
they come from reasonable citizens, they do not come from reasonable citizens who 
have taken on a suitably public perspective.287  
This has led several critics of Rawlsian liberalism to question whether 
reasonable citizens are indeed given justifications that they can reasonably be 
expected to endorse. It might seem fair to ask Catholics and Quakers to offer reasons 
to others that they can understand from a suitably public perspective. What seems 
unfair is to ask Catholics and Quakers who receive justifications from the standpoint 
of democratic culture to evaluate those justifications from that public standpoint. A 
Catholic might be able to recognize that abortion is justifiable from the perspective of 
public democratic culture, but what this means is that she finds abortion justifiable 
given the criteria of public reason. She does not actually endorse abortion, nor is she 
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reasonably expected to do so from the public perspective. The public perspective is 
silent upon whether foetuses have moral status during the first trimester. It never 
claims that it is unreasonable to believe that it does have such moral standing.  
Therefore, the Catholic’s belief that abortion is murder is a belief that needs to 
be taken into account when others offer her a justification. After all, she is not 
claiming that others cannot have abortions because abortion is murder. She is simply 
claiming that those who have not responded to her concerns about the murderous 
practice of abortions have not in fact justified their positions to her. Even if all public 
reasons must be offered from the perspective of public democratic culture, in order 
for the justification to succeed, must it not appeal to people’s public reasons as well 
as those private reasons that are not considered unreasonable? Otherwise, in what 
sense is the so-called public justification publicly justified?  
The liberal response would have to be that the public perspective is the only 
appropriate perspective of reasoning. Separating the standpoint of offering a 
justification from the standpoint of receiving a justification simply misses the point. 
The public perspective is the only perspective that reflects the views of reasonable 
citizens when they are positioned as free and equal citizens.288 A liberal Catholic is not 
receiving a justification as a liberal Catholic, but as a reasonable liberal citizen. Note 
that what this actually amounts to is that both the offer of reasons and their 
evaluations have to be done from a perspective that considers the standpoint of all 
reasonable citizens.  
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In this sense the standpoint of public democratic culture is no different from 
the standpoint of an impartial spectator. Individuals must take on the perspective of 
this spectator in order for the evaluation of offered justifications to be evaluations of 
reasonable citizens. When the Catholic or the Quaker project themselves into the 
impartial spectator’s position, they see that public reason has provided a suitable 
justification for the policy to which they are conscientiously opposed. 
Therefore, the Rawlsian  account of justification from the perspective of ‘free 
and equal democratic citizens’289 is precisely that of a liberal impartial spectator, if we 
assume that (i) forming, pursuing and revising one’s conception of the good is a part 
of an individual’s rational interest, and (ii) approval does not consist in agreeing 
upon the content of a belief, but in agreeing upon the reasonableness of a belief. If the 
Catholic insisted that it was reasonable to offer arguments to all citizens that were 
found only within the tenets of Catholicism, then there would indeed be a problem. 
However, in accepting the burdens of judgment and in behaving like a reasonable 
citizen, the Catholic is willing to take on the perspective of spectators who may or 
may not give priority to the views that she finds reasonable.  
 
3.2.3 Objection from Impartiality  
I would now like to review two objections that a Rawlsian may have with an account 
of sympathetic liberalism based in mutual sympathy and impartiality. The first 
objection is that principles of impartiality are often much weaker than the principle of 
reciprocity, particularly with regard to a-social and anti-social preferences. The 
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principle of reciprocity immediately disqualifies consideration of such preferences in 
developing social rules, since reciprocity itself presupposes a social and cooperative 
relationship. By contrast, it is possible to resolve disputes between anti-social 
individuals whilst being completely impartial (e.g. through the use of an impersonal, 
utilitarian calculus.)290   
Rawls raises the Impartiality Objection when discussing why justice based in 
reciprocity is superior to justice based in impartiality. This argument, though simple, 
is vital to his defence of liberalism over utilitarianism. In Rawls’ view, both 
reciprocity and impartiality require arbiters of justice to take a general rather than 
personal perspective . However, impartiality is a weaker requirement than 
reciprocity insofar as it gives positive weight to a-social and anti-social preferences 
held by certain individuals. Rawls illustrates the difference between impartiality and 
reciprocity by considering the utilitarian argument against slavery. Rawls 
acknowledges that the disutility suffered by slaves in an institution of slavery is not 
restricted to harms suffered under a harsh master, but also involves stunted 
cultivation of moral and political agency, the absence of the social bases of self-
respect and so forth. It is this comparative disutility aced by slatves which makes 
slavery wrong from the utilitarian perspective.  
However, Rawls claims that under justice as reciprocity, it would be 
unnecessary to compare the disutility of the slave to the utility gained by the master 
since by definition, slavery cannot meet the demands of reciprocity.291 Slavery is not 
the sort of relationship that can be characterized as ‘reciprocal’. Reciprocity already 
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assumes free and equal cooperation amongst the agents involved. Moreover 
utilitarianism cannot respond to the criticism that the utility derived by the master is 
completely irrelevant to the wrongness of slavery, whereas justice based in 
reciprocity completely avoids discussion of the utility derived by the master.     
Assuming that we accept Rawls’ view that a-social and anti-social preferences 
should not be counted in determining the rules of social cooperation, it would seem 
that justice based in impartiality is inferior to a notion of justice based in reciprocity. 
However, the principle of impartiality that guides utilitarian calculi is of course quite 
different from that which guides sympathetic evaluations. When an individual uses 
the device of the impartial spectator to project himself into the situation of the slave 
owner, he finds the attitude of a slave owner completely inappropriate.  Therefore, 
allowing sympathetic judgments into public discourse need not give undue 
normative weight to a-social and anti-social preferences and interests. Moreover, it 
continues to respect the political values of cooperation, freedom and equality 
embodied in Rawls’ principle of reciprocity.  
3.2.4: The Problem of Equal Status 
The second objection to impartiality over reciprocity hinges on an understanding of 
the political relationship between democratic citizens as being one of free and equal 
status with respect to all other citizens. A reasonable exchange between democratic 
citizens reflects this basic relationship, in the sense that the willingness to exchange 
reasons is also a willingness to recognize another person’s equal status. It would be 
unnecessary to reason with someone who was obliged to be deferential to our 
demands, or who we did not see as being capable of mature judgment. By taking 
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seriously the objections that others may raise to a given set of reasons, a reasonable 
exchange reaffirms the free and equal status of their fellow citizens.  
A sympathetic exchange, by contrast, can reflect beliefs about another person’s 
vulnerability and ineptitude rather than their free and equal status. The second 
concern with incorporating sympathetic judgments into public deliberation involves 
the respective positions of sympathizer and sympathized in evaluations of sympathy. 
When two individuals engage in reasoned deliberation (as opposed to sympathetic 
deliberation), the practice of exchanging reasons presupposes each person’s 
acknowledgement of the other person’s mature capacity for reason. Intrinsic to this 
presupposition is the belief in the equal status of the other participant of reasoned 
discourse. In demonstrating a willingness to engage in reasonable discussion, citizens 
also demonstrate their willingness to view each other on terms of respect and equality.  
Such attribution of respect and equality is not present in any analogous way in 
exchanges of sympathetic judgments. When one person accedes to the requests of 
another because he or she sympathizes with the other, the sympathy could just as 
easily be inspired by the other’s vulnerability as by feelings of reciprocity and 
equality. The sympathetic judgment could be a judgment of pity, disgust, 
disapprobation or a whole host of other considerations that diminish the status of the 
other individual. Moreover, the recipient of the sympathy may not approve or even 
agree with such judgments. Yet in the framework of sympathy, the person to whom 
sympathy is given becomes the object of sympathy, rather than an equal participant 
in the sympathy.  
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To see this more clearly, consider the situation of a father who has recently 
been dismissed from his job. He is not very well-off, is the primary breadwinner of a 
moderate sized family, and has saved a reasonable amount given his earnings and 
situation. The cause of his dismissal from work is the result of market pressures 
rather than through any fault of his own. He has cultivated the ability to take pride 
in being able to meet the responsibilities of employee and family man. However, he 
now needs to apply for government benefits to support himself and his children. 
Suppose under current policy stipulations he would not qualify for any support, but 
that a proposed policy change would make him eligible. This man is a proponent of 
the new policy, and publicizes his predicament in a forum of public discourse, in 
hopes of garnering more support for it. The question before us now is the way in 
which his situation ought to affect the reflections of his fellow citizens.  
In a forum of public discourse, one reasonable response to this man’s concerns 
might be the claim that each citizen ought to have a right to a minimum income, and 
that given the absence of any responsibility on this man’s part for his job loss, he 
(and others in his position) ought to be given a level of support from public funds. 
An alternative response, equally reasonable, might be that although this man is 
deserving of financial support, given the scarcity of collective resources, it would be 
impossible to support all those in his situation and so none should be supported. In 
both instances, the man (assuming that he is reasonable) could accept that both the 
responses are reasonable, although he agrees with one and disagrees with the other.   
Contrast the reasonable disagreement described above, with two possible 
sympathetic judgments in response to this man’s appeal. Both sympathetic 
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judgments consider his anxieties as a father, as well as the humility required on his 
part when asking for support, given his original pride in being able to stand on his 
own two feet. The first sympathetic judge, evaluating the feelings of anxiety and 
humility, responds with a fellow-feeling of sadness and commiseration, and an 
evaluative judgment of pity. The other judge, attributing the same feelings of anxiety 
and humility to the man, becomes disgusted at his inability to live up to his 
responsibilities. Just like reasoned judgments, sympathetic judgments can contradict 
each other. However, unlike the reasoned judgments, neither of the sympathetic 
judgments would sit well with the man in question if he is really the proud and 
responsible breadwinner we have characterized him to be. The sympathetic 
judgments are not responses to his appeal, but reflections about him and his 
situation. His situation is being objectified and analysed, without any indication that 
his fellow citizens owe him a respectful response to the argument he was aiming to 
make by invoking the sympathy of others.    
In this way exchanges of sympathetic judgments do not maintain the equal 
status implicit in exchanges of reasonable judgments. In order to allow sympathetic 
judgments to play a role in public discourse, it is therefore necessary to establish 
parameters under which such sympathetic arguments as provided above are given 
no weight whatsoever. One way to do so is to encourage all liberal citizens to 
recognize and appreciate their shared vulnerability with respect to the collective. The 
neo-Stoic view offered by Martha Nussbaum aims to accomplish this very task.292 In 
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the remainder of this section I want to outline this view, and offer an alternative 
account which is more in line with the Rawlsian conception of citizenship.  
According to Nussbaum, emotions recognize and embody the judgment that 
much of what affects an individual’s ability to lead a good, flourishing life lies 
outside of his or her control.293 What emotions enable an individual to understand is 
an aspect of the external world that needs to be attributed a certain weightiness or 
attention for the purposes of flourishing.294 The emotion of fear, for example, consists 
in the identification of a threatening situation which must be avoided for purposes of 
survival. Similarly, the emotions of love and hatred identify those people whose 
involvement in our lives has particular relevance for us, despite our inability to 
govern or control them.  In this view, accepting emotions as important value-
judgments requires putting aside any grandiose delusions of people serving as 
autonomous agents entirely responsible for the course their lives take, and instead 
accepting that each individual is vulnerable to the practical situation in which he or 
she finds herself.  
In Nussbaum’s view, the appropriate emotional response to the newly 
unemployed father is neither pity nor disgust, but the recognition that anyone else 
could have been in his situation, including those who are now judging him. As 
Nussbaum says: ‘the victim shows us something about our own lives: we see that we too are 
vulnerable to misfortunate, that we are not any different from the people whose fate we are 
watching, and we therefore have reason to fear a similar reversal.’295 Since vulnerabilities 
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are shared and all are recognized as vulnerable, it is not a disrespectful 
condescension that ought to accompany the sympathetic judgment but rather 
compassion based in a sense of recognition and mutual sympathy.  
Upon first reading, this sense of mutual vulnerability seems like a reasonable 
way to constrain the sorts of sympathetic judgments that can be used in public 
argument. However, cultivating an attitude of shared vulnerability may not have the 
scope that Nussbaum believes it to have. Nussbaum argues for example that a man 
living in a society where women are not given adequate legal protections from 
sexual harassment, can recognize the possibility of a society where men are also 
denied such protections, and therefore show a respectful compassion for those 
women and try to change legal stipulations.296   
Yet there seems to be something odd about this description of sympathy. First 
of all, it is unclear whether a man raised in a society where women are not given 
adequate legal protections, could actually invoke the empathy to place himself in a 
woman’s shoes. Although he might be able to play a hypothetical game of 
envisioning the counterfactual scenario, it is unclear whether he could fully 
understand the particular stresses of being in such a position of vulnerability. 
Secondly, even if he could comprehend what it would be like to be so vulnerable, he 
also knows that it is unlikely that he will ever be so vulnerable. True, there could 
potentially be a society where men are denied the same legal protections as women 
in his society.  However, he does not live in such a society and in all likelihood need 
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not expect that he ever will. Why should he be moved to compassion just because the 
roles could potentially be reversed?  
Citizens are not obliged to recognize their shared vulnerabilities in the same 
manner in which they are obliged to recognize their shared capacity to reason. When 
an individual recognizes a fellow citizen as reasonable she recognizes something in 
the other person that is not only worthy of respect, but that is identical to what she 
respects about herself. This is similar to the Kantian idea that in recognizing each 
individual’s capacity to reason we also recognize their common humanity. However, 
it is restricted to the political sphere and couched in terms of the equal moral 
capacity to form, pursue and revise conceptions of the goods.  
Given the generality required of reciprocity, a citizen cannot place greater 
weight on her own ability to reason and cultivate her moral powers, than similar 
abilities in anyone else. Therefore, she must recognize that just as she is owed 
justifications when the will of others is placed upon her, she owes justifications to 
others when she places her own will upon them. Hence, when she takes up political 
positions which, if reflected in law, will affect the lives of other citizens, she must 
provide justifications.  
This means that even if Nussbaum could successfully show that citizens ought 
to recognize a shared position of vulnerability, she has still not offered an argument 
as to why this relationship generates a duty of compassion in the same way that the 
shared ability to reason generates a duty of civility. In the liberal political sphere 
guided by the principle of reciprocity, such duties must either be natural duties, or 
they must emanate from the social or political relationship (that is, the relationship 
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between individuals). In the latter case, the obligation to temper disrespectful uses of 
sympathy (e.g. condescension) through compassion, or through some other response 
to the recognition of shared vulnerability, would require us to say something about 
how the duty derives from civic and cooperative relations. Why is it necessary for 
free and equal individuals engaged in cooperative enterprise to be compassionate 
towards each other?  
Furthermore, if a person were to adopt a strong ethic of personal responsibility 
in her own life, such that she confronts whatever practical difficulties that may accost 
her with a sense of resilience, and perhaps commits herself to living without voicing 
any complaints, she could expect those she sees as ‘equally vulnerable’ to adopt a 
similar attitude. She does show others the same compassion that she would expect 
people to show her. Correlative to this problem is the fact that an identification of 
shared vulnerability in principle, does not translate into the existence of shared 
vulnerability in practice. Not only is one person typically less vulnerable than 
another but a person may be less compassionate as a consequence of such 
vulnerability. Someone could reasonably (and sympathetically) believe that although 
her life is comfortable, were she required to face a difficult situation (such as 
unemployment), she too would be the victim of circumstance and would be expected 
to endure her position without complaint.   
I propose that Rawlsians need not take the step of acknowledging this situation 
as one of shared vulnerability. In the sentimentalist framework of Hume and Smith, 
it is possible to feel sympathy for those whose accomplishments we find noble and 
indeed heroic, because we can imagine ourselves subject to conditions in which our 
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courage is forced to shine through even when we did not choose the direness of the 
practical situation. We can feel sympathy for those who are better off than we are, 
because we can imagine being in their situation, in the same way that we can feel 
sympathy for those who are worse off. 
What we are centering on is not a shared position of vulnerability but a shared 
capacity for self-appraisal. We all share the ability to reflect on our life and determine 
whether or not it is worthwhile, interesting and flourishing.  While we may all apply 
different standards to the analysis, we all share the desire to have life narratives that 
are worthwhile from our own perspectives. This capacity for self-appraisal and 
desire for self-approval reveals a shared aspiration to live a life of dignity, potentially 
hindered by events outside of our control but just as plausibly aided by the social 
bases of self-respect and the sympathetic approval of those capable and desirous of a 
similar level of dignity.   
This capacity for self-appraisal is perhaps best embodied in the Rousseaun 
concept of amour-propre. Rousseau’s amour-propre or ‘self-love’ is typically viewed 
as a source of social ills that arise when individuals’ capacity for self-love leads them 
to vice and corruption.297 However, contemporary scholars argue that amour-propre 
can lead to ‘gentle’ and ‘humane’ passions as well.298 Like sympathy it is a mirroring 
device. It does not exist prior to the existence of civil society, but comes into being 
once people learn to regard evaluate themselves in relation to others.299 Unlike 
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sympathy, it results in individuals becoming egoistical in their attempts to win 
honour and approbation, as opposed to the desire of praiseworthiness as reflected in 
meeting the standards of an impartial spectator. As Darwall points out, Smith 
invokes an idea similar to amour-propre when he considers the capacity for an 
individual to feel moral indignation in response to a person exhibiting too much 
amour-propre.300 However, such indignation results because the person in question 
wills to place himself and his needs, too far ahead of those of others (a person who 
displays too much amour-propre.)301  
It can equally be, however, that when another affords a sufficient level of 
respect to others in honor of their own sense of self-respect, this will be evaluated 
positively by sympathetic agents. After all, the ability to weigh the value of our own 
lives, while holding our own self-worth to some measure dependent on the esteem of 
others, is the basis of a sympathetic relationship. The reciprocal aspect of the 
relationship lies in the fact that the mutual respect which derives from the interaction 
of two individuals capable of reflecting on and forming value-judgments of the 
quality of their own lives is on par with the mutual respect derived from recognitions 
of reasonableness. This level of mutual respect acknowledges the moral powers of 
others, and their free and equal status respective to oneself; and generates terms of 
equality not present in recognitions of mutual vulnerability.  
To get a sense of this, all we need to do is take another look at the man who is 
constructing a sympathetic response to women who are not afforded adequate legal 
                                                          
300
 Stephen Darwall, ‘Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith’ Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 28 (1999):139 – 164 at pp. 144-145. 
301
 Ibid. p. 145. 
162 
 
protections against sexual harassment or assault. I argued that this man need not and 
even may not be able to recognize in the situation of these women, anything at all 
resembling his own position in society. Both his capacity and motivation for 
empathy may be limited. There is nothing reciprocal about his standing with respect 
to women who are formally free and equal in the eyes of the law, but face 
diminished social and legal opportunities to fully express this freedom and equality. 
What this man can recognize, however, is the effect that it would have on a person’s 
sense of personal dignity to reflect upon the quality of his or her own life in the 
absence of these legal protections. The reflection does not take the form of a 
counterfactual role reversal, but the identification that something of worth to the 
man, namely the socio-legal bases for his dignity, also has the potential to be taken 
from him. Just as the reasonable man can recognize that reason in others’ is of value, 
the man who values his ability to reflect well on his own life can recognize the 
importance of this same value to others. Therefore, he too must value the personal 
dignity of someone else, whose importance he recognizes because of his capacity for 
sympathy and in recognition of the value of his own personal dignity. 
In this reading of sympathy, the person who judges the position of the 
unemployed father with pity or disgust is not just disrespecting the father, but also 
the personal dignity of all citizens. The condescending judgments do not take 
seriously the mature capacity of individuals to feel indignities, to be able to reflect 
upon these indignities while judging the value of one’s own life, and the 
dehumanization that occurs when one judges his or her life to be of little worth. In a 
sympathetic liberalism, citizens have to hold in reverence not just the moral powers 
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of themselves and others in being the authors of their own lives through the 
formation, revision and pursuit of their views of the good; but in addition the 
appraisers of their own self-worth through the life that they have been given the 
chance to author. This establishes a variation of sympathy that is suitable for a civic 
relationship embodied in a principle of reciprocity.  
3.3: Conclusion  
In this chapter I considered whether the Smithian notion of sympathy could be 
adopted into the Rawlsian liberal sphere. I maintained firstly that Smith’s account of 
justice can be reconciled with Rawls’, not in terms of the content of justice, but in the 
function that justice plays and the way in which individuals are motivated to act 
justly with relation to each other.  Secondly, I argued that the impartial perspective 
of the Smithian impartial spectator is reconcilable with the impartiality found in 
Rawls’ account of public reason. Finally I argued that Smith’s sympathy does 
maintain the sort of equality of status that Rawlsians would want to have in their 
public sphere, and that sympathy is preferable to compassion in maintaining this 
view on equal status.  
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Chapter 4: Sympathy & Publicity302  
4.1: Overview of the Argument for Sympathetic Public Reason  
From the perspective of the individual, the faculty of sympathy functions to 
communicate the social passions, restrain the expression of the unsocial passions and 
the bodily passions, and make the selfish passions agreeable to others by 
communicating the situation of those experiencing the relevant feelings of grief, joy, 
etc. However, sympathy also plays an important regulatory role at the social level. 
As all individuals have the capacity for sympathy and understand that others have 
this capacity, sympathy helps determine the rules and manners which constitute a 
particular society’s sense of propriety. In Chapter 3, I mentioned that one of the 
consequences of humans’ capacity for sympathy was for one’s self-approbation to be 
constructed through imagined social approbation. This ‘mirror’ of the self, reflected 
in the imagined evaluations of impartial spectators, forms the basis of conscience in 
Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments.303 In order to determine whether others can 
approve of the passions that an agent exhibits, one has to imagine what the spectator 
would feel, if the spectator were imagining himself or herself in the agent’s shoes. 
This creates a ‘mirror’ in the sense that an agent can see her own self reflected back at 
her from a perspective outside of herself.  
Within a liberal political society, there are at least two levels at which an 
individual’s capacity for sympathy may play a role in regulating individuals’ 
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political interactions. During the course of public deliberation, the ability for each 
citizen to recognize her fellow citizens as sympathetic agents might shape the sorts of 
reasons offered in justifying one’s political positions. When trying to defend 
affordable healthcare, affirmative action or criminal justice reform, it might be easier 
to ask one’s fellow citizens to imagine the conditions of those who are in need of 
such policy reform rather than to invoke philosophical concepts like justice, 
egalitarianism, moral desserts and so forth. Situating oneself in the imagined 
position of others may generate an instant recognition of the practical difficulties 
they face, in a way that may not be fully conveyed through abstract or technical 
argument.  
Another level at which citizens’ sympathetic faculties may regulate political 
interactions amongst citizens is in determining the fair terms of social cooperation. 
These are the terms by which citizens aim to resolve competing claims from within 
an institutional setting. In many cases this may require simply appealing to the law 
in order to determine which citizen (if any) has a valid claim upon another within the 
jurisdiction of a polity’s legal authority. However, citizens may also appeal to 
legislatures to change the laws if these laws are seen as lacking, and in some cases 
appeals may be made to the citizenry at large to change the constitutional principles 
under which lawmakers legislate. Hence, by the ‘terms of cooperation’ I mean any 
code of conduct or institutional practice by which cooperation is maintained in the 
light of competing interests. I also include those public democratic principles and 
values that can be justified from the perspective of public reason. For example, in an 
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ideal Rawlsian political society, the two principles of justice would count as a term of 
cooperation.  
There is clearly great overlap between sympathy regulating public 
deliberation and sympathy regulating the terms of cooperation. Both are closely tied 
to the ideas of publicity and reciprocity. In this chapter and in Chapter 5, I elaborate 
how envisioning liberal citizens as sympathetic agents, affects liberal arguments for 
the obligations of reciprocity and the demands of public justification. In order to 
examine the uses of sympathy more closely, however, I will consider sympathy in 
relation to each of these ideas in turn. In this chapter, I will outline what a principle 
of publicity would require for a cooperative enterprise of reasonable, rational and 
sympathetic agents. In Chapter 5, I go on to consider what sorts of obligations would 
stem from reciprocal relations between citizens so conceived.  
The overall objective is to construct a sympathetic account of public reason. In 
the Introduction to this dissertation, I explained that Rawls’ pure public reason has to 
be public at two levels. Firstly, it represents the shared standpoint from which all 
reasonable and rational citizens engaged in the cooperative enterprise of political 
society may deliberate about their common objectives and resolve their differences.304 
Secondly, it serves as the criterion of justification that all reasonable citizens can 
reasonably and rationally identify as the criterion by which legitimate public policies 
ought to be evaluated. While the first sort of publicity specifies the content of public 
reason, it is the second notion of publicity which gives public reason its normative 
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force when its dictates conflict with the reasons found within a citizen’s private 
comprehensive doctrines.    
Consider what the absence of this second type of publicity would mean for a 
case like that of the Humanitarian and the Pacifist. If the procedures of public 
decision-making legitimately determined that the collective use of power would be 
used for intervention, then the Pacifist would not be able to reasonably endorse a 
legitimate political position from within her own comprehensive doctrine. The best 
she can do is to recognize the normative authority of public reason in determining 
legitimate courses of action.305 However, public reason can justify her position just as 
well as it can justify the Humanitarian position. It is, after all, only a necessary 
condition for legitimacy. Instead, what ultimately legitimates intervention is either a 
pure procedural account of legitimacy or an account where there exists a pro tanto 
moral duty of fairness to follow the procedural outcome. Since I have argued against 
pure procedural accounts of legitimacy, it must be the latter which gives intervention 
its legitimate authority.  
However, public reason cannot specify how some moral duties weigh against 
other moral duties. This is the task of what Rawls calls ‘full justification,’ which 
involves reasonable citizens fitting a freestanding political conception of justice into 
their comprehensive doctrines.306 In Rawls’ view, the task of ordering moral duties 
must be a part of the comprehensive doctrine of any reasonable individual. 
Therefore, a part of the function of public justification must be to ensure that 
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reasonable individuals can at least endorse the legitimate authority of a political 
mandate that is in accordance with public reason (i.e. one that is politically justified), 
even if they cannot endorse the content of the mandate itself.307 However, he cautions 
that it is not the comprehensive doctrine which actually lends the public justification 
its normative force.308 In fact, a politically reasonable citizen who reasonably 
endorses public reason can reasonably disagree with its mandates.309 We have seen 
this throughout the thesis, in cases like that of the Liberal Catholic, the Humanitarian 
and the Pacifist, and the French Hijab Controversy. Rather, the normative authority 
granted a specific set of constitutional essentials and democratic ideals within a 
particular territory comes from citizens  ‘taking each other’s views into account’ 
while affirming a political conception of justice. In short, it stems from the 
relationship of reciprocity itself. This is why, particularly in the absence of 
procedural legitimacy, reciprocity must be taken seriously as a cornerstone of public 
justification.  
Reciprocity is also the ideal that governs the interaction of reasonable 
citizens.310 In this chapter and in Chapter 5, I will focus my attention on how an 
understanding of citizens as sympathetic agents affects the public justifications 
reasonable citizens offer to each other. Occasionally, I will illustrate how such 
reasonable citizenship affects political reasonableness, by examining policy issues 
like abortion. However, this will largely be for purposes of clarification. The purpose 
of these chapters is to consider why reasonable and rational agents should take up the 
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view of sympathetic public reason. It is a defence of sympathetic public reason as a 
criterion of public justification that is superior to pure public reserve. I reserve the 
more rigorous examination of sympathetic political reasonableness for Chapter 6, in 
which I analyse how sympathetic public reason tackles the Problem of Conscience by 
examining particular difficult cases like abortion, the case of the Humanitarian and 
the Pacifist, and the French Hijab Controversy. If we can accept that reasonable and 
rational citizens should take up the perspective of sympathetic public reason when 
determining proper uses of political power, and we can accept that sympathetic 
public reason informs which values, ideas and forms of enquiry are politically 
reasonable, then we can also accept that sympathetic political reasonableness is both 
politically and fully justified, and that political mandates justified in accordance with 
it are politically legitimate. In Chapter 6 I will show that sympathetic public reason is 
better suited than pure public reason to tackle the Problem of Conscience.  
4.2: The Structure of Justification for Empathetic Judgments  
In recent years, a number of political philosophers have highlighted the importance 
of empathetic considerations when making informed public decisions. Martha 
Nussbaum, for example, has stressed the importance of imagining the upbringing 
and emotional experiences of others for the purpose of compassionate adjudication 
and merciful criminal sentencing.311 Similarly Robert Goodin has advocated for the 
cultivation of citizens’ ‘deliberative imagination’ when establishing procedures for 
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legitimate deliberative democracy.312 He claims that in order to ensure that others’ 
views are adequately represented in the deliberative process, those individuals must 
be ‘‘imaginatively present’ in the minds of deliberators.’313 Meanwhile, Ackerman and 
Fishkin’s ‘Deliberation Day’ experiment reports instances of individuals who 
radically change their judgments on policy, in response to hearing narratives of 
others’ experiences.314 Overall, the general idea appears to be that understanding the 
situation of another through deliberation and imagination, affects the hearer in a way 
that captures an important aspect of decision-making on public matters.  
Those who advocate for engaging the deliberative imagination in public 
decision-problems argue that this aspect of decision-making can be absent in 
reasoned argument, in fair procedural outcomes or in both. However, the precise 
nature of the absent element is difficult to pin down.  Goodin, for example, writes 
that: ‘a procedure in which people fail to internalize the perspective of one another qualifies as 
democratic only in the most mechanical of ways: without properly registering what one 
another is saying, it will be not an exchange of reasons but merely a count of votes.’315 Yet he 
makes this claim knowing that the ‘mechanics’ of ‘mere counting’ are often justified 
along grounds of equality, fairness, neutrality, anonymity, epistemic considerations, 
and a host of other procedural virtues that originally provided good reasons to find 
democratic procedures legitimate. Therefore, the appeal to imagination must refer to 
some insufficiency in certain procedures to capture all the correct sorts of reasons 
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that must go into a collective decision. Yet this says relatively little about what those 
considerations are.  
Nussbaum makes several compelling arguments about the role of the 
‘narrative imagination’ (or ‘literary imagination’) in providing a clearer picture of the 
demands of equality.316 She writes of the imagination being used as a tool to 
understand the real ‘human facts’ of a case,317 and the possibility of prudent 
Aristotelian poet-judges moving beyond ‘an abstract pseudo-mathematical vision of 
human beings’ and towards ‘a richly human and concrete vision that does justice to the 
complexity of human lives.’318 Again we discover that there is something crucially 
humanizing in judgment formation based on imagination and empathy, which may 
be missing from the processes of judicial and legislative decision-making. Judges, 
lawyers, even legislators appeal to reasons in their decision-making that are 
impartial by way of being impersonal. Nussbaum discusses the case of Judy 
Norman, who murdered her husband after several years of having to endure intense 
physical, psychological and emotional torture at his hands. Her claim of self-defence 
was dismissed by both a trial court and the North Carolina Supreme Court, on 
grounds that her action could not have been motivated by a feeling of ‘imminent 
death or great bodily harm’ given that her husband was asleep at the time that she 
shot him.319 Nussbaum invites us to consider whether North Carolina’s criminal 
justice system made an appropriate evaluation of Norman’s criminal intent, by 
looking solely at the practice of criminality, and not at the social structures or 
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psychological conditions which resulted in the formation of Norman’s criminal 
motivation.  
Legislative procedures can also exemplify such narrow-sightedness. Consider 
the commitment to creating small government which is reflected in the policies 
promoted by the Republican Caucus of the One Hundred and Twelfth United States 
Congress (in session from January 2011- January 2013). During the 2011 fiscal year, 
forty-seven million Americans relied on Medicare benefits, including eight million 
who were classified as non-elderly disabled Americans;320 a similar number of 
Americans required food-stamps;321 and about thirty per cent of the 14.5 million 
unemployed Americans received unemployment insurance benefits.322 From an 
impersonal perspective, it may very well be reasonable for a member of Congress to 
believe that, given the size of the American population, far too many Americans are 
dependent upon social services. From this perspective, a politically reasonable 
citizen could justify cuts in social services. However, a legislator willing to take up 
the more personal perspective of the deliberative imagination would point out that a 
commitment to the ideals of small government at such an exceptional time in the 
country’s history displays considerable disregard for personal livelihoods. From 
such a perspective, it is not necessarily reasonable to cut social services at a time 
when joblessness is high and the economy is yet to recover from a great financial 
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recession. Rawls’ pure public reason is therefore less demanding than an account of 
sympathetic public reason which would utilize the deliberative imagination.  
The general idea is that the incorporation of the deliberative imagination in 
public discourse provides room to appeal to shortfalls in both legislative and judicial 
procedures. Intuitively, one can understand the difficulty of assessing complaints 
against pain or harm independently of the perspective of those subject to it.323 The 
personal narratives of Judy Norman, and those of citizens in need of social services, 
supply fuller pictures of the problems which the legislative and judicial procedures 
in each case were aiming to address. By utilizing the sympathetic imagination, the 
perspective of citizens plays a more substantial role in the process of public decision-
making.  
Both Nussbaum and Goodin appear to believe that the empathetic 
imagination is an important supplement to legitimate democratic procedures. Neither 
is willing to dismiss the important role that procedures play in the creation of 
legitimate democratic decisions.324 Goodin’s reflective democracy imagines a 
reasonable individual deliberating about the competing views of his or her fellow 
citizens, and allowing these considerations (informed by empathy) to result in a 
judicious and balanced democratic vote. In Goodin’s framework, each citizen’s vote 
reflects a subjective weighting of all the private views of every citizen. These 
weightings by each citizen are then democratically aggregated. According to Goodin, 
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such a procedure enables a preference-based democratic process to be democratic at 
both the level of output (aggregation), as well as the level of input (voting), in the 
sense that the perspectives of different individuals in society are considered at both 
initial and outcome phases of the democratic process. Through imagination, the 
views of numerous citizens are already considered even before the aggregation of 
votes takes place.325  
In contrast with Goodin’s use of empathy as a pre-procedural refinement to 
the democratic process, Nussbaum situates empathy within the procedures of public 
decision-making. She considers how a judge, or a lawyer, or any reasonable citizen 
acting within an institutional framework, would have her deliberation informed by 
access to a cultivated imaginative capacity.326 In describing a neutral judge, for 
example, Nussbaum writes:  
‘[S]he does not tailor her principles to the demands of pressure groups, and 
she gives no group or individual special indulgence or favour on account of 
their relation to her interests. As a judicious spectator, she does not gush with 
irrelevant sentiment. On the other hand, she does not think of this sort of 
neutrality as requiring a lofty distance from the social realities of the cases 
before her.’327  
Nussbaum seems to use empathy to clarify her answer to a much more 
difficult moral dilemma, namely, what is the appropriate perspective to take in 
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relation to a person, in order to ascertain that judgments are impartial? Nussbaum, in 
effect, places great emphasis on the first person perspective in a procedure of 
deliberation. Nussbaum further claims that empathy, in the form of the literary 
imagination, has the additional benefit of enabling citizens to recognize that each 
individual’s life has a value independently of the group to which the individual 
belongs.328 According to Nussbaum, the fact that the objects of empathy are 
individuals rather than groups explains why prejudice towards groups does not 
always extend to each member of the group.329 This, in turn, makes the capacity for 
empathy and imagination crucial for healthy relations of civility between citizens 
from different backgrounds.  
For now, let us assume that Nussbaum and Goodin are right to claim that the 
faculty of imagination enables individuals to glean information about others’ 
situations through a capacity for empathy. There remains an additional question 
regarding the justifiability of the judgments arising out of individuals’ imaginative 
capacities. Nussbaum and Goodin remain silent upon whether the mere fact that one 
citizen has empathy for the plight of another gives the first citizen a publicly 
justifiable reason to advocate for the second. They identify reasons why citizens 
ought to be empathetic towards other citizens by invoking a bilateral account of civil 
relations between an empathizer and an empathized; more precisely, they explain 
why a citizen A ought to use her imaginative faculties to consider the needs of a 
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citizen B (i.e. for purposes of identifying the psychological and socioeconomics 
struggles faced by citizens subject to such decisions.)  
However, in order for a judgment based on empathy to be publicly justifiable, 
it is not sufficient to determine that A can engage in such empathy. According to the 
liberal principle of reciprocity, an argument only serves as a justification if the person 
offering it can reasonably expect all others to endorse her argument from a 
reasonable public perspective.330 Therefore, if the mere fact that A empathizes with B 
is a part of A’s political justification, then A must be able to offer the fact of her 
empathy as a reason that all reasonable citizens can have to accept A’s political 
justification. These reasonable members of the public might include A herself and 
also B, but they must also include other reasonable citizens who may not feel similar 
levels of empathy for B.  
This means that in order for A’s empathetic judgment regarding B to be 
publicly justifiable, it would have to be the case that any reasonable citizen C is 
required on politically reasonable grounds to consider the needs of B in reasonable 
deliberations about public decisions, only because of A’s empathy for B. It is the 
requirements placed on C in light of A’s empathy which determines the public 
nature of the justification, as C represents the unbiased public to whom A must 
justify her empathy. C’s own empathy towards B is irrelevant to the justification, 
except insofar as it informs C’s judgment as to whether the level of A’s empathy is 
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appropriate. By incorporating this third perspective, empathetic public justification 
must depart from the framework constructed by Goodin and Nussbaum.  
Let us begin with a simple example to see what the public justification of an 
empathetic judgment would require. Suppose B is the head of a family who has 
recently lost his job. He is advocating for a bill which would help him to support his 
family during difficult economic times. A and C are citizens deliberating about 
whether they will become proponents or opponents on this bill. Prior to hearing the 
narration of B’s story, assume that neither A nor C have any strong feelings for or 
against the bill. They each have the same set of relevant information at their disposal, 
and if forced to vote, they would flip a fair coin to determine their view. However, 
upon hearing B’s story, A uses her capacity for imagination to re-examine B’s 
situation and is so affected by his story that she decides to vote in favour of the bill. 
However, if the bill passes C will also be subject to the content of the bill. How might 
A justify her new political position to C?   
It seems that there are a range of questions C could ask A in response to A’s 
empathetic judgment. The two most obvious are perhaps ‘Why do you feel empathy 
for B?’ and ‘Why should I be subject to a law because of your empathy?’ The first 
question asks A to give an account of her reasoning regarding B’s situation, while the 
second asks A to take the third person stand-point, and ask whether it is reasonable 
to impose obligations on others due to her own subjective view. In short, the first is a 
question of publicity, and the second is a question of reciprocity. It is necessary for A 
to be able to answer both questions in order to have the judgment be publicly 
justifiable. Let us quickly review why this is the case:  
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Suppose that A has a suitable answer to the question of reciprocity, but not 
the question of publicity. This means that C agrees that A’s empathetic judgments 
require consideration, but A is unable to explain to C why her judgments are what 
they are. In such a scenario C confronts three problems: firstly, she cannot be sure 
that A’s judgments are judicious, or if they properly discriminate between different 
appeals. A might be super-sensitive to the needs of all struggling parents, some who 
are deserving (like the responsible breadwinner who lost his job to the economy) and 
others who are not deserving (for example, a parent who loves his children but has 
never cultivated the will-power or sense of responsibility to take care of them.) 
Secondly, C cannot be sure that A’s judgments are fair. Perhaps A empathizes with 
B, because she imagines him to be weak-willed, foolish or inferior, and her empathy 
is conditional upon a condescending sense of charity. Third, C is left with some 
uncertainty as to how she ought to balance A’s judgments against the judgments of 
those with opposing views. If an opponent of the policy explains to C that 
implementing it will redirect the municipal or federal budget away from other 
initiatives, and C cannot be sure why A believes what she does, how can she judge 
A’s claims for consideration against this other citizen’s?  
On the other hand, if A is only able to answer the question of publicity, but 
not the question of reciprocity, C might rightfully question why A’s feelings ought to 
impose obligations upon her fellow citizens. For example, suppose A explains her 
attitudes towards the policy by reporting that B’s story suddenly reminded her of an 
occasion in which her favourite uncle lost his job. According to A, the struggle to 
make ends meet imposed both financial and psychological burdens on her uncle and 
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her aunt. They faced anxieties about losing their cherished home, and being able to 
send their children to quality schools. Her aunt felt resentment and even some shame 
at her diminished social status, and her uncle was never able to fully recover his 
sense of self-respect as a good provider for his family. Having watched her uncle and 
aunt suffer from such hardship, A has the belief that any citizen going through 
similar circumstances deserves the support of the political community.   
Here A is giving C an answer that C can both understand and expect some 
reasonable citizens to endorse. However, C herself need not endorse the view. She 
may feel the requisite compassion for B, and still think that it is not the responsibility 
of the political community to provide such support. If A insists that the explanation 
of her sympathetic judgment is grounds for political justification, then her 
justification violates reciprocity. It is not yet clear why A’s concern for her uncle 
should inform public policy in any way.331 This is not to say that it should not. It’s 
simply unclear why C ought to be subject to a law for this reason.  
A may have to add something to the story, such as an account of how 
watching her uncle experience the anxiety, shame and frustration of an economic 
downturn made her believe that a fair system of justice would minimize the impact 
recessions had on all citizens. Even then C might demand to know why another 
person’s negative emotions ought to affect the laws to which she is subject. What are 
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her obligations to citizens facing such pain? In short, it becomes necessary to give an 
account of precisely when an empathetic judgment meets the demands of reciprocity.  
The imaginative faculty is connected to various forms of empathy: the 
capacity for compassion, for pity, for mercy, for moral indignation, for sympathy. 
Each of these may satisfy the requirements of publicity and reciprocity in different 
ways, and it is possible that some may not satisfy one or both of the requirements. 
My task will be to show that sympathy, at least, is a reasonable candidate for a type 
of empathy which can be publicly justified. In this paper I tackle the first of these two 
tasks, namely to show how sympathy meets the Rawlsian demand for publicity. I 
will then pursue the question of reciprocity in Chapter 5.   
4.3: Rawlsian Publicity  
Before launching into an analysis of the publicity of sympathetic justifications, I 
briefly want to outline some basic ideas in the literature of liberal publicity to which I 
allude in the remainder of the chapter. In Political Liberalism, Rawls writes that the 
full publicity condition is satisfied when the following three conditions hold: (i) 
public principles of justice govern the political processes of a liberal society,332 (ii) the 
political conception of justice is justified in accordance with ‘general beliefs’ 
regarding democratic values, scientific knowledge and methods of enquiry and 
reasoning which can be found in ‘the current public views of a well-ordered 
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society,’333 and (iii) when each citizen can take this freestanding conception of justice 
and embed it into his or her own reasonable comprehensive doctrines.334  
A separate feature of Rawlsian notions of publicity is found in Rawls’ 
criterion of reciprocity, which requires citizens to offer justifications to each other on 
terms that they believe that other citizens could reasonably accept as reasonable.335 
Rawls points out that this goes beyond simply making a person’s view 
understandable to those to whom one is offering a justification. He writes that 
Michael Servetus could understand why Calvin believed that anyone who did not 
believe in the Trinity ought to be burned at stake. However, this does not mean that 
Servetus found it reasonable that Calvin wanted to burn him at stake.336 It was 
politically unreasonable insofar as Calvin was not offering reasons from a shared 
perspective, after having taken into account relations of reciprocity and the burdens 
of judgment.  
Political liberals, who generally accept the criterion of reciprocity, often find 
the need to add further specifications to it. Two of these further specifications will be 
useful in my analysis of the publicity of sympathetic justification. The first is Steven 
Wall’s distinction between that which is publicly accessible and that which is 
publicly understandable.337 He constructs an example in which a justification for 
abolishing capital punishment relies on Einstein’s Theory of Relativity. Although the 
General and Special Theories of Relativity are ‘public’ in the sense of being 
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established by the scientific standards of current liberal societies, arguments that 
invoke them will not be easy for the average citizen to follow. In Wall’s terminology, 
although theories of relativity are publicly accessible, they are not publicly 
understandable.338  
This becomes an important distinction in the publicity of sympathetic 
justification, because individuals’ capacities of sympathetic imagination will 
fluctuate between individuals and also differ depending on the situation. A liberal 
who has been raised Anglican may find it easier to be in sympathy with the views of 
a Liberal Catholic on abortion than with the views of an Atheist. However, this same 
Liberal Anglican may not be able to engage in the same level of sympathy with the 
Liberal Catholic on matters concerning the environment. An account of sympathetic 
justification will have to explain whether the Liberal Catholic’s views on abortion are 
simply not understandable to the Atheist or are instead not accessible, and whether 
her views on abortion and the environment are equally accessible in both cases to the 
Anglican.  
A separate distinction is introduced by Kent Greenwalt, which differentiates 
accessible reasons from those which are generalizable.339 Greenawalt writes of the 
‘joyfulness’ that came with the birth of his three sons, and how sharing that joy with 
his wife reaffirmed for him the importance of the ‘overwhelming value of caring and 
love.’340 In his view, the joy felt at the birth of a child is general, in the sense that 
many parents experience such joy. However, it is only accessible through the actual 
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event of experiencing such joy.341 Those who are not parents will not have access to 
the ethical insights that follow from the experience of such joy. Yet, Greenawalt 
claims that in some sense we want to say that the ethic of caring and love is general. 
It applies to all of us, despite the fact that not all of us have access to the insights that 
support it.  
Greenwalt’s distinction straightforwardly applies to the example of the 
unemployment benefits I considered in section 4.2. In that example, A’s sympathy 
for the unemployed father came from an insight she had when her uncle lost his job. 
However, the insight was towards a general ethical principle of how a political 
community ought to be supportive of those responsible breadwinners who lose their 
job due to an economic downturn.  
In what follows, I will try to establish what publicity looks like for 
sympathetic justification.  
4.4: The Publicity of Sympathetic Justification 
In many ways, exchanges of sympathetic justification are not that different from 
other types of reasonable disagreement already found within the uses of public 
reason. Consider the following scenario discussed by John Rawls and Samuel 
Freeman.342 Reasonable members of a liberal democratic polity have invoked 
legitimate procedures of decision-making in accordance with public reason, to 
determine whether or not to legalize abortion. The outcome has favoured proponents 
for the right to choose. However, a subset of the population is pro-life on moral 
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grounds. From within their own comprehensive doctrine, they could never find 
abortion justifiable. How is it that these citizens can be asked to find abortion 
justifiable from the perspective of public democratic culture, and why is such 
justification important for liberal legitimacy when citizens do not ‘actually’ find such 
decisions justifiable?  
One answer lies in the criterion of reciprocity, which requires reasonable 
individuals to offer to each other explanations for their political positions that other 
reasonable citizens may be expected to find reasonable.343 In the decision to legalize 
abortion, the case for abortion is supported by reasons that all citizens can find 
reasonable, including those who privately oppose abortion. These reasons include 
women’s rights over their bodies and the socioeconomic burdens of carrying a child 
to term.344 In the liberal interpretation of the pro-life position, those morally opposed 
to abortion still recognize these reasons as significant, simply not as weighty as a 
foetus’ right to life. On the other hand, those in favour of abortion do not recognize a 
foetus’ right to life as having any significance whatsoever. They do not believe that a 
foetus has such a right. Since everyone reasonably accepts the two reasons in favour 
of abortion, and only a subset of the population endorses the reason opposed to it, 
Rawlsians argue that only proponents of abortion can form justifications for their 
position that meet the criterion of reciprocity.345  
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This line of analysis can supposedly be extended to all moral or ethical 
oppositions to legitimate laws. If a law is legitimate, then all citizens can recognize at 
least one public reason to accept it, namely that it was generated in a legitimate way 
(say through a legitimate procedure invoked after a process of deliberation guided 
by public reasons). As in the case of abortion, even citizens who may oppose the law 
from within their private comprehensive doctrine can accept this account of its 
legitimacy. If no citizen opposes the law on public grounds, then the law is publicly 
justifiable no matter how many citizens oppose it on nonpublic grounds. In order to 
meet the demands of the criterion of reciprocity, private reasons cannot be given any 
weight. 
If citizens cannot accept justification from the perspective of public 
democratic culture, they may end up questioning the reasonableness of the 
procedure itself. Freeman writes, ‘It will be a problem only if, as a result of their inability 
to accept the political resolution by public reason for one or more constitutional issues (e.g. 
regarding abortion), they are led to reject public reason itself in all other cases.’346 Yet in a 
culture of pluralism, this is precisely what will happen. The burdens of judgment 
combined with the seriousness of the issues indicate that given a large enough 
political community, there will inevitably be at least one person who finds abortion 
to be that particular issue by which she measures the reasonableness of the procedure. 
This in turn means that in the absence of such an individual in the political 
community, the stability of the political system depends not on deep-seated 
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reasonable agreement but on the empirical fact that none have taken the 
destabilizing reasonable viewpoint.    
Freeman adds that it is perfectly sensible that sometimes cognitively 
reasonable people cannot accept that which is politically reasonable,347 where 
‘cognitively reasonable’ indicates beliefs that a person actually holds, compared to 
those held in virtue of taking up the perspective of the public sphere. For example, 
we may say that it is perfectly reasonable for a Catholic to be unwilling to accept the 
reasonableness of that which she believes is committing murder. However, Freeman 
does not see this as a politically reasonable argument, since the interpretation that 
abortion is murder comes from within her private comprehensive doctrine.  
Yet in making this assertion, Freeman fails to distinguish private beliefs from 
disagreement over differences generated by the burdens of judgment. After all, 
public democratic culture never stipulates that it is cognitively unreasonable to 
ascribe a moral status to a foetus that would make abortions impermissible. It simply 
holds that such a position is publicly unjustifiable. In fact, the standpoint of public 
reason must also hold that if foetuses were to have the moral status that Catholics 
ascribe them, then it would, in many common circumstances, be impermissible to 
have abortions. Otherwise the public standpoint would be stipulating that on certain 
occasions, murder was justifiable. Public reason accepts such a conditional as true, 
while neither affirming nor denying the truth of the antecedent clause. This 
generates the following concern: 
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(1) If the foetus has a particular moral status, then it is not publicly justifiable 
to have abortions (i.e. an abortion is comparable to murder.) 
(2) Either the foetus has a particular metaphysical status or it does not.   
Although it does not follow from this that abortion is unjustifiable, it also 
does not follow that abortion is justifiable. Given the importance of not committing 
murders, whether or not one believes the truth of the antecedent in (1) is of pivotal 
importance. Pure public reason accepts neither the truth nor the falsity of the 
antecedent. Therefore, it can neither accept that it is justifiable or unjustifiable to 
have abortions. If pure public reason were to accept that the justifiability of having 
abortions, then it would follow from (1) that a foetus does not have a particular moral 
status. However, pure public reason cannot make such a claim. Therefore, as long as 
a Liberal Catholic claims that it is not publicly justifiable to have abortions, Freeman 
is wrong to say that Catholics are making use of their private comprehensive 
doctrines when asserting the impermissibility of abortion.   
In order to see this more clearly, compare the above reasoning to that in a 
proposition like: ‘If the Bible says homosexuality is wrong, then gay marriage should 
be illegal.’ Here public reason need not deny the antecedent when making the claim 
that it is politically unreasonable to make gay marriage illegal on these grounds. 
Public reason could accept that there are passages in the Bible that claim 
homosexuality is wrong and still argue that as far as public democratic culture is 
concerned, claims in the Bible should have no bearing on the legality of gay 
marriage.     
188 
 
Once we make this distinction, the Catholic’s argument is indeed one which 
is publicly reasonable (although not justifiable). It is reasonable in the sense that it 
follows reasoning that is public, and involves beliefs that public reason neither insists 
is true, nor insists is false. Consider how a politically reasonable citizen would go 
about determining her attitudes towards abortion. Her judgment would depend on 
how she answered three questions:  
(1) Does having a particular moral status make it wrong to murder (rather than 
merely kill) certain living things? 
(2) Does the foetus have a moral status that would make killing it murder?  
(3) Should murder be illegal? 
 
Political reasonableness most certainly provides guidance in answering some 
of these questions. Firstly, it requires citizens to answer (3) in the affirmative. At least 
in the Anglo-American common law tradition, murder is differentiated from 
homicide or manslaughter in that it is seen as a public wrong.348 Like injustice or 
inequality, murder is one of those cases in which public reason demands citizens to 
take a particular moral view. One could not hold the opposite view and still be 
politically reasonable.  
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As for question (1), the democratic values of different political societies may 
differ in how they answer this question. However, we could invoke a manner of 
public reasoning such as treating like cases alike. If we were to ask whether it could 
ever be justifiable to kill a child that had not reached the age of reasonable maturity 
(i.e. two years old, three years old, even seventeen years old) on grounds that the 
child was harming the parents’ economic prospects or contributing to gender 
inequality by imposing burdens on young mothers, political reasonableness would 
typically give a clear indication that killing a child on such grounds would be 
murder.   
The only place in which political reasonableness can neither guide nor 
command involves question (2). Freeman views this inability as automatically 
placing (2) within the jurisdiction of one’s nonpublic beliefs or private 
comprehensive doctrine. Yet reasonable disagreement is just as much a concern 
within the public sphere as the private sphere. As we saw in Chapter 3, a defendant 
in a criminal murder investigation might have left no conclusive proof he committed 
the murder, but significant evidence in the form of DNA, prior threats, personal 
character, motive, etc., can be aggregated in different ways by different reasonable 
individuals when determining guilt. Simply because two jurors disagree on whether 
or not the evidence is incriminating hardly makes their reasoning nonpublic.  
Yet the line between ‘reasonable expectation of reasonable endorsement’, and 
‘nonpublic reasoning’ remains ambiguous. If one juror says that in her view the 
defendant had a motive but not the character to commit the crime, and another juror 
holds the opposite view, in what way are their situations different from a citizen who 
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believes the foetus should be treated like it has a particular moral status while 
another disagrees? At the level of the two individuals who are in disagreement the 
cases are exactly alike. At the level of publicity, however, Freeman believes that 
political liberalism should claim that the jurors’ disagreement is reasonable 
disagreement which does not defy the criteria of publicity, while the metaphysical 
status of the foetus is reasonable disagreement on a non-public matter.  
A defender of this interpretation of Rawls might argue that public democratic 
culture accepts that the disagreement about the guilt of a convict is about a fact of the 
matter for which there is epistemic ambiguity, whilst the other disagreement (over 
abortion) involves a question on which political reasonableness has pre-determined 
that there is no fact of the matter. In other words, according to public democratic 
culture, the point of time in which a foetus turns into a being with a moral status has 
the ontological status of an empty question. Since people of different faiths disagree 
about it, public reason simply assumes there is no correct answer. By contrast, it 
cannot contend that the guilt or innocence of an indicted defendant has no correct 
answer, so that is seen as a reasonable disagreement.  
However, if public reason really develops from an overlapping consensus, it 
has no more authority to determine the ontological status of questions any more than 
it has the right to insist on the metaphysical status of objects. The burdens of 
judgment demand that we leave difficult metaphysical questions aside. All 
Rawlsians agree that, ‘The public conception of justice is to be political, not 
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metaphysical.’ 349 The agnosticism about the foetus relies instead on the very fact that 
no reasoning about the foetus is at once public and reasonably acceptable by all 
reasonable people. Public reason is silent on the metaphysical status of the foetus, 
but not because it is an empty question. It is silent because it cannot even begin to 
answer such a question, and struggles to articulate constitutional and political 
reasons to circumvent this issue.350    
A second defence of Freeman’s position may be that although public reason 
cannot answer the question about the metaphysical status of a foetus, it additionally 
finds it politically unreasonable to even consider a view on the foetus’ metaphysical 
status while making political decisions. This means that although public reason 
holds that, ‘if foetuses were to have the moral status that Catholics ascribe to it, then it 
would be impermissible to have abortions,’ it is politically unreasonable to consider 
any beliefs regarding whether or not foetuses actually have the moral status in 
question, when making political decisions. This view explains why it is as politically 
unreasonable to deny the right to life on grounds that foetuses do not have such 
status, as it would be to argue for the right because they do have such status.  
However, the Liberal Catholic views the foetus’ right to life not merely as a 
moral right, but also as a political right grounded in the Liberal Catholic’s sense of 
justice. The existence of disagreement on the moral status of the foetus should not be 
sufficient to overturn a claim to a political right. Otherwise, those who are racist, 
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sexist or homophobic could also justify their bigotry by questioning the moral status 
of personhood assigned to the victims of their prejudice. It is the sense of justice 
associated with a particular belief regarding the moral status of the foetus, and not 
only the belief itself, which is of concern when determining the justness of the 
practice of abortion.  
Hence, Rawlsian public reason is left in a quandary: the relationship between 
pro-life and pro-choice advocates appears to be the same as that between jurors who 
believe a defendant is guilty and those who believe a person to be innocent. On what 
grounds can public reason claim that the former is a matter of reasonable 
disagreement, but the latter an account of a given party aiming to force non-public 
reasons upon another?  
I will now argue that understanding civic relations as relations of sympathy, 
provides a way out of the problems highlighted by the abortion debate. Let us first 
look at what sympathy says about reasonable disagreement between any two 
individuals (whether jurors or voters), and then determine what it would say about 
the question of publicity itself.  When two people disagree, sympathy claims that 
they still want the other to approve of their own position. As I argued in Chapter 3, 
this means that in the liberal public sphere, citizens will try to justify their political 
positions from a perspective with which they believe that others can agree. Smith’s 
sympathy therefore only affects the Rawlsian account of public justification slightly, 
in that a justification is not only offered on shared terms, but with the desire to have 
others approve of the position of the citizen offering the justification.  
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Note that whenever the criterion of reciprocity is met, mutual sympathy is 
always achieved in the extended, political sense that I described in section 3.2.2. If a 
reasonable citizen accepts the reasons offered by another reasonable citizen, then she 
approves of that reasoning even if she disagrees with the outcome of that reasoning. 
The juror who sees that another juror has carefully weighed the evidence given to 
both of them, but has come to a different conclusion purely because of the burdens of 
judgment, has met all three conditions of mutual sympathy.351 However, in accepting 
the burdens of judgment, she also knows that the other juror’s situation is slightly 
different from hers and accounts for this in choosing to sympathize with her view.  
Therefore, the two jurors are in mutual sympathy (in the political sense) 
despite their reasonable disagreement, as long as each believes that the other is 
reasonable. Can the pro-choice and pro-life advocates be in mutual sympathy if one 
side is accusing the other side of committing murder? Let us begin with the 
assumption that such a deep-seated moral disagreement cannot generate mutual 
sympathy, and consider why this assumption is false.  
The first condition for mutual sympathy is for one spectator to imagine 
herself in the position of an agent, and try to determine how the agent might feel in 
that situation. Meeting condition (i) is very demanding when considering radically 
different moral views. The imagination would be required to carry out a rather 
difficult feat in order to imagine developing a significantly different moral calculus 
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through practical experience, moral education and so forth. It is, of course, not 
impossible to do so, and in fact Kent Greenawalt and others have argued that 
individuals come closer to understanding the views of religious opponents than they 
often realize.352 However, for drastically different moral and philosophical world 
views, we can imagine that meeting condition (i) is difficult.  
In the case of the jurors I said that condition (ii) was met in the sense that if 
the jurors see each other as having a reasonable view, they must thereby conclude 
that were their situations different, they would have been able to adopt the view of 
the other. Circumstances surrounding (ii) are also different for those who disagree on 
the metaphysical status of the foetus. Although they are called upon to believe or act 
as if they believe that the others’ view is reasonable, they are not really in a position 
to the judge the reasonableness of the others’ view in the way that those who have 
similar beliefs could judge the views. A Catholic who is not liberal, or even a Liberal 
Protestant, may be better placed to understand the Liberal Catholic’s sense of justice 
regarding abortion, than other reasonable citizens. This is because they may be better 
equipped to understand how the Liberal Catholic’s ‘sense of justice’ is attuned to 
political matters, more than other liberals.353  
Here, Rawlsians will likely point out that I am using the phrase ‘sense of 
justice’ rather differently from Rawls. Rawls defined it as the ‘capacity to 
understand, to apply, and to act from the public conception of justice which 
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characterizes the fair terms of social cooperation.’354Given that I am trying to 
determine whether or not the Liberal Catholic’s position regarding abortion is 
suitably public, it is too early to use the notion of ‘a sense of justice’ to support my 
argument. The sense of justice, as far as Rawls is concerned, presupposes publicity.  
However, my account of the sense of justice meets the requirements of the 
criterion of reciprocity, which is also a Rawlsian benchmark for publicity. As I have 
tried to show above, the criterion of reciprocity is met whenever mutual sympathy in 
the political sense is achieved. The reason that a conservative Catholic or a Liberal 
Protestant is better able to understand why the Liberal Catholic’s views on abortion 
stem from a ‘sense of justice’ is because when the Liberal Catholic offers her views to 
them, they can more easily imagine that she really has weighed all the evidence 
carefully and given political values their due weight. Like the two jurors who, when 
presented with the same evidence, might be able to understand why an individual 
might come to the conclusion that the other juror did, someone who understands 
how the Catholic reasons will find it easier to accept a disagreement as a reasonable 
one. In short, not only are the reasons public, but the reasoning is also public.  
By contrast, if the Liberal Catholic were trying to explain her views on 
abortion to someone with a very different comprehensive doctrine, it might not be 
easy for that person to assess the quality of her reasoning. As reasonable citizens, 
those others must still believe that the Liberal Catholic has reasonable reasons for 
disagreeing with abortion. However, there may be no impartial perspective available 
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to them from which to judge whether the Liberal Catholic’s reasoning is good 
reasoning.  
If we imagine citizens to be perfectly sympathetic agents, however, the above 
problem disappears. Perfectly sympathetic agents can imagine precisely what it is 
the Liberal Catholic means when she talks about a ‘sense of justice’ towards an 
unborn foetus. Such agents can step into the Liberal Catholic’s shoes and determine 
what reasons the Liberal Catholic feels are important, and can understand their 
normative force qua Catholic. They do this in a way analogous to how a reasonable 
citizen adopts the perspective of public democratic culture and can understand the 
normative force of public reason qua citizen.   
Therefore, in cases where a reasonable comprehensive doctrine heavily 
informs a view on matters of justice, a perfectly sympathetic agent need not worry 
about the distinction between sympathetic justifications that are publicly accessible 
and publicly understandable. Just as a perfectly reasonable citizen can understand 
Einstein’s theories well enough to understand how they might support the 
abolishment of capital punishment,355 a perfectly sympathetic one will understand 
the sense of justice and moral motivations that make a Liberal Catholic believe that 
the right to life of a foetus is also a matter of public justice.  
The further question is whether or not this publicity of the Catholic position 
gives it any sort of authority in the public sphere. I view this as a matter of the duties 
that emerge from relations of reciprocity. I tackle this question in Chapter 5. In the 
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remainder of this chapter, I consider two ways in which sympathetic judgments 
could fail to satisfy the requirements of publicity: Failures of Judgment and Failures 
of Publicity. 
4.5: Failures of Publicity  
By invoking the definition of empathetic justification outlined in 4.2, I now claim that 
in order for a sympathetic judgment to be publicly justifiable, A’s sympathy towards 
B must be such that C is required on politically reasonable grounds to consider the 
needs of B in reasonable deliberations about public decisions, only because of A’s 
sympathy for B. I consider two ways in which such justifications could fail.  
Failures of Publicity occur when the justification for A’s sympathy cannot 
succeed despite there being no failures in A’s judgment itself. For example, it may be 
that A’s judgment is based on an emotion that C cannot identify (say admiration, 
guilt or compassion). This could be a variant of the demand that A’s justification be 
sufficiently other-regarding (a problem I consider in 4.5.1), or it may be because C’s 
own life-experiences are such that she cannot fully evaluate A’s judgment in an 
unbiased manner (a problem of faulty imagination).   
Failures of Judgment occur when C reasonably believes that the sympathetic 
judgment formed by A (in response to the situation of B) is inappropriate. From C’s 
perspective, A might have an inappropriate attitude towards B, say one that is 
prejudiced; or C may believe that A’s imagination does not fully capture B’s position. 
I consider the first sort of problem in 4.5.1 and the second in 4.6.1. It might also be the 
case that despite having the correct attitude and a properly functioning faculty of 
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imagination, the judgment A forms fails to be adequately other regarding. This 
problem I consider in 4.6.2. 
4.5.1: Introducing Failures of Publicity 
Consider for a moment what it would mean to engage in a cooperative political 
enterprise with an individual who was reasonable and rational, yet incapable of any 
sympathy. We would know her to be a person with both rational interests and a 
moral outlook, and as a reasonable person we would expect her to recognize the 
same features in us. When proposing general terms of cooperation we would have to 
make room for the fact that neither of us ought to receive an advantage during a 
conflict of rational interests and that to the best of our ability we ought not to 
interfere with each other in our pursuits of what we conceive to be the good. We 
would expect to be treated fairly.356 In short, we would expect something like the 
general picture presented in ‘Justice as Reciprocity,’ although, as Rawls’ own 
reformulation in Theory of Justice suggests, the details are clearly up for debate.357  
However, once these conditions are established, we would be left to our own 
devices to pursue our private purposes. We could end up with rather fulfilling 
private and social lives, in which each of us could live in accordance with our own 
values, tastes and preferences. However, a personal touch would be absent from our 
political interactions. Indeed, offering a public justification to another citizen on 
grounds that a particular policy reflects one’s values or preferences would generally 
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be seen as an exercise of political unreasonableness. The point of political 
reasonableness is to take up a shared perspective, and acknowledge its superiority 
over our personal perspective. In return, we would avoid having to answer to the 
demands of other members of our cooperative, whose demands might seem self-
absorbed, narrow-minded, uncritical or intolerant.  
On reflection, however, one might wonder whether it is necessary to be wary 
of such demands when we have already assumed that our fellow cooperators are 
reasonable and rational agents? If during public discourse, such agents were to 
explain to us the values or preferences that support their views on a particular 
policy, they would not expect us to simply accept the policies on such grounds. 
Rather, they might be inviting us to examine the question from a different (private) 
lens, or providing a larger picture which gives an account of why their beliefs are 
coherent or sensible. This may not lead directly to a justification of the political 
position, but considerations of such reasoning might shed light on features of the 
practical problem that we have not previously considered. They might inform an 
overall justification if justification requires the weighing of reasons, and a particular 
interpretive lens.  
Consider the following: the impact that policies supporting small businesses 
or local farmers might have on the economic flourishing of a community might be 
comparable to those that would result from higher paying but less fulfilling jobs 
brought in by larger corporations. Yet how can the degree that a job ‘fulfills’ a 
citizenry be determined from the public perspective? It requires a private lens to 
make such a judgment. Similarly, the importance of providing state-funded schools 
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the resources to teach Greek, Latin, music and the arts might be said to presuppose a 
certain vision of what a rewarding education consists in, a vision that need not be 
publicly defensible to every person of every outlook (since we cannot assume that 
everyone sees the value in a liberal arts education), but one that is widely recognized 
as being more fulfilling than a concept of education as a process of skills acquisition.   
The question before us is whether there is any harm in taking up the lens of 
such a viewpoint, and considering the policy decision from a particular viewpoint at 
hand? Undoubtedly, if only one such viewpoint were taken to be the acceptable lens, 
then those who do not share this viewpoint would have reason to complain.  For 
example, if those advocating for the support of small businesses were to be seen as 
‘correct’ to the point where the ambitious young corporate climber’s view of the 
good life was completely dismissed, then the latter would certainly have a reason to 
complain about the public defensibility of the small business supporters’ claims. If 
Ancient Greek were taught at the expense of a modern language that reflected the 
spoken tongue of a linguistic minority, then surely it would be unfair to accept only 
the humanistic tastes as the correct one.  
However, defenders of the standard view of reciprocity cannot claim that it 
would be wrong to ask the corporate climber to imaginatively consider the 
perspective of the small business owners, if the small business owners were willing 
to consider the perspective of the corporate climber. The treatment of each citizen 
would still be reciprocal with relation to every other citizen. In fact, there would be 
nothing wrong in forcing the linguistic minority to consider the perspective of the 
defenders of a humanistic public education, if the latter were also forced to consider 
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the perspective of the linguistic minority. As reasonable citizens with a sense of 
fairness and reciprocity, both sides would have to be willing to reflect on the others’ 
perspective in a sincere and sympathetic manner if they had cause to believe the 
other would do the same. Note that reciprocity persists whether it is an individual’s 
tastes that require sympathetic evaluation, or the needs of a minority group. For both, 
it operates as a way of allowing certain private interests into public discourse.   
In short, if agents engaged in seeking fair terms of cooperation were not 
sympathetic, then a wide array of values, aesthetics, reasonable world views and 
non-public ethics would have to be eliminated from public discourse. This 
elimination would occur despite the fact that such beliefs are compatible with 
reasonable citizenship. This does not yet show, of course, that sympathetic 
judgments should be considered in the political sphere. It is simply meant to address 
the concern that introducing sympathetic judgments into public discourse would 
inevitably generate unreasonable demands into political considerations. Sympathy is 
consistent with fairness and reciprocity in the sense that each citizen could 
sympathetically consider the perspective of the other if the other were willing to do 
the same. No non-public tastes or preferences would be advantaged in this way, 
because no one would be forced to accept the other point of view (although they 
might be forced to consider it).  
In this section I anticipate two ways in which the publicity of sympathy might 
be called into question. The first is the worry that a sympathetic judgment is 
informed by the passions that enable a person to experience sympathy. Since 
passions and the experience of passions are inherently subjective the sympathetic 
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judgment itself cannot be made public. I argue that although the experience of 
passions is subjective, the emotion which informs the sympathetic judgment is based 
on a belief that can be communicable.  
4.5.2: Emotions  
In discussing the justificatory capacity of emotions, theorists are careful to 
differentiate between two rather different conceptions of what an emotion is. 
According to the first conception, emotions are experienced as physiological 
sensations devoid of evaluative content358. They are ‘mechanistic’359 in the sense that 
they are ‘forces more or less devoid of thought or perception – that they are impulses or 
surges that lead the person to action without embodying beliefs’360. A slightly more 
charitable interpretation of this conception is one where emotions are either 
physiological responses to one’s environment or an individual’s perception of these 
physiological responses361. In this view, although individuals still experience 
emotions as a passive response to a physiological change, it is the awareness of this 
change which constitutes the emotion as opposed to the feeling itself. In both 
readings, however, no beliefs or cognitive processes of any kind contribute to the 
experience of the emotion.  
The second general conception of emotions is a cognitivist view. In this view, 
although emotions are experienced qualitatively by individuals, there is an 
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additional interpretive or evaluative element to an emotion, one which is variously 
considered to be a type of belief, thought, appraisal or intention362. One such view of 
emotions is the cognitive-arousal theory confirmed by the experimental findings of 
Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer. According to Schachter and Singer’s now 
famous experiment, individuals who are subject to the same physiological arousal 
(e.g. epinephrine) experience different emotional responses given their beliefs about 
the situation with which they are confronted363. In the study, individuals injected 
with the same level of epinephrine but subjected to either an angry stooge or a 
euphoric stooge, experienced feelings of anger or euphoria which corresponded to 
that of their environment. Moreover, those who were aware of the physiological 
side-effects of epinephrine did not experience either anger or euphoria when 
confronted with said stooges, implying that they used their knowledge of the side-
effects to explain the symptoms they were experiencing. This experiment confirmed 
the hypothesis that emotional states arise when individuals use the cognitive 
resources at their disposal to explain their physiological experiences.364  
The precise nature of these cognitive resources has been subject to nearly four 
decades of debate. Robert Solomon cautions that cognitive resources need not be 
‘beliefs’, but may be better understood as ‘evaluations’ or ‘appraisals’.365 By this he 
means that the cognitive elements of emotion need not contain propositional content 
or be informed by facts. In fact, cognitive states need not be self-conscious. It is not 
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necessary for a person to be consciously aware that one is angry or euphoric in order 
to experience anger or euphoria366. However, Solomon concedes that emotions are 
the sorts of things we can ‘think our way into’367. What matters is the fact that we can 
reflect upon our emotions, deliberate about them and articulate aspects of them, even 
if we do not do so at the moment we are experiencing the emotion.  
Our task then is to determine which conception of emotion best describes a 
person’s capacity for sympathy. If sympathy falls into the cognitive category, we 
must further consider what sorts of cognitions it requires. If sympathy lacks any 
evaluative content or reflective belief, then the emotion itself cannot be a subject of 
justification. As an experience imposed upon an individual by his or her 
environment and physical constitution, there is nothing constituting the emotion that 
can be the subject of rational enquiry except its causes. This is not to say that we 
cannot discuss whether it is correct to subject individuals to such external 
environments. We may rightly identify a culture of fear or hedonism to be 
detrimental to personal development or social cohesion. However, such a discussion 
focuses on the consequences of such emotions, rather than on the intrinsic value of 
the emotion itself. For example, we cannot ask whether it is appropriate for an 
individual to feel such an emotion, or whether it is the responsibility of the public to 
respond to the normative implications of such emotive states. The argument, “I have 
a bad feeling about Policy X,” has little normative import if emotions cannot be 
subject to evaluation or deliberation.  
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On the other hand, if sympathy requires cognitive elements that are 
unconscious or not articulable,368 then consensual justification also seems out of the 
question. How can an individual expect others who disagree with her to accept her 
judgment if she herself is not aware of their content? In the following, I will argue 
that Smith’s view of individual sympathy corresponds with several features of the 
internal-sensation theory of emotion, but that the device of the impartial spectator 
provides a sufficiently deliberative heuristic by which to rectify any evaluative 
deficiencies generated by such characteristics. Then I consider the degree to which 
we may expect others to accept judgments grounded in an emotion of sympathy as 
grounds for justification  
The most cited account of the internal sensation theory of emotion is perhaps 
William James’. He wrote:  
 
“Common sense says: we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, 
are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The 
hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that 
the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily 
manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the more rational 
statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid 
because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, 
angry, or fearful, as the case may be.”369  
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Put slightly more formally, the common sense view says that when an Event E 
occurs, it causes a feeling F, which in turn causes a physical response P. The event of 
losing our fortune (E), causes a feeling of loss (F), which results in the physiological 
response of tears (P). Similarly, meeting a bear (E) causes a feeling of fright (F), which 
in turns causes the response of trembling (P). However, the James-Lange Theory 
claims that E causes P through a change in environment, and it is P which causes F. 
By meeting a bear (E) we begin to tremble (P), and it is the perception of this change 
in our own bodies which causes us to experience fright (F).  
Although this account of emotion has been discounted by contemporary 
theorists, we must consider the possibility that sympathy as Smith conceives it bears 
the internal sensation stamp. This is because Smith’s notion of sympathy borrows 
heavily from a theory of psychology developed by David Hume, and Hume’s theory 
of emotion is standardly placed in the internal sensation school370. In explaining the 
operation of sympathy in the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume writes: “When I see 
the effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately passes 
from these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the passion, as is presently 
converted into the passion itself.”371 Here we do not imagine the situation of the other 
person as in the case of Smith. Rather, for Hume, the imagination is the faculty which 
enables us to infer cause from effect372. This idea of causality is important for 
sympathy in the Treatise as, ‘No passion of another discovers itself immediately to the 
mind. We are only sensible of its causes or effects. From these we infer the passion: And 
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consequently these give rise to our sympathy.’373 The imagined effects arise so quickly in 
the mind, however, that sympathy itself is experienced as a sort of contagion.374  
Hume illustrates this mechanism of sympathy as the immediate transfer of 
passions through an example of the ‘terror’ and ‘pity’ felt at the impending surgery 
of another individual.375 His illustration easily fits the requirements of the James-
Lange Theory of emotion. In the presence of surgical instruments (E), discomfort 
begins to arise (P) which creates the feeling of terror (F). The feeling of terror persists 
despite the fact that the rational and evaluative faculties of the individual know that 
he himself will not be undergoing any kind of surgery. His terror is a response to his 
environment caused ‘immediately’ by inferring from the presence of surgical 
instruments and the anxiety of the person to be operated upon, that there will be a 
painful surgery.    
Smith’s theory, however, depends far more on the faculty of imagination as a 
process by which individuals consciously or unconsciously place themselves in the 
situation of the person affected by a particular circumstance. Smith tries to illustrate 
the effects of the faculty of sympathy on individuals by discussing reactions to three 
general cases: the case of a person who will be stricken in the arm or leg, the case of a 
dancer walking on a tight-rope, and the case of a beggar suffering from sores and 
ulcers. Smith writes that when viewing each of these events, we ‘naturally shrink and 
draw back our own leg or our own arm’ in the first case, ‘naturally writhe and twist and 
balance’ in the second case (i.e. as if we ourselves were in dancer’s position,) and in 
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the third-case we ‘feel an itching or uneasy sensation,’ but only if we are ‘weakly-
constituted’.376  
We can describe the process as follows: in each case, when we witness 
another person confronting a situation E, we expose ourselves to a corresponding 
situation E* through our imagination. E* is similar to the original event, except that 
we are the ones subject to it. It is either an immediate projection of ourselves into the 
other scenario377 or the conscious decision to enter into the other person’s point of 
view. In E* we become the dancer, the beggar or the person about to be stricken with 
a blow. The similarity between E and E* depends on the cognitive faculty of the 
imagination. If we imagine the tight-rope to be lower than it actually is, or the stroke 
to be less dull, we would not feel the strength emotion. In fact, the pain or pleasure of 
the other we experience through sympathy is never as strong as the feeling of the 
person actually experiencing the event.378 Similarly, our cognitive awareness of the 
fact that we are not actually in the same situation impedes us from responding the 
same way. This is why spectators always experience the imagined event less 
intensely than the actual event. “That imaginary change of situation, upon which their 
sympathy is founded, is but momentary. The thought of their own safety, the thought that 
they themselves are not really the sufferers, continually intrudes upon them...” 379 
In order for Smith’s account of sympathy to be an internal sensation account 
of emotion, two things must be true. First, the move from E to E* must be non-
cognitive. If the imagination described by Smith always consists in a type of belief, 
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evaluation or appraisal, then sympathy only satisfies the cognitive conception of 
emotions. Secondly, the emotions generated by E* must either meet the requirements 
of the common sense view of emotion or the James-Lange view of emotion. That is, 
event E* must either cause a physiological response P which causes a feeling F, or E* 
must cause a feeling F which causes a physiological response P.   
Let us begin with the first question. How does an event E generate the 
imagined event E*? D.D. Raphael points out that Smith oscillates between a 
conception of sympathy that explicitly requires an imaginative faculty, and that 
which leaves the role of imagination ambiguous380. In some cases, Smith describes a 
sympathetic response as the ‘instantaneous’ transfer of passion from one person to 
another381 (i.e. a self-projection.) Given the immediacy of this transfer, it is unclear 
whether or not the faculty of imagination is required in cases of sympathy with 
another’s passions. However, there is still room to believe that an evaluative faculty 
is at play, for Smith quickly cautions that passions can cause antipathy in the absence 
of knowledge of another’s situation. Describing the behaviour of an angry man, 
Smith writes: “As we are unacquainted with his provocation, we cannot bring his case home 
to ourselves, nor conceive anything like the passions it excites.” 382 As a result, what would 
have generated sympathy had we known the cause of his distress, instead generates 
‘disgust’, in fact ‘exasperates us’, because we are unaware of his situation.383   
Therefore, Smith appears to concede that an appraisal of the situation can 
inform the quality and direction of our sympathy. Once we realize that the angry 
man has reason to be angry, we will sympathize with his anger. However, Smith also 
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seems to accept the fact that our emotions are not absent prior to our full 
understanding of the situation. Instead, they are corrected after our knowledge of the 
event. Smith says, for example, that despite antipathy towards the angry, we feel 
instantaneous sympathy with the plight of the victims of anger even before we know 
whether they are deserving of it384. Yet if imagination is always an evaluative 
response, then our immediate sympathy with the victims over that of the person 
showing signs of anger requires explanation. Since we do not have any idea as to the 
cause of the anger, why would we not approach the situation with complete 
neutrality?  
The explanation of this phenomenon requires a brief look at the taxonomy of 
passions in Theory of Moral Sentiments. Passions are first split into bodily passions and 
passions of the imagination.385 Bodily passions reflect a physical state of the body, 
such as hunger, thirst or appetite. Although these passions are directly and intensely 
felt by the individual, a sympathetic response is not natural to the expression of these 
passions.386 Unlike in Hume’s account of an imagined cause immediately giving rise 
to sympathy, Smith says that a spectator cannot feel hungry simply because he sees a 
person eating voraciously. Moreover, he claims that the universal response to such 
voracious eating is in fact displeasure at the inappropriate demonstration of the 
bodily passion in question.387 The role played by sympathy is to curb the agent’s 
expression of the passion, as he is in sympathy with the disgust that a spectator will 
experience upon witnessing his appetite. Even when the hunger is not only felt but 
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clearly unavoidable, sympathy directs individuals to restrain its expression.388 In the 
case of bodily passions, therefore, sympathy is clearly an evaluative mechanism 
directed at the person acting upon the passion.   
Passions of the imagination, however, can appear to have the contagious 
effect that they have in Hume. There are three types of passions of the imagination: 
selfish passions like grief and joy, unsocial passions like anger or justice, and 
passions of habit like love. The clearest case of a passion of the imagination being 
‘immediate’ or contagious, involves witnessing grief or joy in the face of another. 
Smith writes, “The passions, upon some occasions, may seem to be transfused from one man 
to another, instantaneously, and antecedent to any knowledge of what excited them in the 
person principally concerned. Grief and joy for example, strongly expressed in the look and 
gestures of any one, at once affect the spectator with some degree of a like painful or agreeable 
emotion.”389 In the absence of knowledge of their cause the emotion of sympathy is 
‘imperfect’390 but certainly not absent. 
Smith’s explanation for this is that in witnessing the expression of grief or joy 
upon a person’s face, we connect this to the idea of fortune or misfortune.391 He 
appeals to the inference from effect to cause in much the same way Hume does, with 
one caveat. Smith is concerned very specifically with the situation of the other 
person, and not just to the person’s environment. Griswold suggests that this very 
concern with the particular situation of others makes Smith’s view of emotion a 
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relational or intentional view of emotion,392 which in turn would require a cognitive 
account of emotion as its basis. Even when the evaluative capacity of the imagination 
is imperfect, it is still in operation. For example, we find prisons more disagreeable 
than palaces because we immediately associate them with the discomfort of the 
inmates, even though justice would make us believe the inmates’ situation 
justified.393 We find romances agreeable, not because we feel any romantic affinity to 
the object of love, but because loving passions lead to situations generating the more 
agreeable passions of hope, happiness and fear394.  
All three types of imaginative passions use the imagination to consider the 
situations of others, which lead to sympathy. By contrast, the bodily passions do not 
make use of such imagination, but also do not lead to sympathy. Even during the 
uses of imagination that can be properly identified as immediate and unwilled 
projections into the situations of others, the emotion does not operate like emotional 
contagion. We are able to reflect upon our sympathetic responses to situations if we 
choose. As a result, we are also able to deliberate with others on whether or not our 
sympathies are appropriate, as long as they too have this reflective capacity. 
Therefore, we may conclude that unlike Hume’s account of sympathy, sympathy for 
Smith is a cognitive emotion. 
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4.6 Failures of Judgments 
4.6.1: Unreasonable Attitudes 
In addition to the possibility that sympathy itself would fail to generate publicity, 
there is the further problem that the judgments of sympathy might not be sufficiently 
public. In this final part on sympathy and publicity, I look at how sympathetic 
judgments can fail to be public, and what this says about the scope of sympathetic 
justifications. I begin with the Problem of Unreasonable Attitudes, which occurs 
when C, in receiving a sympathetic judgment from A regarding B, believes that A’s 
attitude towards B is politically unreasonable.  
In order to understand the Problem of Unreasonable Attitudes, let us once 
again look at Rawls’ version of the justification of slavery. In this criticism of 
utilitarianism, Rawls asks whether the wrongness of slavery lies in the fact that the 
harm to slaves is greater than the pleasure afforded to slave owners, or whether the 
wrong can be isolated in the fact that it is harmful to slaves?395 Of course, 
utilitarianism can try to account for the badness of violations of personal rights by 
ascribing great utility to respect for personal freedoms. According to Rawls, the 
problem is that the benefits or pleasures that can be attributed to the slave owner 
should not play any role in a framework of public decision-making.  
The slave owner has an inappropriate attitude towards his or her slaves. It 
does not matter that we as a society value the humanity of the slaves more than the 
pleasure of the slave owner. If our public decision-making procedure is reasonable, 
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then the claims of the slave owner will not be taken into any account at all. Only 
claims that are reasonable are considered in public decision-making, and the slave 
owner does not have any reasonable claims. In fact any claims that are racist, 
misogynistic, homophobic, or generally intolerant, must be eliminated prior to any 
public deliberation.  
Therefore, the Problem of Unreasonable Attitudes has essentially to do with 
the inputs into the procedure of deliberation. Here I borrow terminology from an 
interpretation of democratic theory found in the social choice literature, in which the 
democratic procedure is seen as a mechanism which takes inputs in the form of 
citizens’ preferences or beliefs, and aggregates them to produce an output in the 
form of the collective decision.396 Much of the Rawlsian discussion on public reason 
assumes that only public reasons are suitable inputs for procedures of public 
decision-making. This is accomplished by weighing all reasons from the public point 
of view, which necessarily eliminates any input from non-public reasons.397  
Therefore, the slave owner’s preferences, beliefs and claims regarding his slaves 
would be excluded because they are not appropriate inputs given the slave owner’s 
reprehensible attitudes towards his slaves.  
The use of restricting inputs into public deliberations in order to ensure 
reasonable and reciprocal attitudes could be jeopardized by the use of sympathetic 
judgments in public decision-making forums. For example, it is not inconceivable 
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that a reasonable citizen with the narrative imagination described by Nussbaum 
would on occasion be able to empathize with those whose attitudes public 
democratic culture finds reprehensible. In fact, John Harsanyi has a model of 
distributive justice which utilizes this precise strategy.398 His equiprobability model is 
designed to determine the moral superiority of any two distributions of goods on 
utilitarianism grounds. When an individual has to determine whether a distribution 
D1 is morally superior to a distribution D2, then, assuming that both distributions 
consider goods distributed across equal numbers of people, (call this number N), 
Harsanyi asks that a person first utilize the Smithian impartial spectator to determine 
what his utility would be, were he to take up the position of each of the N people in 
society.399 Harsanyi calls the preferences that a person has when he takes up the 
perspective of the impartial spectator, a person’s moral preferences.400 As a utilitarian, 
Harsanyi argues the moral superiority of one distribution over another (from the 
perspective of an individual) is reflected in whether an individual morally prefers one 
distribution over another. This means that whether D1 is superior to D2 can be 
determined by calculating the expected utility that a person would have as a member 
of society, if he were equally likely to be any of the N individuals. If his expected 
utility in D1 is greater than that of D2 then D1 is the more just distribution.  
This model differs from accounts of rational behaviour, only insofar as 
preferences are determined using an impartial spectator.401 This means that it is the 
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impartial spectator that is weeding out all the amoral or immoral preferences that 
might bias a person’s judgment. A similar phenomenon occurs in sympathetic 
justification, but such justification tailors to accounts of justification that are more 
definitively specified. 
Consider a more contextualized account of slavery in which the narrative 
imagination can become fully operative. Gideon Rosen has provided one such 
example, regarding slavery in the Ancient Near East.402 Rosen asks us to consider a 
Hittite society where (i) slaves or not seen as sub-human, but less fortunate humans 
(i.e. slavery is a misfortune comparable to illness or poverty in our society)403; (ii) any 
person could potentially become a slave due to imprudence or bad luck, in the same 
manner that anyone in our society can become ill if they have bad health or do not 
properly take care of their health 404; (iii) the institution of slavery is a long standing 
social norm, “taken for granted” across the Ancient Near East405; and (iv) Ancient 
Near Eastern societies predated the earliest debates regarding the morality of 
slavery, which occurred in Late Antiquity.406  
Rosen claims that although we might still find slavery to be an immoral 
institution when morally evaluating such societies, a reasonable Hittite Lord who 
carefully considered all the relevant moral considerations of chattel slavery that were 
accessible to him at the time, would not have been able to judge its wrongness. 
“Given the intellectual and cultural resources available to a second millennium Hittite lord, 
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it would have taken a moral genius to see through to the wrongness of chattel slavery.”407 
Although the facts of slavery are accessible to the Hittite Lord, the appropriate 
reasoning about the morality of slavery is unavailable. Suppose we tried to imagine 
ourselves in the place of the Hittite Lord in order to determine the appropriateness of 
his moral conclusions. Given our twenty-first century knowledge, we would know 
that the practices are wrong. However, if the Hittite Lord really did not have access 
to the sort of reasoning to which we are accustomed, through the use of our 
imagination we would conclude that we too would have been mistaken about their 
wrongness had we been raised in the Ancient Near East. Although we are free to 
evaluate the practices themselves, because we know that the Hittite Lord is not free 
in this respect, our imagination can respond to this handicap. It is entirely possible 
that through our capacity for sympathy, we would determine on occasion that 
engaging in a completely unreasonable practice may be undertaken by reasonable 
individuals who have good reasons to be mistaken about what is reasonable.  
In terms of inputs into the collective decision-making procedure, our initial 
account of public justification allowed only for reasonable inputs that could conflict 
with each other (i.e. it allowed for reasonable disagreement). The justification of 
sympathetic judgments, by contrast, allows for reasonable inputs as well as 
unreasonable inputs that consist in beliefs mistakenly adopted by otherwise 
reasonable people. These beliefs are not public in the sense that we could reasonably 
expect all reasonable citizens to endorse them. Rather, they are public in the sense 
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that we could reasonably expect all reasonable citizens to understand why a 
reasonable citizen might have mistakenly adopted them.   
Now we might think, at this point, that this opens the door to an exchange of 
reasons that are ultimately not justifiable. When considering restrictions on religious 
expression, for example, Rawls wrote that the fact that Servetus could understand 
the reasons why Calvin wanted to burn him at stake, did not constitute reasonable 
justification.408 Although Calvin might expect Servetus to understand his reasoning, 
he could not expect Servetus to reasonably endorse it. Should we not exclude the 
reasoning of the Hittite Lord on similar grounds? 
A sympathetic spectator could respond that there are several differences 
between Calvin and the Hittite Lord: first of all, unlike Calvin who presumably 
knows that Servetus cannot accept his reasoning on reasonable grounds, the Hittite 
Lord does not know that a slave cannot be expected to endorse his reasoning on 
reasonable grounds. He might infer from the badness of slavery, that the slave would 
not accept his reasoning on egoistical grounds (that is, given the choice between 
being a slave and not being a slave, the slave would choose not to be a slave out of 
his own self-interest). However, given his cultural background, he is unaware that 
reasonable people reasoning properly would immediately exclude his conclusions.  
By contrast, Calvin was not accusing Servetus of being self-interested or 
egoistical in denying the existence of the Trinity. Rather, in condemning Servetus’ 
beliefs, what Calvin was doing amounted to denying reasonable pluralism. Servetus 
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was not condemned because he was being unreasonable. Servetus was condemned 
because he was believed to be wrong. Rosen’s Hittite Lord Example exemplifies a 
situation in which reasonable reflection conditioned upon certain cultural codes, 
leads an otherwise reasonable person to accept an unreasonable position. What is 
crucial is that the reasonable person has adopted such beliefs by mistake, rather than 
through some commitment to the truth.   
However, this leads to the problem that social conditioning might often be 
involved in the adoption of unreasonable behaviour.  Rosen claims, for example, that 
sexist American men in the 1950s, who could not see a woman’s claims to 
educational and professional opportunities as being on par with similar 
opportunities sought by men, are in a position comparable to that of the Hittite 
Lord.409 Their sexism could be construed as the result of how they were raised and 
not any sort of malicious intent. How the sexist American man differs from the 
Hittite Lord is that he is well aware of the debates supporting women’s rights. 
However, he has been raised to find the reasons favouring women’s rights 
“obviously wrong”,410 in much the same way that the Hittite Lord takes it for granted 
that the institution of slavery is obviously appropriate.  
Now suppose that this Hittite Lord or the Sexist Man is our B. A has a 
capacity for narrative imagination and realizes that although B is wrong in his views, 
she can use her imagination to understand why it is that he believes what he does. 
Does this mean that A finds B’s views reasonable? Not necessarily, for Nussbaum 
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understands the narrative imagination to be a critical faculty that frames the 
empathetic evaluation in terms of the imaginer’s own personal objectives.411  
Nussbaum writes:  “The narrative imagination is not uncritical: We always bring ourselves 
and our own judgments to the encounter with another, and when we identify with a character 
in a novel, or a distant person whose life story we imagine, we inevitably will not merely 
identify, but also judge that story in the light of our own goals and aspirations. But the first 
step of understanding the world from the point of view of the other is essential to any 
responsible act of judgment…”412 In other words the narrative imagination does not 
only consider B’s views, but B’s views in light of A’s projects. 
In many respects, this is in line with the specifications of reasonable 
disagreement. Although A can understand how and why B came to the best 
conclusions that he could based on the evidence available to him, B cannot 
reasonably justify his position to A. The question is whether he can reasonably 
expect A to endorse his beliefs, and unlike the Hittite Lord, the sexist American man 
must know that he cannot. Unlike the Hittite Lord, he is fully aware that there are 
debates raging on second wave feminism; or at the very least, the existence of these 
debates could be made public to him in political debate. By contrast, the feminists 
who are aware the sexist American man believes what he does based on the evidence 
available to him, also know that he is not being politically reasonable. Political 
reasonableness requires individuals to desist from appealing to prejudices of the sort 
the 1950s American Man holds.  
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This means that A can consistently say that while it might be reasonable for B 
to have the views he has, the views themselves may not be reasonable views. In the 
absence of objective moral truths, what would it mean for a view to be unreasonable 
independently of a reasoning agent? One answer is that  when B comes into contact 
with reasonable people who do not share his views, he might be subject to change. If 
A has a capacity for narrative imagination, then she must agree that the Hittite Lord 
is blamelessly ignorant for not being aware of the wrongness of slavery. However, 
suppose that B has been non-maliciously sexist within the boundaries of law (i.e. 
suppose B is a teacher who informally encourages his male students to apply to 
college, and discourages his female students from doing the same).  Citizen A 
engages her capacity for narrative imagination. Would she also find B’s practices 
justifiable? 
 The trouble is that the justification of the empathetic judgment is a part of the 
public decision-making process, so the problem of discrimination is primarily one of 
the suitability of the inputs in a legitimate procedure of public deliberation. 
However, empathy cannot guarantee such reasonable procedural inputs. Therefore, 
sympathy can never be a sufficient reason for a justification to be publicly acceptable. 
A sympathetic judgment is only justifiable if it also meets the demands of 
reasonableness.  
4.6.2: Faulty Imagination  
The second problem with the use of sympathetic judgments in public justification 
involves the capacity of C to determine whether the sympathy of another citizen is 
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warranted. C may believe that A’s capacity for imagination is somehow faulty, and 
may criticize the judgments she makes on these grounds. 
Unlike the Problem of Unreasonable Attitudes which was a pre-procedural 
problem, the Problem of the Faulty Imagination lies within the procedures of 
decision-making.  Let us take as our example, the view propounded by US Supreme 
Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who was grilled during the Senate hearings leading 
up to her confirmation, because she had said on several occasions: “Justice O'Connor 
(a female Supreme Court Justice) has often been cited as saying that a wise old man and 
wise old woman will reach the same conclusion in deciding cases…I would hope that a wise 
Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a better 
conclusion than a white male who hasn't lived that life.”413 Two members of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, who participated in her confirmation hearings, interpreted this 
statement as a means by which to question her willingness to make impartial 
decisions on issues before the Court, or whether she would be swayed by extra-legal 
prejudices. What they failed to realize was that a citizen might ask her fellow citizens 
to consider her experiences as a woman, a racial minority, a veteran or even a 
member of the elite, not because she would benefit from policies generated as the 
consequence of sympathy with her experience, but because she believes her 
experiences form justifiable grounds for policy reform. Just as there are insights 
about the ethics of love and care that are generated by the experience of being a 
parent, there may be insights about the nature of justice and fairness that are gleaned 
from individuals’ experiences.  
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However, only when she separates her claims for sympathy from her 
justification of said sympathy, can she begin to examine whether the sympathy is 
publicly justifiable. In order to do so, those who are offered sympathetic justifications 
must engage in a type of sympathetic judgment themselves. C must take the position 
of A, and determine whether A’s sympathy is appropriate given both her life 
experience and those of others.  
Suppose we were to require that in making a sympathetic justification, 
Citizens A and C were both required to take the perspective of the other when 
judging the others’ view towards B’s situation.  In some cases, those forced to 
consider the opposing view may willingly change their own reasonable views for the 
reasonable views of another, once they are able to sympathetically consider the 
perspective of that other.414 The corporate climber might put greater weight on the 
claims of his opponents, once she learns she can sympathize with aspects of their 
values. The school curriculum might end up reflecting aspects of both the humanistic 
pedagogy and the needs of the linguistic minority, as the two sides come to believe 
that the other perspective has some worthwhile criteria by which to inform the 
public decision. If such a process of sympathetic imagination were undertaken, 
sympathy would only lead to greater convergence of individuals views. It would not 
invite completely self-regarding demands, because the sympathetic agents we are 
considering are also reasonable and rational.  
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The distinction between a sympathetic agent and a reasonable sympathetic 
agent hinges on the other-regarding features of the justifications that they are willing 
to provide. There is a world of difference between a citizen who says “We must 
pursue policy X because X would be beneficial for me” and one who says “Does it 
really signify nothing that policy X would mean so much to me when I am a fellow 
reasonable and rational citizen?” While both claims are egoistical (and therefore 
standardly nonpublic), the second claim still makes an appeal to others. It asks others 
to recognize certain features of the person making the claim, and is consistent with a 
willingness to recognize these features in others. The second claim manages to be 
both egoistical and other-regarding; egoistical in the content, other-regarding in the 
means by which it aims to justify itself (i.e. from the other point of view.) The other’s 
ability to perform the act of recognition is crucial for the offered justification to work.  
The question is whether these are the sorts of other-regarding appeals on 
which reasonable citizens ought to be deliberating. A child who says to her father, 
“Does the fact that buying me a doll will put a smile on my face really signify nothing to you 
when I am so adorable when I smile?” is of course offering a justification that would 
work only if the other were to recognize certain features of the claimant, (i.e. that the 
doll would make her happy, that her happiness is important,) or features that reflect 
the relationship between claimant and receiver of justification (i.e. that he wants to see 
her with a smile on her face). Yet if we were to replace the child in this scenario with 
a grown person, the doll with a substantial sum of public funds, and the father with 
a political collective, the other-regarding claim made here would seem out of place. 
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This is because what the person is asking others to recognize are features that should 
be irrelevant to the political process.  
Indeed, we have seen something like this before and dismissed it on grounds 
of reciprocity. When the slave owner asked us to consider his claims in favour of 
slavery, reciprocity required them to be dismissed because he had the wrong attitude 
towards slaves. The attractive lobbyist could similarly have her claims dismissed, not 
because she herself has the wrong attitude towards someone, but because in order 
for her justification to work, she would need someone else to have the wrong 
attitude towards her. Asking that others give a person privileges because she looks a 
certain way, is as unreasonable as asking that others have privileges taken away 
because they look a certain way. No reasonable citizen would make such a claim, 
and so the need for recognition is not by itself a sufficient ground for justification.  
I have throughout been coupling sympathy with reason and rationality, and 
have therefore never supported its claims to sufficiency. There are, however, times 
when sympathy is necessary for a justification to work. Certain reasonable claims, 
after all, would be disputable if others could not recognize the relevant features of 
the person making the claim. Claims involving disability benefits, for example, 
require that others recognize both the illness and the effect that such an illness has on 
the life of those individuals struggling with it. Consider the claims of a woman 
suffering from post-partum depression who needs to use public funds to help her 
nurture her newborn child. It is hard to believe that a political collective would make 
provision for those suffering with any sort of depression, unless reasonable 
individuals were capable of recognizing mental health to be a serious concern. It is 
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the very ability to recognize the suffering in another that makes their claims for help 
justifiable. Absent the capacity for sympathetic imagination, there would be no 
awareness of the fact that the ill were actually suffering.   
Now in deep-seated disagreements about sympathy, such as those between 
Justice Sotomayor and her non-Latina colleagues, as long as both parties try to 
understand the sympathetic imagination then regardless of whether they manage to 
succeed, the difference in perspective may be taken as adding a separate layer of 
analysis to the debate. It may call for more trust and more respect on the part of 
those who disagree with each other. However, if each is viewed as reasonable and 
the attempt to offer justification is recognizable, then there are good reasons to 
invoke such trust and charity towards the other when the perspective seems beyond 
one’s comprehension.   
4.7: Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have tried to establish what publicity in the context of sympathetic 
public reason requires. I first argued that sympathetic public justification, like public 
justification with pure public reason, must meet criteria of publicity and reciprocity. I 
then showed that the nature of publicity is different for sympathetic and pure public 
reason. While pure public reason uses only reasons that are shared from a common 
perspective, sympathetic public reason can utilize reasons that are accessible when a 
person imaginatively places himself or herself into the perspective of another being. I 
showed how this type of sympathetic publicity would resolve the debate on abortion 
differently than the resolution found in pure public reason. 
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The final two sections of this chapter looked at concerns about the ways in 
which sympathetic public reason might be non-public. First, I considered the 
concerns that judgments based in sympathy fail to be public, simply because 
sympathy is not a cognitive faculty, and therefore does not warrant public 
deliberation. I showed that this was not the case. Then I looked at two Failures of 
Judgment – one in which the person engaged in sympathetic judgment formation has 
politically unreasonable attitudes towards others; and another in which her capacity 
for sympathetic imagination seems biased by her life experiences. In both cases, I 
tried to show that as long as citizens are reasonable and rational, as well as 
sympathetic, the problems do not arise.  
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Chapter 5: Sympathy and Reciprocity  
In the preceding chapter, I addressed the concern that an exchange of reasons based 
in individuals’ sympathy (i.e. sympathetic reasons) might not be suitably public to 
serve as grounds for public justification. In the process I clarified a troublesome 
distinction made by liberal philosophers, between reasons that are publicly 
accessible and those that are reasonably endorsed by all reasonable individuals. In 
the model of pure public reason, justifications that are politically reasonable are those 
that invoke reasons from within a particular subset of all reasons that are reasonably 
endorsed by all reasonable individuals. Reasons that individuals can understand but 
not endorse, for example, do not constitute bases of justification in accordance with 
the Rawlsian criterion of reciprocity.415  
Sympathetic reasons, I argued, are neither merely accessible nor reasonably 
endorsed by all reasonable citizens. Like merely accessible reasons they are non-
public, in the sense that they are not the shared reasons of all individuals. However, 
all can identify why sympathy-based reasons could have normative force from the 
perspective of some reasonable individuals. When sympathetic citizens place 
themselves in the positions of those who hold these non-public standards of 
reasoning, they can understanding how their non-public reasons developed, and 
they can accept that from a non-public perspective, such reasoning might seem like it 
ought to be the criteria upon which public decisions are made.  
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In this chapter I intend to look at the normative force that such non-public 
reasons ought to have in the public sphere.  When I discussed the moral foundations 
of pure public reason in the Introduction to this dissertation, we saw that two 
features of a criterion of justification must be public in order for it to have normative 
authority in the public sphere. First, the content of pure public reason must be public 
so that all reasonable citizens can, in theory, reason in accordance with it, and can 
reasonably endorse those reasons to varying degrees. Secondly, the reasons which a 
citizen has for taking up the perspective of pure public reason must be public. In the 
case of pure public reason, the duty of fair play and the idea of reciprocity provide 
public grounds for accepting its perspective as having normative authority. When 
reasonable citizens accept these grounds, they agree that in order for a course of 
action to be politically legitimate, it must be justifiable from the perspective of pure 
public reason. For example, a pro-life advocate who believes that abortion is murder 
will believe the practice to be privately unjustifiable no matter what pure public 
reason requires. However, she must be able to see that it is publicly justifiable in order 
for the practice to be politically legitimate.  
My conclusions from Chapter 4 show that the sympathetic imagination can 
enable individuals to understand the content of non-public reasons to which others 
subscribe, and can enable them to get a sense of how to reason from within 
perspectives that are not their own. In some cases, but not all, they also get a sense of 
why such positions are reasonable from the perspective of reasonable citizens. These 
cases are distinguished by the fact that the individuals who reason according to them 
do not have prejudicial attitudes towards their fellow citizens, but are able, from 
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within their non-public perspective, to acknowledge them as free and equal, 
reasonable and rational agents who are engaged in a mode of social cooperation. As 
a result, such citizens are reasonable in the Rawlsian sense. 416     
In this chapter, I turn to how sympathetic public reason meets the second 
requirement of public justification. I show why all reasonable citizens can agree that 
sympathetic public reason ought to serve as the criterion of justification which grants 
a political position normative authority in the public sphere. I will argue that when 
citizens recognize each other as possessing the capacity for sympathetic judgment 
formation, the relationship of reciprocity generates two further duties. These duties 
provide grounds for some types of non-public reasoning to have greater normative 
authority in the public sphere. The two further duties generated by sympathetic 
liberals situated in relations of reciprocity are the Duty of Deliberative Sympathy and 
the Duty of Respectful Political Equality.  
What I call the Duty of Deliberative Sympathy requires that any normative 
theory of public justification must reflect an account of reasonableness that is 
consistent with those aspects of an individual’s personal narrative that are 
identifiable as experiences common to and appropriate for free and equal reasonable 
citizens. I will argue that such experiences include the aspiration to live in 
accordance with a conscience that has been formed after critical deliberation on a 
wide array of difficult moral problems confronting reasonable citizens living in a 
liberal democratic society. As a consequence of the Duty of Deliberative Sympathy, 
citizens are required to be sensitive to the struggles created by what, in Chapter 1, I 
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called the Problem of Conscience. I will show that this sensitivity is sufficient to 
require reasonable citizens to allow other citizens the chance to avoid the burdens of 
the Tragic or Brutish Conscience, by justifying political positions in accordance with 
their non-public reasons.  
What I call the Duty of Respectful Political Equality requires citizens to show 
each other a form of respect consonant with the sense of self-worth each citizen 
would need to bring to the cooperative enterprise, if the citizen were to be viewed as 
an equal partner. Political liberalism already goes far towards accomplishing this, by 
requiring that every collective act is publicly justifiable to all reasonable citizens 
(even when they do not find it privately justifiable or ‘most reasonable’ from a public 
perspective). I distinguish the notion of respect already present within the liberal 
tradition from the one I advance, by showing how sympathy would require citizens 
to allow their fellows to exercise their reasonable judgment in shaping policy, not 
simply in accepting it as justifiable from the perspective of a particular criterion of 
justification.  
Just as the duty of civility and the obligation to obey the law were generated 
by relations of reciprocity, and gave pure public reason its normative force, the 
duties generated by sympathetic citizens situated in relations of reciprocity lend 
normative weight to the use of a sympathetic variant of public reason. This variant of 
public reason incorporates certain forms of non-public reasoning that is cultivated by 
reasonable citizens. What these forms of non-public reasoning have in common is 
that sympathetic citizens can sympathize with the experience of developing such 
reasoning, and can respect the fact that citizens would want to live lives in 
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accordance with its prescriptions. For example, moral reasoning is non-public, but all 
citizens can identify with the deliberative struggle which contributes to the 
formation of reflectively stable moral values and can understand why individuals 
want to live in accordance with these values.  
I will argue that sympathetic citizens generate what, following Darwall, I call,  
‘appraisal respect’ for the non-public reasoning of their fellow reasonable citizens, 
and that this is grounds for sympathetic citizens to take up the non-public 
perspective of their fellow citizens, and give it normative weight in the public sphere. 
Since citizens can understand the difficulty of performing certain kinds of reasoning, 
and can accept that reasonable people will want to live in accordance with their non-
public reasoning, they will incorporate such non-public reasoning into their criterion 
of justification.  
For example, the way in which reasonable individuals non-publicly weigh 
conflicting considerations in cases like abortion or the Hijab Controversy, in part 
depends on whether or not they believe good reasoning involves commitments to 
laicism, scriptural interpretation, scientific evidence, or some combination of these 
reasons. (Note that all reasonable citizens must agree that laicism and scientific 
evidence are politically reasonable, but they need not agree that this sort of reasoning 
is actually reasonable.) If a citizen who did not believe that scriptural interpretation 
was required for good reasoning were to take up the perspective of a citizen who 
did, the former would have a sense of why some reasonable citizens would place 
such great weight on the belief that abortion is disrespectful of human life. In 
addition, she would have a sense of why someone could reasonably believe that the 
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non-public framework of reasoning adopted by the pro-life advocate ought to have 
normative authority for decision-making.  
Just as in the case of political reasonableness, where citizens understand the 
content of pure public reason, and also understand why it should be given normative 
authority for public decision-making, sympathetic liberalism enables citizens to place 
themselves in others’ positions to understand both the content of non-public reasons 
and the normative authority of non-public reasoning from the others’ perspective. 
Then, due to the generated appraisal respect, citizens have a further reason to believe 
that such non-public reasoning ought to have normativity in processes of public 
justification. The result is that the religious views of the pro-life advocate, and the 
secular views of the Laiciste feminist, both become public in the sense that the 
content of the framework of reasoning, as well as its grounds for normativity, both 
become public.   
5.1: Reciprocity in Liberalism  
The idea of reciprocity characterizes the relationship of free and equal individuals 
who are engaged in a fair scheme of social cooperation.417 Since political liberals view 
political society as a fair cooperative enterprise,418 they must also view reciprocity as 
a fundamental characteristic of the political relationship.419 Furthermore, the political 
conception of justice which regulates the interactions of citizens in a political sphere 
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must reflect this relationship of reciprocity.420 Various political duties and 
obligations, (e.g. the duty to obey the law,) derive as a consequence of this system of 
regulation.421 The idea of reciprocity is presupposed in the liberal ideas of justice, 
duty and obligation.  A good criterion of justification is one which provides a way to 
seek fair terms of cooperation that reflects the relationship of reciprocity.422 
Reciprocity is often characterized as an idea situated between those of mutual 
advantage and impartiality.423 Theories of impartiality are non-egoistical and can 
require individuals to pursue particular courses of action that are not in their self-
interest.424 Reciprocity resembles impartiality in the sense that if a person generally 
benefits from a social practice, then in a given instance, it may require him to go 
against his self-interest to maintain the rules of the practice. For example, if a person 
generally benefits from the institution of promise-keeping, then even if he finds 
himself in a situation where it is in his self-interest to break a promise, reciprocity 
maintains that in the absence of conflicting moral obligations, he still ought to keep 
it.425 
However, impartiality is far more demanding than reciprocity. Firstly, a sense 
of impartiality can generate obligations towards those with whom individuals do not 
engage in social cooperation, such as foreigners, children and members of politically 
unreasonable interest groups. Second, impartial standards may conflict with each 
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other, and higher level impartial standards would have to be invoked to resolve such 
conflicts.426  Impartially applying the standards set by the utilitarian Greatest 
Happiness Principle would yield very different results from applying impartial 
standards established by Kant’s account of moral freedom.427 It is also not always 
clear which higher level impartial standard could be invoked to resolve conflicts, 
such as those between utilitarianism and Kantianism. 
By contrast, individuals cooperating on terms of reciprocity agree upon how 
to resolve their conflicts of views and interests, prior to any instance in which such 
conflicts must be resolved.428 The foreigners and children that may be subject to 
impartial standards adopted by a group need not actually agree to be judged by 
those standards in order for those standards to be applied to them impartially. 
Likewise, the higher-level standards invoked to resolve conflicts of impartial moral 
views need not require any kind of agreement. They may depend on other concerns 
such as the epistemological constraints of public political argument.429Agreement is 
the constraint that reciprocity places upon impartiality, and it is this sense of 
agreement which supports the idea of mutual advantage.  
When institutional arrangements of a political society do not secure 
advantages for all citizens, but impose obligations on them all, then citizens who do 
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not benefit from the arrangement can point out that were they free and equal, they 
could not reasonably be expected to endorse such arrangements. Those who support 
such institutional arrangements must then acknowledge that through their support, 
they are presupposing that not all citizens ought to be treated as free and equal 
cooperatives of a fair social scheme. Those who support such practices or policies are 
then disregarding one of the fundamental characteristics of the political relationship.  
Reciprocity recognizes the fact that free and equal individuals would not 
voluntarily choose to cooperate with each other unless each benefitted from the 
cooperation. This insight establishes a benchmark for what citizens are owed when 
social cooperation is not voluntary, such as when individuals are born into political 
societies. According to Rawls, the involuntary subjection of citizens to institutions 
makes it all the more ‘urgent’ that the regulating principles meet the demands of 
reciprocity.430 Since participation in political society is not actually voluntary, it is 
important that at the very least, the conception of justice which regulates political 
society could be one to which free and equal, reasonable and rational citizens would 
subscribe.  
The insight regarding mutual advantage also connects the idea of reciprocity 
to that of justifiability. If we treat citizens as free and equal, then the terms of 
cooperation we propose to them must be those that we sincerely believe they would 
find justifiable. This means that when we determine that a citizen ‘could’ find a law 
or social policy reasonably justifiable, we do not simply mean that they ‘could’ 
hypothetically endorse it if they had a different set of values, or if they had rational 
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interests different from the ones that they do. We take citizens’ beliefs and values as 
they are, but assume that they are indeed seeking fair social cooperation with other 
free and equal citizens. In fact, this is a part of the characterization of the ‘reasonable 
citizen.’431  
One of the contributions of the requirement of mutual advantage is that 
reciprocity, unlike impartiality, is not closely connected to the idea of altruism.432 
Since impartiality can encourage the general good or welfare, it may be consistent 
with impartiality to ask one person to sacrifice for many. A military draft, for 
example, might be consistent with an impartial conception of political justice in 
which all individuals are asked to do what they can to preserve and protect their 
country. Reciprocity separates itself from impartiality in the sense that despite being 
non-egoistical it is personal. A citizen can object to a military draft on grounds that it 
would not be reasonable to suppose that all free and equal individuals would 
reasonably accept such a policy. The only condition required by reciprocity is that 
this person has not voluntarily benefitted from the draft in some way (say by 
receiving a scholarship from the military in return for the possibility of being 
drafted). If they have in some way benefitted, then other duties of reciprocity (such 
as fair play, or fidelity to one’s promises), might require these individuals to submit 
to the scheme of cooperation, as long as the scheme is fair.  
This reflects what Rawls has called the criterion of reciprocity. The criterion 
of reciprocity requires that ‘when those terms are proposed as the most reasonable 
terms of fair co-operation, those proposing them must also think it at least reasonable 
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for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or 
manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social position.’433 He 
instantly cautions that such an agreement will not be based upon terms of justice that 
are ‘most’ reasonable, but on terms that all can find reasonable to some level.434  
In general, the way obligations derive from relations of reciprocity is as 
follows: people who view themselves as engaging in a fair cooperative enterprise 
with free and equal agents are led to seek fair terms of cooperation.435 Since all agents 
are free and equal, the only way to determine such terms is through mutual 
agreement (as none can be forced by others to accept any given term). Therefore, 
agents offer each other terms that they believe others could reasonably accept.436 In 
offering such terms to each other, each agent realizes that offering terms simply 
because they benefits himself will never suffice in securing the agreement of others. 
Rational individuals are not wholly altruistic.437 If general agreement is not secured, 
then the person who disagrees with the terms of cooperation can complain that he or 
she is subject to it, rather than being free and equal.438 
Rawls claims that those situated in relations of reciprocity are then 
confronted with two kinds of commitments: obligations and natural duties. 
Obligations are moral demands imposed upon a citizen as a consequence of his or 
her voluntary actions. For example, the obligation imposed upon an individual by a 
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promise that she made is a consequence of her having voluntarily made the promise. 
By contrast, natural duties are those that are imposed upon individuals non-
voluntarily, such as the duty to support just political institutions.439 They are 
imposed on citizens in recognition of their reasonable and rational natures. Both 
natural duties and obligations are recognized as morally binding by individual 
citizens situated reciprocally (e.g. by individuals behind a veil of ignorance).440 
However, unlike obligations, natural duties are those which one would expect to be 
recognized even outside of the social cooperative.441  
The Duties of Deliberative Sympathy and Respectful Political Equality are 
duties in the sense that they result from (typically non-voluntary) membership in a 
liberal political society. However, their universal applicability is questionable. In 
Theory of Justice Rawls determines whether or not a natural duty ought to have force 
within the public sphere, by asking whether all agents beyond a veil of ignorance 
would choose to recognize its universal applicability.442 My method of defending the 
force of duties in this chapter stems from an earlier Rawlsian method, which situates 
citizens in positions of reciprocity and then tries to determine how these citizens 
would agree to resolve competing claims within political society.443 The terms agreed 
to when citizens are so situated, form the basis of an original social agreement. 
Acting in accordance with those terms is necessary for justice as reciprocity. 
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Given that the objective of reciprocity is cooperation based on mutual 
agreement and advantage, liberals must account for why individuals continue to 
respect their duties and obligations in the face of deep-seated disagreement such as 
those exposed in intense moral debate. For example, Rawls writes that reciprocal 
obligations require submitting to some unjust laws.444 He means that upon hearing of 
the painful experiences of fellow citizens denied healthcare opportunities, 
educational opportunities or proper end of life care, due to the complexities of issues 
like affordable care, affirmative action and euthanasia, individuals might need to 
comply with the letter of the law as long as the institution is ‘near just.’445 However, 
given a citizen’s other moral commitments, why would it be that the obligation to 
comply with an unjust law motivates compliance in such situations?  
Many have argued that this phenomenon can be explained by the fact that 
citizens’ moral psychologies are such that they are conditioned to submit to certain 
reciprocal obligations, one of which is the duty to comply with unjust laws. Without 
deviating far from the Rawlsian paradigm of justice, Gibbard writes of the possibility 
of individuals having an innate sense of ‘fair reciprocity,’ whereby individuals may 
treat others decently ‘simply because’ they have received decent treatment from 
them in the past.446 Rawls’ own account of moral psychology is quite different. 
Although reciprocity is connected to his idea of a reasonable citizen with a sense of 
fairness,447 reciprocity does not have any power to motivate moral action.  Rather, for 
Rawls, the psychological development of a sense of justice is based on ties of 
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affection and attachment to institutions that benefit citizens, rather than any innate 
sense of reciprocity.448  
A third factor considered to motivate fair cooperation is the moral attitude of 
respect. Gutmann and Thompson argue that when each citizen can be sure that 
others are sincerely seeking fair terms of cooperation, and can offer mutually 
acceptable reasons for rejecting beliefs offered by others, then attitudes of respect can 
be fostered despite other kinds of moral disagreement.449 This notion of respect 
moves beyond simply tolerating the views of other citizens through the 
acknowledgement of reasonable disagreement. It involves the cultivation of an 
attitude that encourages continued cooperation despite reasonable differences.450 In 
this view, the respectfulness cultivated towards other citizens enables those with 
strong moral beliefs to recognize that those with conflicting beliefs are still moral 
persons who are trying to act in a moral way.451 It inclines citizens towards ‘civic 
magnanimity’ towards their fellows.452  
According to Gutmann and Thompson, the disposition towards mutual 
respect is evidenced by the fact that liberals show different levels of respect towards 
advocates of capital punishment in comparison to those who favour practices 
marked by racial discrimination.453 While most liberals see both positions as morally 
problematic, proponents of capital punishment can offer mutually acceptable reasons 
for their views, while proponents of racial discrimination cannot. The former meet 
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the demands of reciprocity, and since respect is cultivated through relations of 
reciprocity, their treatment by liberals is different. However, Gutmann and 
Thompson then appeal to the strong sense of respect cultivated by reciprocity to 
derive civic magnanimity as a principle of moral accommodation.454 This means that 
even when such magnanimity does not actually exist in practice, it is a moral 
principle which ought to guide the behaviour of citizens who stand in relations of 
reciprocity.  
While I believe that Gutmann and Thompson are correct in maintaining a 
strong, even vital, connection between a sense of political reciprocity and the respect 
felt towards one’s fellow citizens, it seems to me that the account they propose for 
this mutual respect does not suffice to explain the attitudes of the average liberal. An 
American liberal may respect the moral deliberative capacities of her fellow citizens 
while still recoiling with horror at the six-hundred and sixty-seven state sanctioned 
executions which took place in the United States during the first decade of the 
millennium.455 Moreover, if the person in question is an American liberal, such horror 
is quite likely a moral feeling insofar as it arises as a consequence of a deeply 
ingrained moral principle or value.456 If we interpret Gutmann and Thompson’s 
account of civic magnanimity to indicate that the desire for social cooperation is 
sustained in such cases by attitudes of respect counteracting feelings of alarm and 
outrage, then Gutmann and Thompson’s account fails to afford proper concern for 
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the role moral indignation plays in citizens’ moral deliberations. Magnanimity could 
not possibly cause reasonable citizens to turn a blind eye to what they reasonably 
believe to be grave wrongs, to the extent that they continue faithfully in their 
endeavour for fair social cooperation with those who support such actions. 
However, Gutmann and Thompson never claim that magnanimity is a 
feeling, sentiment or even an attitude. Rather, they present it as a principle of moral 
accommodation characterized by openness and charitable interpretation in morally 
laden political deliberation.457 This, however, brings us back to our starting point. 
What sorts of attitudes would liberals have to cultivate towards their fellow citizens 
to maintain a desire to seek fair terms of cooperation and a willingness to engage in 
charitable and open-minded moral deliberation, in light of strong feelings of moral 
indignation that may quite naturally flare up during such deliberation?  
In what follows I argue that if we conceive of liberal citizens as free and equal 
sympathetic agents with access to a capacity for deliberative imagination, then we can 
explain how citizens can cultivate attitudes of respect towards fellow citizens with 
whom they disagree. This will illustrate how citizens are motivated towards further 
social cooperation, even in times of deep-seated moral disagreement.  
5.2: Sympathy and Respect 
In Chapter 3, I wrote of how spectatorship and concern for spectators’ mutual 
sympathy leads Smith to postulate that ethical self-restraint is the result of each 
sympathetic agent learning to view the attitudes of others as a mirror by which to 
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judge her own self.458 Using the analogy of the mirror, each liberal citizen can 
imagine the difficulty that other agents face when trying to understand their own 
views on capital punishment, abortion, end of life care, or a number of other complex 
moral decisions. If an agent’s views on these issues are substantiated by the 
particular way in which she balances her ethical, philosophical, religious or even 
political values, she can ask herself whether or not she could approve of her own 
position if she did not have these values. By discovering the difficulty of answering 
such a question, she gains a sense of the reasons that others have for responding to 
her views in the way in which they do. 
She also gains a second, even more valuable insight: a sense of propriety 
regarding the behaviours of others in response to the difficulties they face in 
understanding her point of view. If others respond to her views with the moral 
dogmatism that Gutmann and Thompson fear might exist in the absence of civic 
magnanimity,459 or if in their fury at her views they respond with disdain or even 
violence, she can rightfully disapprove of their behaviour. Her sympathies tell her 
that despite the difficulty of reasonably accepting her position, it should not lead to 
such ridicule or madness on the part of others. However, if they respond with a level 
of moral indignation or anger that is appropriate for their reasonable views, yet show 
restraint in acting on such anger due to the principle of magnanimity, she can be sure 
that she is viewed as a reasonable, moral being confronting a complex moral problem 
with other reasonable, moral beings.  
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Here civic magnanimity becomes an operative principle, but for a different 
reason than the one proposed by Gutmann and Thompson. Rather than recognizing 
other citizens as reasonable moral beings who deserve respect despite their moral 
differences, every citizen sees in herself and in every other a reasonable moral being 
who is encountering a difficult moral problem with a number of other reasonable 
moral beings. While this may or may not generate respect in every citizen, it will 
necessarily generate sympathy in all sympathetic citizens. After all, every citizen is in 
the same position. If a moral dogmatist in this group claims that she does not want to 
try to understand the position of another, the social mirror will remind her that the 
other could reply to her in the same way. If it would be inappropriate for others not 
to try to understand her position, it must also be inappropriate for her to be so 
dismissive of others, since all are identically situated.  
Note that a sympathetic attitude would be consistent with the beliefs of a 
citizen who thinks she knows the demands of ‘true’ morality, while the others fail to 
grasp it. If she asserts her account of the truth to others, and they respond with mild 
scepticism or even exclaim that despite all their best efforts it is futile to try to 
understand her, then the imagination ought to make her sympathetic towards them. 
She can imagine what it might be like not to understand the complexity of the view 
she is trying to present, but they cannot imagine what it might be like to grasp its 
complex truth.  
In fact, the more complex and reflective the view, the more generous one’s 
sympathetic nature ought to be towards those who cannot understand it. If I am a 
legal scholar who required a year of law school to develop fluency in legal jargon, I 
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should sympathize with non-lawyers who cannot understand the jurisprudential 
tradition from which I am making my political evaluations. If I am an elected official 
who took several years to master the rhetoric required to make public arguments, or 
a policy analyst who had to learn to make sense of empirical reporting and statistical 
evidence, I have no reason to disregard the difficulty non-experts have in 
understanding or accepting my viewpoint. Similarly, if I were a lifelong Catholic, I 
could not expect others to fully understand the important foundations upon which 
my beliefs regarding abortion rest. 
By extension of the narrative imagination, I must now be prepared to 
understand and accept the complex and arduous path which other citizens took 
before they came to a stable reflective perspective on their ethical and philosophical 
viewpoints. Even if I believe them to be wrong, I can feel sympathy for the journey 
that (in my view) led them to the wrong destination. As a moral being, I ought to be 
able to appreciate the nobility of the act of confronting a difficult moral question, of 
not taking conventional wisdom as one’s guide, and instead setting out to balance 
myriad conceptual, intuitive and practical reflections amassed over several years of 
study and life-experience, which finally leads one to acquire a reflectively stable (if 
erroneous) moral belief. 
The shared experience of struggling to gain a stable moral perspective will 
certainly generate mutual respect amongst those who have taken such an endeavour, 
as long as these individuals are sympathetic agents. Even some who have not taken 
such an endeavour, but whose sympathetic imaginations are well-cultivated will be 
able to access the nature and importance of the struggle. However, the object of such 
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respect will not be the status of another as a moral being or as an equal citizen. Those 
citizens who appear to use political deliberation as a forum to air platitudes or 
tirelessly propound their own non-public point of view will not generate such 
respect no matter how sincerely they were to believe that they were right. In using 
public forums to proselytize, these citizens reveal that they do not have respect for 
the viewpoint of others, which means that either (i) they are unsympathetic to those 
who are situated identically to them, or (ii) they have not in fact taken upon 
themselves the extended, self-critical moral deliberations which are the object of such 
respect. Had they experienced such an internal struggle, their sympathetic 
imaginations would have taken into account the difficulty presented to others in 
balancing such moral reasons against other aspects of their experience.  
To borrow terminology from Stephen Darwall, the respect generated by the 
shared experience of moral deliberation is not a type of ‘recognition respect’ which is 
generated as a consequence of recognizing a particular feature of the other.460 Instead, 
it is a form of what Darwall calls ‘appraisal respect.’ Darwall writes: ‘the appropriate 
ground for [appraisal] respect is that the person has manifested characteristics which 
make him deserving of such positive appraisal.’461 Such respect consists in 
identifying ‘the excellences of a person’ with respect to a certain set of standards, but 
also in believing that the person agrees that such standards are acceptable.462 Darwall 
gives the example of a skilful tennis player who does not take seriously the standards 
of sportsmanship embraced by the profession. Although we may admire his skill, he 
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has not succeeded in achieving appraisal respect because we have no reason to 
believe he himself appreciates the standards of the profession.463 Therefore, appraisal 
respect weighs in not only on one’s ability to undertake a given activity, but also on a 
person’s character.464 
Similarly, in the sympathetic agent’s respect for participants of moral 
deliberation, the respect need not be generated by the intellectual sophistication or 
depth of passion that a person feels towards his or her moral commitments. It 
certainly need not be generated by agreement. It is sufficient to identify in oneself 
and the other person mutual respect for the demands of rigorous moral analysis. 
Whether or not we believe that the other person is equipped to undertake such a 
task, much less succeed in it, may be irrelevant if the attempt is made in a way that 
most sympathetic moral beings can identify as laudable.  
In addition to mutual appraisal respect for all those who have undertaken 
moral deliberation, the sympathetic imagination may also generate appraisal respect 
in times where a citizen, through no fault of her own, finds the demands of moral 
deliberation bewildering or psychologically burdensome. For example, if a person 
has been raised to believe that questioning the authority of scripture will lead to 
unimaginable harms, then the sympathetic imagination may find it appropriate that 
she responds to the subject of teaching evolution in public schools in a politically 
unreasonable manner. Although from the perspective of pure public reason she is 
violating the duty of civility by appealing to non-public reasons, a sympathetic 
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public reason would encourage her fellow citizens to accommodate her views to 
some degree, in response to the appraisal respect they feel for her.  
In order to make the case somewhat clearer, let us suppose that in general 
this individual does try her best to meet the demands of the criterion of reciprocity 
(that is to offer others terms that she reasonably believes they could reasonably 
accept.) The teaching of Creationism, however, is a special case in which she cannot 
be politically reasonable, due to the way in which she has been taught to reason. 
Through sympathy, her fellow citizens understand why the Creationist is not being 
politically reasonable in this instance, and why she cannot take up the perspective of 
pure public reason. If they view her as a citizen who generally tries to meet the 
demands of social cooperation (i.e. publicity, reciprocity, etc.), then they ought to be 
willing to accommodate her moral views due to their appraisal respect. Clearly, it 
may not be possible for them to fulfil all the Creationist’s non-public demands. 
However, they can accommodate by allowing some room for the science-
Creationism debate in the curriculum, though perhaps not by giving it the central 
place the Creationist would have wanted.  
Some may argue that I distort the notion of appraisal respect by arguing that 
a citizen can be shown such respect for her capacity for moral deliberation, even 
when she has shown that she is in fact incapable of such moral deliberation. 
However, I am claiming that this citizen is only incapable of moral deliberation in 
situations where she is asked to question the dictates of scripture. There is no reason 
to suppose that such deliberation is exhaustive of all the moral deliberation that a 
citizen might come across qua citizen. For example, she might be fearful of the word 
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of God, and still be perfectly capable of sitting on a jury in cases of grand theft, 
larceny, etc.   
Secondly, even if this citizen was not able to engage in any sort of moral 
deliberation, our sympathetic imagination would inform us that it was not for lack of 
inclination. The citizen was not making a choice not to engage in such deliberation. 
Rather, through sympathy, we would understand the psychological burdens placed 
upon her as she tries to engage in reasonable discourse with her fellow citizens. We 
may view her as having a disadvantage or disability in engaging the practice of 
public deliberation, but this is sufficient to meet the demands of appraisal respect.  
In effect the sympathetic imagination reinterprets what it means to respect 
the burdens of judgment (i.e. to accept that reasonable individuals will disagree.)465 
In this reinterpreted form, this requirement is based not only on the epistemic 
grounds that reasonable people can disagree on complex questions, but also on the 
more personal struggle that individuals face in determining what it is that their 
consciences demand. The fact that it is possible to sympathize with reasoning as well 
as with reasons illuminates the benefits of incorporating sympathetic justifications 
into public deliberation.  
While the disagreement persists, reasonable citizens have at their disposal a 
new set of reasons that can be publicly shared. Reconsider an example that I brought 
up earlier, that of the politically reasonable Catholic who belonged to a liberal polity 
in which the practice of abortion was legitimate. One of the reasons that abortion was 
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legitimated was because the strongest reason to oppose abortion was that the foetus 
had interests that the state ought to protect. Since the force of such an argument 
depended on the metaphysical or moral status of the foetus, and since pure public 
reason was not equipped to determine the appropriate status of the foetus, the 
reason was given less weight from the public perspective than public reasons such as 
women’s rights and equality.466  
The response of the sympathetic reasonable citizen towards the Catholic will 
differ from that of the standard, Rawlsian liberal citizen in at least two ways. First of 
all a sympathetic citizen not only recognizes the reasonableness of the Catholic’s 
non-public moral beliefs. She can imaginatively project herself into the Catholic’s 
shoes to get a sense of why a fellow reasonable citizen would subscribe to that 
particular moral viewpoint. The sympathetic liberal need not merely recognize the 
Catholic’s position as one of several possible reasonable perspectives. Rather, by 
invoking her sympathetic imagination, she can actually judge the abortion case from 
the perspective of the Catholic. She can develop a sense of why, from this 
perspective, it is important to respect the foetus’ interests. Obviously, if the 
sympathetic citizen stops projecting herself into the Catholic’s shoes, she can make a 
different set of judgments. However, she now has a sense of why respect for the 
foetus might be important, all things considered, from the Catholic perspective. Just 
as all reasonable citizens could accept the normative significance of pure public 
reason qua citizen, the sympathetic imagination enables all sympathetic citizens to 
accept the normative significance of the Catholic perspective qua Catholic.  
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As a result, a sympathetic citizen also realizes what the Catholic is sacrificing 
when she is called upon to accept as politically legitimate, those practices which are 
at odds with her private comprehensive doctrine. If the Catholic truly believes that a 
foetus possesses the sanctity of a human life, then the practice of abortion will not 
only lead to a belief that foetuses are being murdered. This belief may very well be 
accompanied by emotions of sorrow or disgust at the loss of human life. The 
sympathetic liberal will be aware of these emotions, and will be able to use this 
awareness as a reason to be sensitive towards the Catholic viewpoint when making 
public decisions. Consideration for the Catholic viewpoint is no longer based only in 
a sense of fairness or reasonableness. The sympathetic liberal agent is situated so that 
she also understands what is at stake for the Catholic, when making abortion a 
legitimate practice. Although it does not follow that she automatically defers to the 
Catholic position, she now has reason to give greater weight to her concern for the 
reasonable Catholic, when determining whether to reasonably accept that abortion 
ought to be legitimate.  
The second difference between sympathetic liberals and Rawlsian liberals is 
that the former can understand the deliberative struggle that led to individuals 
forming their particular moral world views, and are therefore willing to show 
respect for the individual who has gone through this struggle. The sympathetic 
citizen would not only understand the reasonableness of the Catholic perspective but 
respect the Catholic for coming to such a perspective. This offers a level of public 
justifiability to the Catholic view on abortion because any reasonable and 
sympathetic citizen could take up the Catholic perspective, and would have reasons 
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independent of the Catholic perspective to show respect for its normative authority 
(i.e. the reasons found in their own appraisal respect for the development of a 
Catholic moral outlook).This means that the Catholic position has met the two 
criteria for public justification: the content is public accessibly, and every 
sympathetic citizen has at least one reason for accepting its normative authority from 
a public perspective.   
Some may object that being able to enter into the perspective of another 
should not be sufficient to entail the normative authority of the reasoning from the 
public perspective. It might seem that if I were to extend my argument, I might have 
to conclude that if Servetus had a sympathetic imagination and could enter into 
Calvin’s perspective, then he would understand why Calvin believed that 
subscription to nontrinitarianism was reasonable cause for execution. He would 
thereby have to agree that it is publicly justifiable for Calvin to want to burn him at 
stake.467  
The problem with Calvin’s attitude towards Servetus, however, is that there 
is little to no moral accommodation, sympathy or respect on Calvin’s part. A 
reasonable and rational citizen ought not to have this attitude towards someone he 
considers situated to him on terms of reciprocity. As we saw in the case of the Hittite 
Lord in Chapter 4, a reasonable attitude towards one’s fellow citizens is a 
precondition for the sympathetic imagination to find the other perspective publicly 
justifiable. Therefore, Servetus need not find Calvin’s point of view publicly 
justifiable, in order to be a sympathetic citizen.  
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By contrast the liberal Catholic does have a reasonable and rational attitude 
towards her fellow citizens. She can understand why it is not politically reasonable to 
ask others to accept the metaphysical status of the foetus as the sort of being whose 
interests ought to be protected by the government. In fact, she is not asking them to 
accept the metaphysical status of the foetus. What she is asking is for them to respect 
the fact that she, the Catholic, has reasons for endorsing this particular metaphysical 
view. She believes herself deserving of such respect, on grounds that her fellow 
citizens can recognize her as a moral agent with a stable philosophical viewpoint. 
This respect provides the reason that justifies the moral accommodation of her view 
in the public sphere.  
Naturally, some may wonder why Calvin cannot make the same appeal 
towards Servetus. Why should Servetus not morally accommodate Calvin’s views on 
grounds that Calvin is a moral agent with a stable philosophical viewpoint who 
deserves appraisal respect? The first response to Calvin has already been stated, but 
requires elaboration. We cannot accommodate views which do not acknowledge the 
freedom and equality of others, and which do not show them the respect deserving 
of moral agents. Sympathetic liberal citizens take their appraisal respect for others’ 
moral viewpoints as grounds for justifying moral accommodation. However, the 
appraisal respect is generated by the identification of all citizens as free and equal 
agents situated towards each other in relations of reciprocity. Calvin’s moral 
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viewpoint, however, does not recognize reciprocity. It denies Servetus his freedom of 
thought, and his opportunity to formulate his own conception of the good.468  
Therefore, in demanding moral accommodation for his views, Calvin is first 
using reciprocity to justify moral accommodation, and then denying the importance 
of reciprocity by refusing to acknowledge the fact that Servetus must be treated as a 
free and equal, reasonable and rational agent. Calvin’s position is inconsistent. This 
becomes clearer if we realize that on grounds of reciprocity, Calvin ought to be 
willing to show Servetus the same appraisal respect that he wishes Servetus to show 
him. After all, from the perspective of public reason, both Calvin and Servetus are 
symmetrically situated. They both have non-public comprehensive views that are 
informed by several years’ moral and philosophical deliberation. The fact that Calvin 
cannot have appraisal respect for Servetus and cannot morally accommodate his 
views shows that Calvin is also not being a sympathetic agent who views himself as 
situated to other reasonable citizens in relations of reciprocity.   
In reality, it will undoubtedly be the case that some reasonable citizens have a 
better capacity for sympathy and appraisal respect than other reasonable citizens. 
Sympathetic justification cannot be determined by the nature of these capacities, as 
they may be arbitrarily distributed across the population. Rather, what I propose is 
to determine which terms of cooperation agents who are reasonable and rational 
would accept, if they knew themselves and each other to be sympathetic agents. 
Then, these terms of cooperation may be justified as ‘duties’ in the political sphere. 
Just as all reasonable citizens are expected to fulfil the duty of civility, regardless of 
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whether or not they actually accept the free and equal status of all citizens, all 
reasonable citizens will be expected to fulfil the duties of Deliberative Sympathy and 
Respectful Politial Equality, regardless of whether or not they are actually 
sympathetic. Below, I use the framework of fair cooperation amongst reasonable and 
rational agents to justify the two duties.   
5.3: Justification of the Duty of Deliberative Sympathy 
In the last section, I argued that many citizens of a liberal polity face a common 
deliberative struggle when shaping their personal moral perspectives. Such moral 
perspectives must be sustained against a wide variety of life experiences and 
philosophical objections. As a result, moral agents with reflectively stable moral 
views often have to engage in a long process of internal deliberation before they can 
reflectively endorse their moral viewpoints. Although different citizens who go 
through this deliberative struggle may come up with a variety of moral viewpoints 
to endorse, the very existence of such a struggle becomes a shared experience and the 
basis of mutual respect. This means that when sympathetic agents in relations of 
reciprocity try to determine the terms of fair cooperation by which to resolve 
competing claims, the capacity for this shared experience can inform their 
justification. 
  Recall that the way reciprocal duties and obligations arise is that each 
citizen offers such duties as a part of the terms that they sincerely believe that others 
can endorse.469 In this section, I defend the first of two duties which sympathetic 
agents would adopt were they seeking fair terms of cooperation. The Duty of 
                                                          
469
 John Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness,’ in John Rawls: Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman 
(Cambridge, MA and London, UK: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 52-62.   
257 
 
Deliberative Sympathy requires all reasonable citizens to ensure that a public 
criterion of political justification reflects aspects of individuals’ personal narratives 
that are identifiable as experiences common to and appropriate for free and equal 
citizens. Extended moral deliberation is one such experience, although there are 
several others.   
The general idea is that if two citizens A and C are situated towards each 
other on terms of reciprocity, then C can acknowledge that A’s reasoning is publicly 
justifiable if the following conditions hold:  
(i) C can have sympathy for A’s reasoning in light of her 
understanding of A’s experiences.  
(ii) C can have appraisal respect for A as a consequence of such 
sympathy.  
(iii) C can identify features of political society which contributed to 
A’s having had such experiences.  
My discussion in the previous section explains the importance of the first two 
conditions. Condition (i) reflects the fact that the sympathy which reasonable citizens 
have for the experiences of other reasonable citizens makes them aware of what is at 
stake for those who hold the other perspective, when a practice that is contrary to 
their views is made legitimate. Condition (ii) reflects the fact that when one citizen 
tries to project herself into another’s perspective and realizes that the other 
perspective is an appropriate mode of reasoning, she feels appraisal respect for the 
internal deliberative struggle undertaken by the other citizen in developing that 
moral perspective.  
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The importance of the third condition may have several elements. Firstly, if 
citizens are reciprocally situated, then if political society contributes to the generation 
of a particular experience (such as moral deliberation, economic struggles, etc.,) then 
any citizen could have conceivably faced such an experience. As we saw in Chapter 
3, this argument for the third condition might be true in some cases but not all. For 
example, when confronting racial or gender discrimination, it may be difficult for C 
to take up the position of A, if A’s reasoning is informed by experiences that stem 
from her race or gender.  
I will focus on what I see as the most important reason for acknowledging the 
third condition as an important factor in the Duty of Deliberative Sympathy. This is 
the belief that when political society is creating certain conditions, then its citizens 
have a special responsibility to accommodate the perspectives generated by 
individuals facing such conditions. Throughout this chapter I have referred to the 
fact that citizens situated with respect to each other on terms of reciprocity must 
view each other as free and equal participants of a cooperative enterprise. In doing 
so, they are willing to place constraints upon themselves in order to secure some 
mutual advantages for themselves and their fellow citizens. The Duty of Deliberative 
Sympathy is generated by the observation that in doing so, citizens commit 
themselves to certain struggles that they otherwise would not need to endure. The 
struggle to both engage in and resolve moral deliberation is simply a fact that moral 
agents in a free liberal society will have to undergo. Unlike individuals in morally 
homogenous societies, liberal citizens are confronted with a range of comprehensive 
doctrines, and citizens are therefore more aware of moral inconsistencies and the 
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need for moral deliberation. In conceiving of themselves as free and equal, 
reasonable and rational citizens, who must take responsibility for collective 
decisions, citizens are naturally positioned to consider the content of correct moral 
law.  
Now this is not a ‘burden’ about which it would be reasonable for a liberal 
citizen to complain. However, it is a process that we would expect most liberal 
citizens to undertake in an ideally liberal society, and from experience we know that 
the process is often daunting, painful, alienating and bewildering. Given that there is 
only a limited amount of choice in undergoing this process, we have a duty to 
support our fellow citizens when they undertake such an endeavour. It would be 
demanding upon citizens to first create a society where they are required to engage 
in a particular form of moral deliberation, and then deny that political 
reasonableness has to take this into account.  
Imagine if political society decided not to take responsibility for what it 
positions its reasonable citizens to become. In particular, imagine a situation in 
which citizens face personal harm for not shaping themselves to society’s mould. For 
example, a free and equal citizen who chose not engage in any moral deliberation, 
public or private, because of the pain endured in the process, would in fact be 
hurting himself or herself. In such cases citizens could claim that if they were truly 
free and equal, they would not have reasonably and rationally agreed to face such 
harms for the sake of mutual cooperation. In refusing to take responsibility for 
shaping citizens in a certain way, political society is refusing to acknowledge the 
ideal of reciprocity.  
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 Presumably, members of these political societies could reply that they believe 
that it is good for citizens to engage in the deliberative struggle of developing their 
own moral points of view. If implementing certain institutions turns citizens into 
what it is good for them to be, is it not a part of the advantage which citizens secure 
through free and equal political cooperation? My first response to this objection is 
that even if the ordeal is in a citizen’s best interest, other citizens still have reasons to 
alleviate the stress and pain that it generates. The citizen subject to the ordeal has not 
undertaken it voluntarily. It is due to political and societal pressures that the citizen 
has cause to undertake it. Furthermore, other citizens have experienced similar 
ordeals, and are aware of the pain and struggle it causes. Since the experience is 
shared by all citizens, the difficulties become a part of the shared reason of every 
citizen. It is not only that every citizen has access to these reasons, but because all 
citizens are subject to such ordeals as a consequence of the political society to which 
they belong, these shared reasons are also public reasons. Every reasonable citizen 
recognizes the gravity of the personal moral struggle.   
Furthermore, the cooperative political endeavour requires each citizen to 
contribute to the formation of any collective decision to utilize political force in a 
legitimate manner. As we saw in Chapter 1, however, the cooperative nature of 
liberal citizenship also means that every citizen is drawn into accepting 
responsibility for those legitimate laws which reflect the collective decisions of the 
citizenry at large. This led to what I termed the ‘Problem of Conscience.’ Citizens are 
asked to withhold appeals to their non-public moral viewpoints when justifying their 
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political positions to each other, and yet also asked to take responsibility for 
collective decisions that go against their deep-seated moral views. 
By conceiving of liberal citizens as sympathetic agents, the Problem of 
Conscience becomes even more pressing. Each citizen is able to use the sympathetic 
imagination to place himself or herself in the position of other citizens, and see that 
some of those citizens find morally egregious those very acts for which they are 
responsible. A sympathetic citizen can sensibly ask how such a citizen might 
reasonably be viewed as free and equal to all others. The politically reasonable 
answer is that the citizen still receives benefits from a political society regulated by 
the two principles of justice and the values of public democratic culture. However, 
this does not address the concern of freedom or equality. Citizens are not free 
because they are subject to laws which they find reprehensible; and they are not 
equal because those laws were created by fellow citizens who can embrace the view 
of themselves as authors or agents of the collective decisions. (In response to this 
latter objection, I defend the duty of Respectful Political Equality.) 
A further concern for those advocating for sympathy to be integrated into the 
public sphere is the profound influence that the public sphere has on shaping 
individuals’ lives in the private sphere. In one traditional liberal picture, there is a 
public sphere of shared values and beliefs belonging to democratic society, as well as 
a private sphere of values and understandings belonging to individuals and families. 
In addition there is a non-public ‘social’ sphere of values and beliefs which belongs 
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to associations like churches, universities and scientific organizations.470 The private 
and non-public spheres constitute the ‘background culture’ of society,471 while the 
public sphere is demarcated by shared public values.  
In reality, there is no strict separation. If the basic structure of society includes 
social, legal, economic and familial organizations,472 then the decisions made in the 
political forums necessarily regulate every aspect of the basic structure (e.g. what 
children are taught in schools, what opportunities there are for social mobility, what 
it is appropriate to wear in public, etc.) Through these channels, public institutions 
shape the lives of individual citizens. This means that if such political forums exclude 
sympathetic considerations, then individual private lives will also be affected by the 
absence of these considerations. The exclusion of sympathy does not just affect 
political interaction. Offering concern for a young pregnant woman in the case of 
abortion, or respect for individuals’ religious expression through their choice of 
clothing, or offering social services to families whose primary breadwinner has lost 
his or her job, capture the concerns that citizens truly face in their private lives. In 
order to fulfil the original liberal vision of moral personhood, which is partly defined 
as the ability to form, revise and rationally pursue one’s own conception of the good, 
473 there ought to be some element of public decision-making which considers what is 
important for reasonable citizens from their own perspective.  
Since all citizens are reasonable and rational, and all are aware that the Duty of 
Deliberative Sympathy will make political institutions more sympathetic to the 
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actual conditions citizens face while living both public and private aspects of their 
lives, citizens may also be willing to make Deliberative Sympathy one of the terms of 
the original agreement for fair cooperation. It is only when a moral duty derives 
from the original terms of agreement that it can be said to be a duty required in the 
public sphere. Given the extraordinary level of influence public institutions exercise 
over private life, all rational citizens have reasons to want public justification to be 
sympathetic. This then justifies the Duty of Deliberative Sympathy.  
5.4: Justification of the Duty of Respectful Political Equality   
The Duty of Respectful Political Equality requires that citizens show to every other 
and receive from every other a form of respect that is consonant with the sense of 
self-worth which each citizen would need to bring to the cooperative enterprise, if 
the citizen were to be viewed as an equal partner. When conceiving of political 
participation as a cooperative enterprise, we know that within the boundaries of this 
enterprise citizens are subject to laws that only a few may positively endorse. By this 
I mean that there are many citizens who might take the perspective of pure public 
reason, and determine that although they can acknowledge the reasonableness of a 
law, were they sole legislators they would choose another reasonable course of 
action.  
Consider again our example of the Humanitarian and the Pacifist, who have 
irreconcilable differences on their views regarding a just war, although they both 
believe it constitutes a form of humanitarian intervention. From her non-public 
perspective, the Humanitarian believes that fighting such a war is morally required, 
while the Pacifist argues that all war is immoral. The pure public reasons offered to 
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justify a just war or to justify non-interference are not the actual reasons of the 
policy’s proponents or opponents. Suppose these are the reasons that are used to 
ultimately justify intervention. Then the Pacifist who takes up the position of pure 
public reason can acknowledge the political reasonableness of intervention. 
However, she knows that if she were the legislator making the decision, she would 
offer a different set of public reasons which did not in fact justify the war.  
The Duty of Respectful Political Equality tries to capture the idea that it is in 
everyone’s best interest if each reasonable citizen can view herself as the legislator of 
the law as often as is possible. While the Duty of Deliberative Sympathy requires 
each citizen to acknowledge all others as being worthy of appraisal respect, the Duty 
of Respectful Political Equality requires that each citizen be able to view herself as 
being worthy of appraisal respect. As a consequence of this, she must be able to see 
herself as one of the many legislators of the law. This is accomplished when public 
justification requires some (though not all) of a reasonable citizen’s non-public 
desires and objectives, to carry normative weight in collective decision-making.   
The desires I have in mind may be characterized as judgments of common 
good, while the objectives include those states of affairs such as intervention or 
peace, which can only come about through ‘collective participation.’ I use the term 
‘participation’ and not ‘action’ since accounts of collective action typically require a 
series of background assumptions about the intentions and mental states of those 
participating. By collective participation I simply wish to convey that system-wide 
participation is required to successfully achieve the objective, such that the average 
citizen will not have the option to opt-out of at least some degree of participation. 
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Collective participation is reflected in scenarios like that of the ‘Humanitarian and 
the Pacifist’ which I introduced in Chapter 1. If a liberal polity decides to engage in 
military enterprise for the purposes of humanitarian intervention, then pacifists 
within liberal society are also participants of this intervention insofar as they 
contribute to the economy which contributes to national revenue which finances the 
war; insofar as they watch media reports on the war and engage in debates regarding 
how to end the dispute most quickly; and insofar as they are engaged in any social 
and political practices which are connected to the war effort. In this sense 
participation does not require a direct causal contribution to the war effort (such as 
the contribution by someone who enlisted in the military in light of the humanitarian 
significance of the war.) Rather, it comes about through engagement and 
participation in social practices which shape the enterprise.  
Citizens of a liberal polity might view common goods and objectives 
requiring collective participation as one of numerous benefits of engaging in political 
cooperation. Once we make non-public moral reasons a part of public reason, several 
common good arguments become publicly justifiable. Since they are common good 
arguments, they are other-regarding, not self-regarding. Since they reflect views on 
the ‘good,’ they are informed by citizens’ personal life narratives.  
We might hesitate to adopt such conceptions into an account of public reason, 
since there are several views of the common good that are clearly incompatible and 
would cause conflict. One such idea of the common good might be religious 
education in schools for the purposes of teaching children correct values, or the 
appropriate account of cosmology and creation. Unlike the Humanitarian and the 
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Pacifist, who both acknowledge that war is a form of humanitarian intervention and 
disagree about the relative weights they place on humanitarianism and pacifism, 
those who propound religious education might not be able to convince others of the 
value of their position. 
 I am assuming, however, that those propounding their own conceptions of 
the common good are reasonable citizens who understand that others will disagree 
and are willing to weigh the demands of reasonable and fair political interaction 
against their beliefs about the common good. In other words, those reasonable 
citizens who wish to teach creationism in schools would have their views taken 
seriously in this context, only if they sincerely believe that it is in the best interest of 
all students to learn creationism all things considered. In this way, non-public beliefs 
are allowed into public deliberation as common good arguments.  
No doubt in practice this requirement generates certain epistemic demands. 
Those who want to teach creationism must show that they are not simply trying to 
undermine the religious expression of others, and have considered the harms of their 
so-called common good (e.g. the affect it will have on students’ scientific education if 
they cannot grasp the complexity of the debate). They must also show that they can 
be sympathetic to other viewpoints. Once they do this, however, the Duty of 
Respectful Political Equality will lend force to their moral arguments, even if such 
arguments are made in the public sphere.  
One concern that may come up with the incorporation of common good and 
collective participation arguments into public discourse, is that it implies that it is 
acceptable to subject the will of one citizen to that of another, even if the first citizen 
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reasonably disagrees with the content of the other citizen’s will. For example, if the 
Humanitarian believes that a just war is a reasonable moral objective, then it is 
perfectly acceptable for him to advocate for intervention and thereby subject the 
Pacifist to participating in a just war on moral grounds that are contrary to the 
Pacifist’s morality. This is quite different from the standard liberal framework, in 
which the Humanitarian claims that intervention is justified ‘from the perspective of 
pure public reason,’ and that the Pacifist must accept it on shared grounds. Given 
sympathetic public reason, the Humanitarian is able to justify this claim from private 
morality because the Pacifist has appraisal respect for her view, and because each 
reasonable citizen is meant to be able to see herself as one of the legislators of the 
law. 
Yet if this argument regarding subjection of will holds in the case of 
sympathetic public reason, then it also holds for the traditional Rawlsian case. 
Simply because the Pacifist is not being unreasonably subject to the will of a fellow 
citizen, traditional Rawlsians seem unconcerned about the fact that her will is indeed 
being subjected, and that there are politically reasonable reasons not to subject her 
will so (namely that it is equally politically reasonable to believe that pacifism is a 
more significant public value than humanitarian intervention.) This hearkens back to 
the sorts of problems I found worrisome in Chapter 2, in which contradictory 
perspectives could both be found politically reasonable.  
In short, the argument for Respectful Political Equality is that there are times 
when political society must choose to adopt certain courses of action which are 
implicitly constituted by substantive accounts of the common good and objectives of 
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collective participation. For example, society must either decide to engage in 
humanitarian intervention or not. Given reasonable disagreement on such actions, 
there needs to be a fair way to ensure that one subgroup of citizens does not always 
have their private wills aligned with the choice of action pursued by the public, 
while another subset only receives reasonable justifications for their choices. If a 
person were always the recipient of a justification, but could never actually see her 
private objectives realized in the public domain, then she would constantly be 
helping to fulfil the visions that others have for their political society, without ever 
having any of her own desires or objectives fulfilled.  
In part, the Duty of Respectful Political Equality connects with Rawls’ idea 
that the first principle of justice must grant each citizen the social bases of self-
respect. In Rawlsian political liberalism, this is accomplished by assuring each citizen 
the same number of votes as all other citizens, by enabling everyone the right to run 
for office and to participate in the political sphere. If any citizen is not granted such 
rights, then her equality is said to be undermined in comparison to those of others. 
Similarly, the Duty of Respectful Politial Equality extends this social base of self-
respect to the deliberative parts of the political sphere. It requires each citizen to be 
able to make the greatest possible contribution to political deliberation, and to 
protect herself from being subject to political powers defying her own will on 
grounds that it is politically reasonable. 
In several cases, this will mean greater compromise out of respect for varying 
moral viewpoints. In the case of the Humanitarian and the Pacifist, for example, it is 
doubtlessly true that only one of the two will be satisfied with the outcome of a 
269 
 
public decision regarding whether or not to engage in a just war. However, it may be 
that if the polity chooses to engage in a just war, then out of respect for the Pacifist, it 
must take further measures to minimize civilian casualties, and in the future support 
international policies that avoid the need for intervention. Similarly, if the country 
chooses not to go to war, it may (out of respect for the Humanitarian) offer other 
forms of aid and asylum to the victims of inhumane treatment. The Duty of 
Respectful Politial Equality, coupled with the idea of moral accommodation, means 
that some kind of compromise is typically owed those citizens whose views about 
the common good are not realized by legitimate uses of power.  
This Duty of Respectful Political Equality is consistent with the traditional 
liberal view that perhaps for a given law, an individual may have to compromise her 
claims or interests in the name of social cooperation. However, it adds a caveat. 
Firstly, it distinguishes between political issues that are of deep importance to 
individuals (the sorts of complex moral cases which I have been discussing), and 
political issues whose results are not ideal but acceptable. The notion of acceptability 
here is of the sort that would be reflected in a freely chosen compromise. A citizen’s 
attitude towards such laws would be one in which a citizen could truthfully say, ‘I 
would not have chosen that law if I were a self-legislator, but nor do I find myself 
disgusting and deplorable for being subject to it.’ Laws which leave a citizen feeling 
badly about his or her status as a moral being or even a good human are not terms to 
which any reasonable citizen would have agreed to be subject, if she were free and 
equal.  
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5.5: Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that citizens capable of sympathy and situated towards each 
on terms of reciprocity view each other in light of a certain kind of appraisal respect 
given their shared struggles. Not only do they respect the fact that other citizens 
undertook a particular struggle that led the citizen in question to cultivate a 
particular form of reasoning, but having either encountered similar struggles 
themselves or due to their sympathetic capacity of imagining how such struggles 
might affect a person, citizens appreciate the importance of living in accordance with 
the reasoning learned through such life experiences.  
However, simply because appraisal respect gives citizens a reason to take up 
others’ perspectives and consider its importance and authority, does not mean that 
citizens will actually do so. I argue that there is a moral Duty of Deliberative 
Sympathy which requires citizens to do so. The argument for the existence of such a 
duty stems from the fact that the political sphere itself shapes the struggles that 
many citizens face. The fact that there is room for free moral deliberation, or that a 
particular polity is going through an economic recession, is not entirely the fault of 
the citizen experiencing the struggle. Given that citizens are capable of sympathy, 
they know that if the collective is imposing a burden on a particular citizen (even a 
burden that will later prove to be in the individual’s interest), then there is value in 
ensuring that citizens can live within political society with the self-awareness or 
identity that is formed by carrying such a burden. For example, if a citizen has 
struggled to come to reflectively stable moral beliefs as a consequence of living in a 
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liberal polity that encourages free thought, then the liberal polity should not deny 
the individual a right to live in accordance with those moral ideals.   
I argue that a further benefit of accepting the Duty of Deliberative Sympathy 
is that it transforms the nature of the interference that legitimate political institutions 
often impress upon citizens in their private lives. Practices that are normally thought 
to be very much a part of the non-public background culture of a polity (e.g. what 
clothing a woman wears) are shaped and guided by the public sphere. The Duty of 
Deliberative Sympathy cannot limit this interference of the public sphere, but can 
ensure that when political powers interfere, they do so by trying to justify their 
interference to citizens as individuals living private lives and capable of having 
private experiences, and not just as reasonable and rational citizens. Since all 
reasonable and rational citizens can benefit from such an arrangement, I argue that 
reasonable and rational citizens engaged in determining fair terms of cooperation 
will choose to accept the Duty of Deliberative Sympathy as one of the terms.  
The Duty of Respectful Political Equality arises from several features of 
sympathetic liberalism. Firstly, the combination of the capacity for sympathy and the 
Duty of Deliberative Sympathy increases the number of non-public reasons that are 
characterized as public on grounds of being arguments for the common good. 
Secondly, sympathy highlights a difference in status between citizens who are 
offered public justifications for politically legitimate courses of action that are 
contrary to their private comprehensive doctrine, and citizens who are offered public 
justifications that are in accordance with their private comprehensive doctrines. By 
imaginatively projecting oneself into the situation of citizens who are morally 
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opposed to legitimate courses of collective participation, their will is being externally 
subject to a course of action that is in defiance of it. The Duty of Respectful Political 
Equality serves to distribute such subjection in a way that is deemed fair, while also 
extending the social bases of self-respect.  
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Chapter 6: The Problem of Conscience Revisited  
In this concluding section I wish to demonstrate how the incorporation of 
sympathetic judgments into the framework of public justification ultimately solves 
the Problem of Conscience with which I began this dissertation. I will show how the 
reformulations of the concepts of publicity and reciprocity that I advanced in the last 
two chapters, frame a practice of collective moral accommodation that enables 
citizens to resolve conflicts of judgments while appealing to their reasonable private 
comprehensive doctrines. These revisions of liberal publicity and reciprocity make 
three contributions to the practice of public collective public decision-making. In the 
first two sections of this chapter, I will consider these three contributions in turn. 
Then in sections 6.3 and 6.4, I will illustrate how these features of sympathetic 
liberalism inform the practice of collective moral accommodation.   
In the early chapters of this thesis, I tried to show that the liberal ideal of 
political society gives rise to what I called the Problem of Conscience. Reasonable 
and rational citizens desire to live on fair terms with all other citizens, and therefore 
impose constraints on the realization of their own will by accommodating the wills 
of others.474 Since they see all citizens as being situated as free and equal to each 
other, and engaged in the cooperative enterprise of political society, they choose to 
behave in accordance with an ideal of reciprocity.475 As a consequence of this, they 
are willing to justify their political positions to each other. This is the basis of the 
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liberal principle of legitimacy and its corresponding moral duty of civility.476 I 
showed in Chapter 1, however, that in light of the principle of legitimacy and the 
duty of civility, liberals also bear a degree of personal responsibility for the 
legitimacy of actions taken on by their political society.  
This means that liberal citizens must choose between taking personal 
responsibility for the legitimacy of practices found immoral, and refusing to act in 
accordance with the moral duty of civility. The struggles they confront in reconciling 
these competing moral demands constitute what I have called the Problem of 
Conscience. I discussed three variations of this problem. The Problem of the Tragic 
Conscience arises when a reasonable and rational citizen would like to be able to 
fulfil the duty of civility, and would like to be able to see herself as engaged in fair 
social cooperation with others, but finds that the terms required to fulfil such a duty 
are too morally demanding. A pro-life advocate who believes the practice of abortion 
to be murderous may confront such a Tragic Conscience if the right to abortion 
becomes legitimate law.  
However, if she does not have to struggle with a Tragic Conscience, and 
instead simply accepts responsibility for enabling abortions to become a legitimate 
practice, then she would be said to have a Brutish Conscience. A Brutish Conscience 
indicates that though a reasonable citizen accepts a particular practice or course of 
action to be morally reprehensible, she does not struggle with accepting 
responsibility for it the way a person with a Tragic Conscience would. In the case of 
our pro-life advocate, such an advocate would be said to have a Brutish Conscience if 
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she held the following three beliefs at once: (i) The practice of abortion is murderous; 
(ii) The practice of abortion is politically legitimate; and (iii) I accept personal 
responsibility for the legitimacy of abortions. The pro-life advocate is a brute insofar 
as she believes abortions to be murderous but does not have any regret or guilt about 
being responsible for making murders legitimate practices.    
Finally the Problem of the Clear Conscience arises because citizens may alter 
essential features of their life in order to resolve the Problems of the Tragic or Brutish 
Consciences, in ways that seem to require too much sacrifice. If a pro-life advocate 
felt the need to leave her Church because she accepted personal responsibility for 
abortion, or alienated her (politically unreasonable) friends and family in some way, 
then her fellow citizens may believe that she has made too large a sacrifice in order to 
fulfil her duty of civility to them. Although the citizen’s own conscience is clear, her 
fellow citizens may feel bad placing her in such a situation.   
 The first of three contributions of sympathetic liberalism to resolving the 
Problem of Conscience is to diminish the boundaries between reasonable citizens’ 
politically reasonable views and their privately reasonable views about political 
decisions. When reasonable citizens make judgments about political decisions, they 
acknowledge the free and equal status of all other citizens in both their public and 
non-public reasoning. A reasonable citizen who is a Liberal Catholic can believe that 
it is necessary to acknowledge the equality and well-being of women, while still 
believing that political society ought to make abortion illegitimate on grounds of 
respect for human life. While belief in the equality and well-being of women is a 
politically reasonable view, the belief that the practice of abortion does not respect 
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human life is a non-public view on a political decision. These latter set of views can 
in turn be distinguished from non-public views on private matters, where 
reasonableness is not required to maintain respect for the free and equal status of all 
citizens. This means that a reasonable Liberal Catholic, who holds the two beliefs I 
have described above, can also privately believe that Catholics are morally superior 
to non-Catholics. As long as she does not use this belief to guide her views on 
political decision-making, either publicly or privately, she will remain a reasonable 
citizen.  
The second revision which sympathetic liberalism implements involves two 
duties that every citizen acquires in relation to their fellows, when each recognizes 
every other as free and equal, reasonable, rational and sympathetic. I argued that 
citizens who are sympathetic towards each other will have appraisal respect for 
certain experiences that their fellow citizens have gone through. Since these 
experiences shape individuals non-public views, there exists a duty to take up a 
position where citizens can get a sense of why their reasonable fellow citizens believe 
that some non-public reasons ought to inform what the collective ought to do. The 
Duty of Deliberative Sympathy states that any normative theory of public 
justification must reflect an account of reasonableness that is consistent with those 
aspects of an individual’s personal narrative that are identifiable as experiences 
common to and appropriate for free and equal reasonable citizens. Along with the 
Duty of Deliberative Sympathy, I argued for the Duty of Respectful Political 
Equality, which requires that citizens must show each other a form of respect 
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consonant with the sense of self-worth each citizen would need to bring to the 
cooperative enterprise, if the citizen were to be viewed as an equal partner.   
The third contribution offers an account of how reasonable citizens weigh the 
views of their fellow reasonable citizens, when making judgments about political 
decisions. In Chapter 2, I characterized citizens as having to weigh three sorts of 
reasons when determining whether outcomes of legitimate procedures were 
justifiable. They first weighed a set of reasons in favour of Policy A (called RA), 
against the set of reasons in favour of a Policy B (called RB). In addition, they 
considered reasons RP, which were the reasons to accept the procedurally legitimate 
outcome, regardless of their reasons in favour of RA and RB. I will now show that 
reasonable citizens’ appraisal respect for fellow reasonable citizens means that the 
way in which they add weights to reasons in RA , RB and RP depends at least in part 
on how they believe other citizens weigh these reasons. This leads to greater 
convergence between reasonable citizens’ views on what ought to be the collective 
decision regarding a particular use of power.  
 In illustrating these three contributions, I will utilize several examples already 
introduced in this dissertation to illustrate how problems with ‘pure public reason’, 
(that is public reason without the additional constraints necessary to enable 
justificatory accounts of legitimacy) are resolved by the sympathetic public reason 
we would expect to find in sympathetic liberalism. Through this analysis we will see 
that the sorts of justificatory problems faced in political liberalism, in fact split into 
four different categories: In section (6.1) I will discuss problems which arise due to 
pure public reason’s distinction between public reasons and reasonable non-public 
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reasons (both of which are separate from unreasonable non-public reasons.) I will use 
the abortion case to show how this distinction collapses in sympathetic liberalism. In 
section (6.2) I will show how the Problem of Conscience discussed at the end of 
Chapter 1 can be minimized by looking at the Hijab Controversy in France. I will 
show, however, that the way sympathetic public reason resolves this controversy 
depends on whether we interpret the objective of proponents as minimizing a 
negative externality or achieving a state of affairs which requires collective 
participation. In section (6.3) I will look at what I call the ‘collective participation 
problem’, which is the problem of justifying policies which demand that all citizens 
participate, despite the persistence of reasonable disagreement. I will evaluate this 
problem in light of debates between liberal pacifists and proponents of humanitarian 
intervention. Finally in section (6.4) I look at cases where the choice is either to 
interfere with individuals without offering proper justification, or preventing other 
individuals from initiating policies that require collective participation.    
6.1: Sympathy and Abortion  
Abortion poses a Problem of Conscience for liberal legitimacy because it requires 
liberals who believe abortion to be an immoral practice to take responsibility for 
making abortion legally permissible for those who believe otherwise. Those who are 
pro-life thereby find themselves subject to a Brutish Conscience or a Tragic 
Conscience, or both. Their conscience is brutish in the sense that they are responsible 
for the legitimacy of the law that allows others to disrespect the sanctity of human 
life. Furthermore, by legitimating such a law, they are thereby imposing a restraint 
on fellow pro-life supporters, who would like to interfere with the actions of those 
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who disrespect the sanctity of life. Since they themselves believe that it is wrong to 
have abortions and that such immoral actions ought to be stopped, fellow 
proponents of life can reasonably ask them how they can live with themselves while 
accepting responsibility for the legitimacy of such practices. The accusation conveys 
the sentiment of ‘Et tu Brute?’ and demands to know how someone who believes 
abortion to be such a violation of life could possibly allow such practices to be 
permissible. In a similar vein, the liberal proponent of life faces a Tragic Conscience, 
in the sense that their moral commitment to respecting human life is in constant 
struggle with their commitment to showing respect and fair treatment to their fellow 
citizens.  
Now the liberal response to pro-life supporters has traditionally been that 
although both pro-life and pro-choice positions are reasonable, the pro-choice 
position is supported by more public reasons than the pro-life position. The pro-
choice position is supported by reasons such as women’s free and equal status on the 
one hand, while the pro-life position is supported by the respect for human life.477 
However, grounding the pro-life position is a belief that foetuses have a 
metaphysical status that requires all citizens to afford them the same moral 
consideration that ought to be given to other human beings.478 Public reason 
originally claimed that while all share the belief that women’s freedom and equality 
would be jeopardized by no right to abortion, there is no agreement on the 
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metaphysical status of the foetus, and hence the reasoning of the pro-life advocate is 
not suitably public.479  
A sympathetic liberal responds to this by placing herself in the shoes of a 
reasonable pro-life proponent. In doing so she realizes that she can not only identify 
the pro-life position as reasonable, but can also understand the force of conviction 
that comes of viewing the foetus as having a particular metaphysical status. She can 
see why such a belief ought to be action-guiding, and she can see how the 
metaphysical status of a foetus becomes an epistemic question of the same sort as the 
true guilt or innocence of a convicted felon. In other words, she can imagine the 
‘truth’ of the pro-life position from at least one non-public but reasonable standpoint. 
Furthermore, because she has appraisal respect for those who non-publicly 
affirm the standpoint in question, she can see why the pro-life position ought to have 
a degree of normative authority in the public sphere.  This means that whereas 
before the metaphysical status of the foetus was not a part of public reason, it can 
now become a reason that members of the public have a reason to consider. This 
reason is not the truth of the metaphysical status of the foetus, but respect for those 
who believe that it has a particular metaphysical status.  Finally, those who cannot or 
will not take up the position of the pro-life proponent through sympathetic 
imagination, must accept that the pro-life position has normative weight, given the 
Duty of Deliberative Sympathy.  
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It may be objected here that understanding why another person views 
something as true is quite different from viewing it as a truth or even a possible truth 
oneself. Unless the sympathetic liberal actually changes her viewpoint based on this 
imaginative faculty, she is not doing anything further than acknowledging its 
reasonableness. In general, I agree with this objection. However, what it shows is 
that in acknowledging the reasonableness of the pro-life position, unsympathetic 
liberals were not fully acknowledging what it meant to have a reasonable belief 
about the metaphysical status of the foetus. Believing that a foetus has a particular 
metaphysical status is packaged with attitudes about abortion itself. Those who 
believe that a foetus has a particular moral status may feel sorrow, or alarm or 
indignation at the knowledge that foetuses are being terminated. Citizens’ capacity 
for sympathy enables them to imagine how such moral attitudes affect the citizen in 
question, and provides them with a reason to assuage the difficulty in reconciling 
responsibility for the legitimacy of abortion with emotions and attitudes associated 
with the belief that the practice is morally repugnant.   
More generally, sympathy can make all moral disagreement a part of 
reasonable public deliberation, as long as the comprehensive doctrines from which 
the moral views emanate are reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Unreasonable 
comprehensive doctrines would fail to meet the publicity requirement because in 
placing oneself in the shoes of someone with a racist, misogynistic, homophobic or 
otherwise prejudiced outlook, a liberal citizen could see that the outlook was 
inappropriate by virtue of being unreasonable. However, if liberals hold that a 
comprehensive doctrine like Catholicism is reasonable, then by placing oneself in the 
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shoes of a Catholic, a liberal would not have any reason to find the Catholic 
worldview inappropriate. While maintaining the distinction between reasonable and 
unreasonable, the incorporation of sympathy into the liberal framework effectively 
eliminates the distinction between public and non-public reasonableness.  
In the language of justification, the elimination of this distinction amounts to 
political justification and full justification effectively collapsing into each other. In 
Rawls; view, political justification is justification from within the political domain to 
individuals in their capacity as citizens.480 It appeals to reasons that have force within 
public democratic culture – reasons such as constitutional essentials or legislative 
procedures. Full justification is justification to a person from within her reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine, conditional upon the comprehensive doctrine affirming the 
free and equal, reasonable and rational status of citizens.481 By contrast, I have argued 
that if citizens strive to sympathize with all other reasonable citizens, then ideally 
they will be able to determine publicly whether a particular use of political power is 
fully justified. If it is not fully justified, this will become a problem for public 
justification, because the deliberative imagination has made every reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine a position from which free and equal citizens can exchange 
reasonable views. For example, we no longer consider political values like ‘all ought 
to respect human life’ as a different category of reasons from reasonable values like 
‘foetuses’ lives ought to be respected’. All of these reasons become public reasons, 
and public justification would have to account for them.  
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This means that public debates about abortion, gay marriage, evolution, etc., 
must now incorporate reasonable private views about political matters because such 
views are no longer non-public. At first this may be seen as quite a step back for 
political liberalism. Many liberals depend on the fact that non-public reasons are 
given relatively little weight, when constructing their arguments for these issues. For 
example, Rawls’ argument in favour of the right to choose would be undermined if 
the public sphere gave positive weight to the claim that those who have abortions do 
not display adequate respect for human life.482  
However, reasons need not be so alarmed. If the Liberal Catholic is also 
reasonable, rational and sympathetic, the result will simply be more reasonable 
disagreement in the public sphere than we originally anticipated. If sympathy can 
make any gains in resolving public reasonable disagreement (as I will claim it does in 
section 6.2) then we need not worry that the incidence of public reasonable 
disagreement will increase.  
In fact, incorporating sympathy into a theory of public justification expands 
reasonable disagreement in a way that liberals ought to welcome, because it makes 
some headway into solving the Problem of Conscience. When a sympathetic liberal 
places herself in the shoes of a reasonable Liberal Catholic, then assuming a 
sufficiently robust faculty of imagination, she begins to understand the effects of the 
Brutish and Tragic Consciences to which politically reasonable pro-life proponents 
are subject. She realizes both the unfortunate nature of the tragic consequence, but 
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also that it is in some way inappropriate for the reasonable pro-life proponent to 
simply allow abortions to take place in the name of social cooperation. 
Therefore, she allows the pro-life supporter to appeal to her private 
comprehensive doctrine whenever it is necessary for her to do so, to ease or eradicate 
the burdens upon her conscience.  If the fact that a citizen believes abortion to be 
murderous, is grounds for her defence of the pro-life position, then those who place 
themselves in the shoes of this citizen understand the force of this reason. They will 
either accept her reasons for not fulfilling the duty of civility or accept that the Duty 
of Deliberative Sympathy allows her not to fulfil the duty of civility.  
 By allowing appeals to reasonable private comprehensive doctrines, and 
thereby increasing the cases of public reasonable disagreement, the public 
justifications which survive the inclusion of previously non-public reasons will 
diminish the number of people who suffer from problems of conscience.  As I will try 
to illustrate, the existence of these burdens of conscience, and the acceptability of 
appealing to private comprehensive doctrines, allows for greater moral 
accommodation.  Suppose, for example, there are ten reasonable liberal Catholics in 
our political society, six of whom are suffering from Brutish and Tragic consciences 
when trying to respect a law which allows abortion after the first trimester. The other 
four are willing to accept responsibility for the legal permissibility of first trimester 
abortions, because when they weigh other values like women’s right to choose, they 
do believe that first trimester abortions are justifiable all things considered. The 
remaining six, as reasonable and rational citizens, are still trying to reach 
compromises with other reasonable citizens, and are still willing to accommodate 
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certain aspects of others’ morality into their political society. Although they do not 
approve of the actions of those who have abortions, reasonableness and sympathy 
enable them to view those committing abortions as moral agents. It is simply that 
first trimester abortions are not the justifiable point of accommodation from their 
perspective.  
By allowing them to invoke their reasonable comprehensive doctrines in 
discussions about abortion, we might find that three of the six are willing to accept 
first and second trimester abortions if the mother is underage, or if the pregnancy 
were the result of a sexual assault, or under some other set of contingencies. The idea 
is that these concerns, coupled with sensitivity towards the moral accommodation of 
other citizens, might lead to a set of laws with which fewer citizens suffer from 
Tragic or Brutish Consciences. This may involve restricting abortions for some 
people, but increasing opportunities for others. This is not to say that all reasonable 
disagreement may be resolved through such bargaining. Rather, the idea is that if 
laws are designed to be sensitive to reasons that citizens actually have, the fewer the 
number of problematic consciences we will find prevalent in political society.  
Now a final objection might be that a person who is strongly pro-life and who 
sees abortion as a moral outrage may not be able to view those of her fellow citizens 
who have abortions, as reasonable and rational moral agents. If she does not view 
them in this way, then the fact that she could prevent them from having an abortion 
and does not will weigh on her conscience. She perhaps sees herself as committing a 
serious omission in not insisting that her fellow citizens not perform immoral 
actions.  
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It is important to realize that a sympathetic liberalism cannot and need not 
tolerate such an attitude towards one’s fellow citizens. Recall Rosen’s example of the 
Hittite Lord who was raised in a culture where slavery was seen as a misfortune but 
not as a moral evil.483 When a sympathetic liberal placed herself in the shoes of this 
Hittite Lord, she discovered that the attitude of the Hittite Lord was wrong, but that 
the Hittite Lord was not an amoral agent. He was following a moral code that was 
ultimately not reasonable and rational, but one he believed to be moral nonetheless. 
Moreover, the sympathetic liberal understood why the Hittite Lord was committing 
such immoral acts despite being a moral person. She was unwilling to accommodate 
his views into public justification because his attitude towards his slaves was not one 
that was sustainable under relations of reciprocity.  
Similarly, even if a pro-life supporter believed that what her fellow citizen was 
doing was wrong, the pro-life supporter’s ability for sympathy would not 
immediately lead to the conclusion that the woman having an abortion was immoral. 
Rather, in placing herself in the shoes of the woman having an abortion, she would 
realize that the woman was in fact a moral agent, despite making a terrible moral 
mistake from the perspective of the pro-life supporter. Unlike the Hittite Lord, 
however, the attitude of the woman having an abortion towards the aborted foetus 
does not defy the demands of reciprocity or fairness. She would still be owed a 
justification if one were to interfere with her actions, and given that she does not find 
abortion immoral, there would be no justification suitable that would justifiably 
prevent her from having an abortion. This means that instead of interfering with her 
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behaviour by making abortion illegitimate, it would be more appropriate for the pro-
life proponent to appeal to her sympathies and ask her to accommodate certain 
elements of the pro-life view in her decision about whether or not to have an 
abortion.  
6.2: Weighing Reasons and The Hijab Controversy 
I argued that by incorporating sympathetic liberalism into our framework of public 
justification we are left with far more reasonable disagreement in the public sphere 
than we originally encountered. When adopting pure public reason as a framework 
of justification, liberals confronted the problem of reasonable disagreement that 
resulted from conflicts of public values. In the example with the Hijab Controversy, 
we faced a citizenry in which all individuals valued equality, but disagreed on 
whether a ban on wearing the Hijab to state schools served to promote or prevent 
equality from being realized. One set of citizens argued that the practice of wearing a 
Hijab represented the submission of women in a patriarchal society, and hence the 
ban on the Hijab was a form of liberation which made women more autonomous.484 
Another set of citizens, however, argued that religious liberty and the expression of 
one’s religious view is also important in maintaining political equality. In this view, 
preventing Muslim schoolgirls from wearing the Hijab indicates a sort of state 
paternalism towards citizens’ religious beliefs,485 and consequently their religious 
identity.486 
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By conceiving of citizens as sympathetic, all reasonable arguments have the 
potential to be shared through the use of the imagination. Therefore, resolving the 
disagreement on abortion becomes comparable to resolving reasonable disagreement 
on public values. Suppose our reasonable disagreement is of the following form: 
there exist two incompatible policies, A and B, which are justified by sets of reason 
RA and RB respectively. Using our example of the Hijab, suppose Policy A is to ban 
the wearing of headscarves and Policy B is to permit it. In order to show how 
reasonable justification would work in a sympathetic liberal framework, I will 
simplify the example. However, it is assumed that the process can be generalized for 
more complex variations.  
Let us denote the reasons in RA as (a1, a2,...an) where all ai are reasons to support 
the ban of wearing headscarves in state funded schools. In our simplified example, 
let a1 correspond to the reason that the Hijab represents a kind of subjugation of 
women, and a2 the reason that a government funded school is a proper place to 
cultivate skills that enable a person to become an autonomous citizen both in public 
and in private.487 Similarly denote the set of reasons in RB as (b1, b2,...bk) and assume 
that all bi constitute reasons to oppose the ban. Let b1 be the reason that the ban 
represents a type of state paternalism that is contrary to autonomy. Let b2 represent 
the fact that for some Muslim girls, wearing a headscarf is fundamental to their sense 
of autonomy. As we have already seen, some reasons might fall within the scope of 
both RA as well as RB. Let a3 and b3 both be the reason that helping children develop a 
sense of autonomy is an important concern for every member of a political society.  
                                                          
487
 Ibid. p. 354. 
289 
 
Now suppose Policy A becomes legitimate law in accordance with legitimate 
procedure. For proponents of Policy B, this means that they now have to consider a 
further set of reasons RP, which is the set of those reasons supporting Policy A in 
light of the fact that it is the outcome of a legitimate procedure. For some pre-
procedural proponents of B, RP will be of sufficient weight to enable them to find 
Policy A justified.  
Let us assume, however, that there is at least one person who continues to find 
Policy B unjustifiable. We can imagine, for example, a Laïciste feminist who cannot 
fully believe that any woman would choose to wear a Hijab without being subject to 
(possibly unconscious) levels of subjugation.488 If political society chooses to hold 
Policy B to be legitimate law, the Laïciste feminist will now suffer from a Brutish or 
Tragic conscience, or both. In such cases, proponents of Policy B will also have a new 
reason to consider in their post-procedural analysis of Policy B. Let us call reasons 
associated with the Problem of Conscience RC.489  
We might think then, that with the utilization of sympathy, pre-procedural 
proponents of the ban on the Hijab must now consider reasons in RA, RP and RC while 
those opposed to it are called upon to consider RB, RP, and RC. However, sympathy 
accomplishes one further task. It makes proponents of Policy A more aware of the 
relevance of reasons bi to proponents of Policy B, and vice versa. In the context of the 
Hijab Controversy, this means that although individuals may believe that the 
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feminist in question is wrong in placing such great weight on a1 (i.e. the fact that 
headscarves are a form of subjugation), the very fact that she gives it such great 
weight gives others a reason to place greater weight on it. Their appraisal respect for 
her, combined with their awareness of the Duties of Deliberative Sympathy and 
Respectful Political Equality, and their awareness of the burdens of conscience, 
means they will place greater weight on aligning their views with those of certain 
perspectives that they themselves do not believe is the correct one. Similarly, since 
the feminist is also a sympathetic agent, the fact that others place more weight on b1 
or b2 gives her reason to increase the weight she gives to these, and thereby diminish 
the relative weight she places on a1. As long as the elements of RA and RB are 
compatible with reasonable comprehensive doctrines, each person must factor in a 
little bit of positive weight to all ai and bi.  
Note that although the Laïciste feminist may end up placing less relative weight 
on a1, the claim is not that, through sympathy, the feminist somehow comes to see a1 
as being less important. I am assuming here that her feminist beliefs are relatively 
stable, and that as a moral agent who believes in the autonomy of all women, she 
continues to maintain the same zeal for alleviating the subjugation of women. 
However, as a reasonable and rational, sympathetic citizen, she could increase her 
zeal for diminishing state paternalism, when she sees how important it is to her 
fellow citizens. This means that the weight she places on reason b1 will increase, 
thereby diminishing the relative weight she places on a1.  
It may be objected that this may not always be possible. For example, the 
Laïciste feminist’s commitment to a1 seems directly at odds with b2, the belief that for 
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some Muslim girls, wearing a headscarf is a part of their sense of autonomy. 
Undoubtedly, any increase in the weight the feminist ascribes to b2 will be tempered 
by the strength of her beliefs regarding a1. However, even in such a case, the feminist 
views those who support b2 as moral agents, and as a reasonable and sympathetic 
citizen, she endeavours to make some accommodation for their views in how she 
weighs her own.  
The basic idea is that sympathy introduces two new sets of concerns in 
individuals’ post-procedural evaluations of procedurally legitimate policy. There is 
the concern for the Problem of Conscience (i.e. the reasons in RC), and the belief that 
the Problem of Conscience ought to be minimized. In addition there is a process by 
which citizens offer a different set of weights to reasons (a1, a2,...an) and (b1, b2,...bk), in 
light of the weights that others offer these reasons. In doing so, the post-procedural 
aggregation of reasons from each citizens’ personal perspective will bring each 
citizen closer to convergence with every other citizen.  
Ideally, citizens may repeat the process of weighing reasons, using a reasonable 
procedure to aggregate across citizens, and then sympathetically re-evaluate them 
post-procedurally, until citizens’ views achieve complete convergence. In some ways, 
this may be the purpose of extended deliberation on policy alternatives over time. 
There is evidence, for example, that Americans’ attitudes towards abortion 
converged much more quickly towards general beliefs about its permissibility during 
the years directly after Roe v. Wade.490 There are of course several explanations as to 
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why this occurred. However, we might suppose that one of them is that as the 
debates about abortion became more public, Americans were better able to exercise 
their sympathetic faculties towards those who had favourable views towards it.491 
However, sympathetic liberalism also offers a mode of adjudication for the 
interim, when citizens’ views have not fully converged. The sympathetic liberal 
constructs a normative framework of justification by recognizing reciprocity and the 
obligations of cooperation. This means that in the absence of public justification, 
citizens must place significant weight on the free and equal status of their fellows. In 
the abortion case, we saw that the reason we could sympathetically justify the right 
to abortion is not the fact that abortion is publicly justifiable, but the fact that we 
could not give a free, moral agent reasons that justified interference from a shared 
perspective.  
It might seem at first glance that in such cases, sympathetic liberalism amounts 
to yet another defence of non-interference. When we cannot offer a reason to 
interfere, we simply defer to a person’s rights of non-interference. However, the 
‘deference’ of sympathetic public reason to a person’s freedom is consistent with 
offering the person numerous and wide-ranging reasons not to have an abortion, and 
demanding of the citizen that she be as sympathetic as she can towards those 
offering her these reasons. She is still asked to be sensitive to the fact that the legal 
permissibility of the abortion weighs upon the conscience of not only herself, but 
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upon her entire political society. She is still asked to consider the opposing moral 
point of view and to judge her action from these points of views in addition to her 
own perspective. It is only after weighing all of these reasons, that she can choose for 
herself whether or not to have an abortion.  
Furthermore, sympathetic liberalism does not justify non-interference in every 
instance. Non-interference is only required before citizens have fully converged in 
their views. One further complexity to the problem is that those Laïciste feminists 
who support the ban do so because young Muslim girls, who are told to wear 
headscarves by their parents, may never fully develop the requisite autonomy to 
claim that they have a right to non-interference on grounds of their free and equal 
status. The Laïciste feminist could argue that the entire point of banning the headscarf 
is to utilize collective power to transform individuals so that they have the 
opportunity for autonomous citizenship. They could further claim that those who are 
opposed to the ban are as unreasonable as the Hittite Lord who refused to recognize 
the free and equal status of his slaves. Unfortunately, neither pure public reason nor 
sympathetic public reason is equipped to adjudicate this further claim. Whether or 
not a traditional, religious upbringing is consistent with freedom in the sense of 
autonomy remains too complex a question to be resolved within the public sphere.  
At the very least, however, sympathetic public reason should be able to explain 
how it determines trade-offs between the rights of private individuals and 
associations (like families) and what I will call collective participation problems. In 
collective participation problems a general law is imposed on all citizens, despite the 
fact that some find it an unjustified interference on their freedom (e.g. when a Pacifist 
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experiences tax increases as a result of a humanitarian war effort). Collective 
participation problems differ from problems involving individual choices, in the 
sense that the justifiability of the objective is itself up for debate. While it may be 
possible to see why no free and equal citizen would want the state to justify 
prohibitions on what to wear and what to do with their bodies, it is not as 
straightforward to claim that no free and equal citizen would choose religious 
identity over autonomy, or vice versa.   
Before determining how trade-offs between individuals’ rights and policies 
requiring collective participation can be adjudicated by sympathetic public reason, 
we must determine what sorts of justifications can be offered for ‘collective 
participation’ itself. Collective participation problems recognize the fact that many 
uses of political power demand the participation of every member of the polity, if the 
legitimate objective is to be realized. The paradigm example of a situation of 
collective participation is that of the liberal Pacifist who is opposed to a war that is 
widely regarded as just, and which some reasonable citizens consider to be a 
humanitarian effort. Regardless of which course of action the collective chooses, 
either the Pacifist or the Humanitarian will suffer from the problems of conscience I 
have outlined. This is because every citizen directly or indirectly contributes to the 
war effort by contributing to the economy, paying taxes, and accepting the rewards 
of more patriotism, civil participation, etc. As a consequence, every citizen is asked to 
take responsibility for the fact that the war is legitimate. The collective decision not to 
fight a war also means that a citizen must participate in the daily life of a civil society 
that is showing disregard for the humanitarian demand to be involved. Either way, 
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some citizens will have to participate in practices that go contrary to their moral 
views. How can sympathetic public reason offer justifications to those who are so 
burdened, when no public justification is actually available? In section 6.3 I will look 
at collective participation problems by taking a closer look at the debate between the 
pacifist and the humanitarian, before trying in section 6.4 to determine how best to 
trade-off individual liberties with problems of participation.  
6.3: Pacificism and Humanitarian Wars 
In the case of Pacifism and Humanitarian wars, we find two citizens who disagree on 
whether or not a country ought to go to war. They both agree that the war is a just 
war. However, the Pacifist believes that the moral obligation to maintain peaceful 
relations and not take human life is sufficient reason not to fight any war, including a 
just war. By contrast the Humanitarian believes that in addition to the permissibility 
of fighting a just war, there is a strong moral requirement to intervene. Let us assume 
that the convictions of both the Pacifist and the Humanitarian are sufficiently strong 
to ensure that regardless of whatever course of action political society undertakes, 
someone will face the problem of the Tragic or a Brutish conscience.  
The case of the Pacifist and the Humanitarian may seem like a variation of the 
classic problem of publicly justifying a just war to a liberal Quaker.492 In that 
problem, a liberal Quaker recognizes the legitimacy of a given political institution 
whose procedures have determined that there ought to be a just war. According to 
pure public reason, since the institutions are legitimate, the Quaker also has the 
further obligation to follow the law, since civil disobedience and conscientious 
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refusal are only rights in nearly just societies.493 (I.e. if we assume completely just 
political institutions instead of nearly just political institutions, there cannot be any 
grounds for civil disobedience.) In this manner, pure public reason views the 
justification of a just war to a liberal Quaker as comparable to justifying abortion to a 
liberal Catholic.494 The problem consists in finding a set of suitably public reasons by 
which to justify a law for which there is a separate duty to obey.  
Sympathetic public reason interprets the problem rather differently. Firstly, it 
does not uphold the view that there is a natural duty to obey the laws of just 
institutions. As argued in Chapter 2, it recognizes that there may be a pro tanto 
obligation to obey legitimate law and even just law, but that all things considered 
reasons must be examined in a case-by-case basis in order to accommodate 
reasonable disagreement. Further, it does not see the problem of justification as a 
problem of acknowledging and overcoming the special non-public reasons that 
Quakers might have that prevent a justification.  
In the tradition of pure public reason, these special non-public reasons give 
Quakers license to engage in the practice of ‘witnessing’, in which they publicly bear 
witness to the ways in which legitimate law encroaches upon their private beliefs, 
while maintaining their obedience to the law in the name of the just institutions 
which generated it.495 Sympathetic public reason, by contrast, typically does not need 
to recognize the practice of witnessing since it does not view the reasons 
propounded by the Quaker as non-public. A citizen is asked to weigh all the reasons 
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against each other and determine whether a justification has or has not been 
achieved. Moreover, the fact that a public reason is in conflict with a person’s non-
public, moral commitments, is already a part of the larger Problem of Conscience. 
Therefore, the practice of bearing witness only needs to be undertaken by citizens 
who truly are not sure how they weigh their pure public reasons against other 
reasons. Witnessing may allow citizens to recognize that there are concerns not 
reflected in the legitimate decision. However, since they are not sure how these 
reasons ought to be weighed against other reasons, it need not generate a Problem of 
Conscience. 
Finally, introducing a believer of humanitarian intervention into the picture 
emphasizes the central problem as sympathetic liberalism conceives it. This is the 
problem that at times, a liberal polity will simply have to impose a Tragic or Brutish 
Conscience upon some of its citizens. If we assume reasonable disagreement, we can 
always postulate the existence of one reasonable citizen whose beliefs challenge the 
procedurally legitimate decision on conscientious grounds. The Humanitarian serves 
to show that no matter what the collective polity chooses, a Problem of Conscience 
will arise. We must determine what (if any) justificatory resources sympathetic 
liberalism has at its disposal for such situations. The larger question looming in the 
background is whether in the light of reasonable disagreement, the use of collective 
political power can ever justify courses of action that necessitate the involvement of 
all citizens.  
Let us first consider the case from the perspective of the Pacifist. If the liberal 
polity decides to engage in warfare, then the Pacifist appears to have a list of 
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legitimate complaints that she can take to her fellow citizens. First of all, they are 
using collective power towards an end which the Pacifist does not find reasonably 
justifiable. Moreover, they know she finds it immoral, and third, they know she will 
have to take responsibility for the legitimate use of power towards such ends. It 
seems that they are not treating her like a free and equal member of the cooperative. 
In fact, although they know that both the Pacifist and the Humanitarian are in similar 
circumstances, in the sense that each may be subject to a tragic or brutish conscience, 
the polity is choosing to trouble the Pacifist’s conscience and not the Humanitarian’s. 
Why is the Humanitarian’s point of view favoured? 
The Pacifist knows that if the polity respected the burdens upon her conscience 
then the Humanitarian could generate an analogous list of concerns. However, it is 
not immediately clear whether this is sufficient to justify burdening the Pacifist with 
a tragic or brutish conscience. The relationship between the Pacifist and the liberal 
polity to which she belongs parallels that of a promissee who has had a promise 
broken by a promisor. Just as we would expect the latter to show the former some 
degree of regret (and in some cases offer compensation), we would also expect a 
polity to do likewise for a citizen whose conscience is burdened because it cannot 
justify its legitimate policies to her non-public mode of reasoning.  
Throughout, I have talked about obligations like keeping one’s promises as pro 
tanto obligations that can be overridden when stronger, contrary reasons become 
operative (e.g. saving a human life.) However, there are also cases when it may not 
be clear which pro tanto reason overrides which others. What if a promisor has made 
two promises to two different people, genuinely believing that both promises could 
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be kept? If the promisor later realizes that the promises cannot be fulfilled 
simultaneously, then she would of course have to renege upon her promise to one 
promissee. However, a sympathetic promisor would at least show some regret at 
having to break a promise, as she can understand the disappointment felt by that 
other person.  
Similarly, when a sympathetic liberal polity cannot fulfil its promise of 
providing a reason to each citizen that she can reasonably be expected to endorse, for 
a pursuing a course of action, it too ought to feel a degree of regret, and make 
amends in the best way possible for all parties. If the legitimate procedures of public 
decision-making were to decide in favour of Humanitarian intervention, 
accommodations must be made in recognition of the Pacifist’s view. For example, the 
polity may choose to make funds available for other initiatives that reflect the 
Pacifist’s moral commitments. If there is a military draft in place, they might excuse 
identifiable Pacifists (e.g. Quakers) from service. While these actions on the part of 
the polity do not diminish the guilt or sense of responsibility the Pacifist might feel 
for the decision to wage a just war, they serve to show that the polity is sensitive to 
the burdens of conscience it is placing upon the Pacifist. Similar measures of 
accommodation would have to be taken on behalf of the Humanitarian, if the 
outcome of legitimate procedures were favourable to the Pacifist. In accommodating 
the views of those who do not find a course of action justifiable, the polity is striving 
to the best of its ability to treat all citizens as free and equal, although unjustifiably 
forcing some (e.g. the Pacifist) to participate in collective activities that the they find 
immoral.  
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In doing so, the polity may also be said to bear witness to the reasons 
recognized in the Pacifist’s moral view. Since sympathetic liberalism views both the 
Pacifist’s reasons and the Humanitarian’s reasons as public reasons, in taking up the 
view of both the Pacifist and the Humanitarian in turn, each member of the collective 
recognizes the weight of both commitments. Therefore, in situations of perfect or 
near perfect sympathy, each spectator should experience a moral dilemma. Although 
the two contrary commitments can be assigned weights privately, they cannot be 
assigned adequate weight in the public sphere. Therefore, regardless of what course 
of action a collective chooses, it must act as if it were one agent facing a moral 
dilemma.  
It follows that any time a collective cannot offer a justification to at least one 
citizen for its actions, the ability for sympathy will place members of the collective 
into a moral dilemma. If one citizen cannot accept a certain course of action B for 
reason RA ,and another cannot accept action A for reason RB, any sympathetic 
spectator observing both members of the collective will feel the forcefulness of both 
RA and RB. In seeing the conflict between reasons, and also by understanding why 
each citizen weighs the reasons as they do, any sympathetic spectator would also 
give both reasons substantial weight. While it would lead to deliberations of when 
RA is weightier than RB and vice versa, the conclusion may be that from the public 
perspective, there is simply no way to determine which is the weightier concern.  
In summary, the inability of a liberal polity to justify a position to a reasonable 
citizen generates two sorts of obligations: the first obligation is to the reasonable 
citizen herself. In order to continue to treat her like a free and equal reasonable 
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citizen despite the Problem of Conscience, the polity must accommodate her views in 
other ways. This shows that although she is not being offered a justification in this 
one instance, her relative status to other citizens remains one characterized by 
reciprocity. The second obligation requires acknowledging that the reason that a 
justification cannot be offered is because from the public perspective, there exists a 
moral dilemma. Although each individual citizen can resolve this dilemma from the 
private perspective (by offering a greater weight to RA or RB), the sympathy expected 
of citizens in the public sphere means they can recognize the immense importance of 
both conflicting reasons, and cannot determine a suitable way to determine which is 
of greater importance.  
The first of these two types of obligations might raise criticism on the ground 
that it seems to be a form of bargaining, rather than a real justification to pursue a 
particular policy. Trying to accommodate a citizen’s views on other policies suggests 
that the polity is aiming to compensate her, or win her cooperation in other ways. 
Even if the Pacifist is granted funding for other peace-keeping missions, this should 
not affect the responsibility she has towards this particular humanitarian 
intervention.  
Sympathetic liberalism can accept this criticism because the Pacifist herself 
identifies the existence of a public reason not to offer her a justification. Just as the 
practical situation of a promisor with two promises requires that a promise must be 
broken, the practical situation of the liberal polity means that a justification simply 
cannot be offered to all reasonable citizens. The complaints of the Pacifist are not 
critical of the practical situation itself. As a reasonable member of the polity, she 
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accepts that the practical situation cannot be helped, that in some cases there is 
simply no good justification available to all reasonable citizens. Rather, the content of 
her complaint is that as a consequence of the practical situation of the liberal polity, 
she is not being treated like a free and equal citizen engaged in a cooperative 
enterprise with her fellows. In offering accommodation, her fellow citizens 
demonstrate that they are willing to maintain the demands of reciprocity to the 
extent that they can.  
A further objection may be raised, however, that in offering accommodation 
rather than justification, a sympathetic account of public reason does not afford the 
same deep-seated normative agreement that Rawls originally intended. It may be 
objected that sympathetic liberalism merely offers a more sympathetic modus vivendi. 
If the Pacifist were in a position to insist on no intervention and compensate the 
Humanitarian, then she would have done so. Political forces simply happen to 
favour the Humanitarian in this case.  
This objection highlights the fact that pure public reason offers an answer to 
cases like just war and abortion that are generalizable to most cases. It claims that 
both are publicly reasonable in almost any liberal poltiy. By contrast, sympathetic 
liberalism really does not claim that just wars can always be legitimate or never be 
legitimate. It first appeals to a legitimate procedure, and then mandates post-
procedural compensation for those who strongly believe the procedure to generate 
an unjustifiable obligation. In this sense the decision may seem arbitrary.  
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However, the sympathetic liberal has achieved an ‘arbitrary’ decision that is 
sensitive to the deliberative struggle of every individual, aims to respect their 
consciences, and compensates them when this is not possible in a way that is 
consistent with their free and equal status. Pure public reason, by contrast, labels any 
citizen with strong non-public commitments as politically unreasonable. It denies 
justification to citizens who can easily make the strength of their non-public positions 
available to their fellow citizens. Instead, it asks politically unreasonable citizens to 
take the public perspective and recognize the reasonableness of the legitimate 
outcome.  
6.4: Individual Liberty vs. Collective Participation  
It may seem that the proposed reconciliation to the Pacifist vs. Humanitarian case 
misses one of the more central concerns raised by justifying collective participation 
problems. The problem is that if sympathetic liberals are committed to justifying all 
legitimate decisions to each citizen (i.e. from the citizen’s private perspective), then 
one liberal citizen is given a significant amount of veto power in determining which 
pieces of legislations are truly legitimate. For example, if the government is trying to 
increase taxes in order to set up a nationalized healthcare system, or trying to 
decrease overall pollution by regulating the amount of emissions sent into the air, 
then one individual who strongly believes that nationalizing healthcare is immoral, 
or that global warming does not warrant interference with individual decision-
making, will have it in his or her power to demand justifications and 
accommodations to suit their private views and needs.  
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The point of sympathetic liberalism is certainly to enable individual citizens’ 
moral concerns to be taken more seriously in the public sphere. Therefore, it may be 
the case that all citizens feel the political strain of having to justify what they see as 
obvious right to healthcare and environmental protection, to those with contrary 
moral commitments. This also encourages liberals to investigate the moral 
commitments of their own positions. In the case of healthcare, for example, the sense 
of justice may be a strong political ideal that leads towards legislation for affordable 
healthcare. However, beyond that sense of justice ought to lie the stronger concern 
for those citizens putting their well-being in jeopardy because they do not have 
adequate access to health care.  
I have argued earlier, however, that sympathetic liberalism is committed to 
greater respect for individual freedoms (as seen in the case of the abortion) when 
Problems of Conscience cannot or have not yet been resolved. In treating all 
individuals as free and equal, individuals must be given greater freedom to 
determine which restrictions they place upon their own life. The key point is that 
they must continue to behave as sympathetic, reasonable and rational individuals. 
When confronted with a serious need for collective participation, with an array of 
moral, scientific and socioeconomic reasons justifying a particular course of action, 
these individuals can no longer claim that the public reasoning goes against their 
private conscience, and that legitimate law is therefore not justifiable to them.  
In debates regarding religious expression in the public sphere, for example, a 
citizen cannot simply appeal to vague or abstract ideals such as autonomy, solidarity 
or liberty. Nor should they do so when propounding their reasonable non-public 
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views (i.e. the ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ of war in the case of the Humanitarian and 
the Pacifist.) While maintaining respect for these ideals and arguing in accordance 
with them, both parties must observe how these ideals translate into the facts of 
fellow citizens’ actual experience. Although more room is made for moral arguments 
in sympathetic public deliberation, the sympathetic imagination places the actual 
experience of citizens at the centre of the analysis. Smith’s sympathy is about 
imaginatively projecting oneself into another’s situation in order to measure whether 
their response is appropriate.496 Private morality is only given greater weight because 
it is a part of citizens’ well-being not to be subject to tragic and brutish consciences, 
and because there is more awareness of the struggle to reach one’s private moral 
standing.  
However, sympathetic liberalism need not sustain appeals to abstract moral 
concepts in response to a cry for help from citizens who can clearly be seen to be 
suffering. Although individuals are offered a great deal of liberty under sympathetic 
liberalism, they must also show their willingness to be other-regarding in order to 
maintain their status as reasonable citizens. Therefore, they may sometimes be called 
upon to accept higher taxes for collective participation problems, and interference 
with their own liberty. A sympathetic objection to these taxes needs to consist of a 
careful articulation of how a citizen’s private values continue to be sensitive to the 
recognized suffering of others, and why despite this recognition, the citizen’s 
conscience must oppose ways to alleviate the suffering. Pointing out the severe 
economic burdens imposed by affordable care may in some cases be a legitimate 
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claim offered by a sympathetic liberal against an increase in taxes. Possibly, concerns 
about spending and fiscal responsibility could play a role in a sympathetic objection. 
Demanding to know why one citizen ought to face increased taxes in order to assist 
another citizen, or maintaining an unsympathetic commitment to personal 
responsibility to justify why the government’s redistributive policies are unfair, 
simply will not display a sufficient amount of recognition for the disadvantages 
faced by fellow citizens.  
6.5: Conclusion  
The purpose of this final chapter has been to show how the sympathetic account of 
public reason I have defended in this dissertation, changes the dynamics of public 
discourse. It offers new tools to citizens with which citizens can justify their political 
positions. These tools are the sympathetic imagination, appraisal respect and the 
Duties of Deliberative Sympathy and Respectful Political Equality.  
These new features of liberalism remove the distinction between reasonable 
public and reasonable non-public reasons regarding political issues. Furthermore, 
they make the Duties of Deliberative Sympathy and Respectful Political Equality, 
duties that must be weighed against other duties to one’s fellow citizens. Finally, I 
have suggested that in cases where citizens have not figured out how to eradicate the 
Problem of Conscience, sympathetic liberalism will generally favour individual 
liberty.  
I made this final claim because sympathetic liberalism asks citizens to take 
seriously the free and equal status of other citizens, when imposing their views upon 
them. However, I must moderate this claim because individual liberty will not have 
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such favour in every instance. Whether or not individual liberty or some other 
outcome is the result of political deliberation depends entirely on more specific 
aspects of the political situation than individual citizens’ reasonable, rational and 
sympathetic natures. Individuals will show sympathy while weighing reasons 
against each other, and choose to morally accommodate each other’s views in ways 
that are situation-specific.    
All that is required of citizens is that when they engage in such deliberation, 
they must show that they have sympathetically considered the situation of those 
others with whom they disagree. For example, a woman choosing to have an 
abortion must still be willing to listen to the moral concerns of anti-abortion activists. 
A person who believes in Humanitarian intervention must be willing to 
accommodate the views of the Pacifist in other aspects of policy, wherever possible. 
The individual worried about the interference of government in raising taxes, must 
show that he or she is acutely aware of the struggles of other citizens which demands 
such redistribution.  
While procedures continue to legitimate most public decisions by offering 
strong pro tanto obligations to follow procedural outcomes, there is a process of 
post-procedural evaluation which determines whether the decision satisfies the 
justificatory requirements, and avoids being overly authoritative. This overcomes 
several of the limitations of pure public reason. More citizens actually agree with the 
content of legitimate laws (rather than simply agreeing with the law from a public 
perspective that they do not take to be their own perspective). Moreover, their moral 
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views are better accommodated in public deliberation, which still maintains the 
values of publicity, reciprocity and sympathy.  
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